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Abstract 
 
This research argues for a more nuanced understanding of the diverse 
motivations for diaspora movement and return. The study develops 
contemporary diaspora literature by critiquing the way that concepts of home 
and homeland are used, underscoring the overlooked importance of community 
engagement, and emphasising the role of racism and gender in return 
migration. Empirically, the argument draws on semi-structured interviews with 
84 male and female participants from the county of Devon, located within the 
southwest of England, in the United Kingdom, and 32 male and female 
participants who have returned to south Kurdistan. Alongside contributions to 
extant literature about migration and diaspora, the thesis also contributes to the 
fields of diaspora and migration studies by shedding light on the current state of 
the Kurdish diaspora in particular. Since Kurds have experienced increased 
autonomy in recent years, the thesis takes the opportunity to reflect on the 
familiar themes of home, community, identity and belonging in research on 
diaspora when long-held dreams of autonomy are finally realised. The thesis 
also makes suggestions for working alongside marginalized and disadvantaged 
people and supporting their struggle for equal citizenship. 
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Chapter One: INTRODUCTION  
 
1. Overview, Significance and Contribution of the Study 
Although a significant body of academic work exists on diasporic communities 
around the world, the purpose of this research on diaspora in Devon, a county 
in the southwest of England, United Kingdom, is to highlight the transnational 
dynamics of immigrants when long-anticipated dreams of political change in the 
homeland are finally reached. This research therefore contributes to and 
critiques notions of diaspora, based upon four key themes: diaspora 
experience; diaspora identity and belonging; community engagement; and 
return to the homeland, through a detailed study of the Kurdish diaspora living 
within the city of Plymouth and its outskirts, in the southwest of England, in the 
United Kingdom.     
 
Country of origin is often implied as ‘home’ or ‘homeland’ (Figure 1.1), and it 
has long been recognized as the wish of many displaced individuals to return to 
where they came from. Although these understandings endure until today, 
 
Figure 1.1  Map depicting various territorial of Kurdistan 
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many contemporary studies about refugees and diasporic communities 
challenge such static views regarding home and homeland and the connection 
between people and place, as these vary with the reality of exile. The reality is  
that with the passing of time, both the displaced person and the homeland are 
likely to undergo changes. These changes affect senses of ‘home’ and 
belonging, which might in turn have important consequences for the question of 
return. Questions such as “Where do I belong?” and “Would I still feel at home 
in my country of birth, or has the country I live in now become my new home?” 
might have gained importance.  
 
The Kurds have been denied what Barth describes as their “basic, most general 
identity” (Barth 1969:13). This chapter presents a general outline of the 
research, which is the study of Kurdish people in Devon as well as returnees to 
south Kurdistan (Kurdistan of Iraq - see Figure 1.1). The research sets out to 
examine diasporic experiences from multiple theoretical perspectives with a 
vision of capturing the nature of engagement, change or movement over time in 
the development of diaspora in the UK. This chapter has been assembled into 
eight sections: 1. Overview, significance and contribution; 1.2 Global context: 
why are these issues important?; 1.3 The Kurdish diaspora; 1.4 Experience in 
Devon; 1.5 Identity and belonging; 1.6 Community engagement; 1.7 Return; 1.8  
Structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Global context: why are these issues important?  
Contemporary debate within geopolitical and social arenas has involved 
arguments regarding the implications and consequences of the global 
phenomenon of increasing human mobility. Mobility of people raises questions 
regarding identity, social cohesion, integration and multiculturalism. To 
understand the migration and diaspora issue is to transcend social and cultural 
borders, taking into consideration the moral and legal responsibilities of both 
home and host country and the transnational diaspora. Globalisation has 
contributed to the development of the world in social, economic and cultural 
ways; it has defined the very nature of society. The way migration has occurred 
is of significance not only to those living within diasporic communities, but also 
to those as hosts. Global security is under constant scrutiny and those in 
diaspora are increasingly being met with suspicion. Forced migration due to 
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conflict and war is at its highest level since the Second World War. UNHCR’s 
Global Trends report finds 65.3 million people were displaced from their homes 
by conflict and persecution at the end of 2015, compared to refugees were 
estimated at 16.7 million by the end of 2013, up from 15.2 million in 2011 
(UNHCR, 2016). People internally displaced by conflict and violence were 
estimated at 33.3 million by the end of 2013, up from 26.4 million in 2011 (DMC, 
2014). The war on terror and the development of ISIS is causing a global 
humanitarian crisis as the above figures demonstrate, so it is important to 
understand the experience of those in diaspora in relation to successful 
community cohesion and integration working in partnership with key actors to 
build trust to facilitate stability in the local and wider community. 
 
The Kurdish matter has been widely debated, and has attracted significant 
global attention during the rise of ISIS, specifically in the region of Iraq and 
Syria. The reason lies in the various political events that have taken place in the 
region of the Middle East as well as the Kurdish diaspora’s transnational 
activities. Since this research began in September 2012, much has happened in 
South Kurdistan, the political and economic situation of south Kurdistan has 
radically transformed, particularly following the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
   
This research will evaluate and assess the engagement, integration and 
experiences of the Kurdish diaspora in Devon, in order to understand the 
moving position of Kurds from “victimhood” in the country of origin to “animated 
residence” in Devon, incorporating the views of first and second generation 
Kurds. The study of the Kurdish diaspora in Devon is important, since Kurdish 
refugees are from a country of origin (i.e. Kurdistan) that has never formally 
existed. This research explores the intersections of experience in diaspora, 
identity and belonging, community engagement, and return which constitutes 
the central conceptual framework for this study. Having grown up with a 
fanatical Kurdish identity in diaspora, returnees move back to south Kurdistan 
for varying reasons. However, the majority of the interviewed participants 
discovered living in South Kurdistan in the long term as a challenging 
experience and most returnees keep transnational connections.   
 
14 
 
This study focuses on the thoughts, considerations and negotiations of Kurdish 
diasporian people in Devon after the fall of the Iraqi regime in 2003. The 
aspects evolving around the questions of if, how and when diasporian people 
return, stay or circulate are analysed within the context of given relationships to 
other diaspora members and relatives in the UK and in the homeland, together 
with other factors in the decision-making process.  Furthermore, the varied but 
central role of return and experiences of returnees in relationships between 
family members and relatives in homeland and the UK will be discussed. 
 
1.3 The Kurdish Diaspora  
 In the last few decades there has been an increased interest in the notion of 
diasporas among academics (Lie 1995; Brah 1996; Carter 2005). Diaspora has 
become a very contentious issue within the political arena. The term diaspora is 
derived from the ancient Greek verb meaning to “sow over” (Cohen 1997:ix). 
The conception of diaspora originated from the dispersal of the Jews from their 
 
Figure 1.2 Map presented at the conference of San Francisco                   Source: Kurdistanica.com 
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historic homeland, but in more recent history has become more commonly 
associated with the Kurds and other refugee communities, as well as being  
often used to describe various well established communities (Cohen 1997; 
Safran 1991; Clifford 1994). Cohen highlighted that “the Jews provide the 
source for most characterisations of the diasporic condition” (1997:xi). 
Collective action and creation of collective identities are thus central elements in 
the diaspora and characterises all diaspora groups. I define diaspora as a 
complex social process characterised on the one hand by deterritorialisation 
and feelings of alienation, homelessness and homesickness, and on the other 
hand collective action and creation of collective identity around issues of home 
(country) and community formation. The Kurdish identity has been the subject 
of several studies (Hassanpour 1995; Alinia 2004; Khayati 2008).  Kurdish 
migration according to Sheikhmous (1990) can be traced back to the 17th and 
18th Century. 
 
After the First World War, the Kurds began to go through the different forms of 
migratory movements, refugees, internal displacement and migrant workers 
(figure 1.2). During the 1960s, many Kurds from Turkey arrived in other 
countries as migrant labour, particularly Germany, while a large number of 
Kurds fled to neighbouring countries as a result of increasing armed conflict and 
persecution in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1960. During the middle of the 1900’s large 
numbers of Kurdish workers and students migrated to Europe, in contrast to 
 
Figure 1.3 Kurdistan is not Iraq                                                       Source: www.pkc.org.uk 
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previous migratory movements of Kurds, which were internal to Kurdish regions 
of neighbouring countries. Kurdish refugee migration to Europe, including the 
United Kingdom, began mainly in the 1980s as a consequence of a changed 
political situation in Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran. 
Figure 1.3 illustrates that Kurdish people do not want to be part of Iraq. 
Diasporic Kurds living outside their ancestral homeland are ‘allowed to vote’ for 
the central Iraqi Parliament (Collyer 2013), however they cannot vote for a 
Kurdish Parliament in South Kurdistan. 
 
1.3.1 Identity of Kurdish Diaspora 
The issues of identity, home, citizenship, and belonging are particularly acute 
for Kurds, as many, particularly in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria, feel they have 
been the victims of continuous discrimination, exclusion and marginalisation for 
over a century (Wahlbeck 1998; Hassanpour 1995; Khayati 2008; Alinia 2004). 
Within Western countries, there appears to be a distinction between the first 
generation groups of Kurds and the second and third generation of Kurds. In 
spite of this, all Kurds in the UK and Western states have had to experience and 
still are experiencing exile and statelessness (Wahlbeck 1998; Alinia 2004). 
 
Many diasporic Kurds, both in the United Kingdom and in other countries 
globally have realised that they no longer need to be Turks, Iraqi, Iranian or 
Syrian, as they have discovered their own Kurdish identity following their 
migration to other countries. The Kurds are the largest stateless ethnic group 
globally. Although the Kurdish community in the UK, and more broadly in the 
West, has a comparatively short history compared to other diasporic 
communities. Wahlbeck has argued that “the notion of transnationalism is not 
enough if one wants to describe the specific experiences of Kurdish refugees in 
exile […] the concept of diaspora gives a more detailed description of this 
transnational community” (1998:11).   
 
The Kurdish national identity has been studied by many Kurdish scholars, who 
have argued that the diasporic experience has allowed the Kurdish people in 
diaspora to have multiple identities rather than one based primarily on a very 
strong connection to their homeland (Hassanpour 1995; Wahlbeck 1998; 
Ahmadzadeh 2003; Alinia 2004; Khayati 2008). Several studies argue that 
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nationalism is a force and resource promoting national identities both in the 
nation state and also among nations without states (Griffiths 2002; Emanuelson 
2005; Billig 1995; Sheikhmous 2000). While there has never been a state called 
Kurdistan, the term Kurdistan has been used since the 12th century (Van 
Bruinessen 1992). As McDowall suggests, today “Kurdistan exists within 
relatively well-defined limits in the minds of most Kurdish political group[s]” 
(McDowall 2004:3).  
 
The term ‘Kurdishness’ has been used consistently among Kurdish 
communities and political party speeches in diaspora, as well as in Kurdistan. 
This identity of Kurdishness or Kurdayati has been highly developed in the 
diaspora. The identities of Kurdish diaspora in the UK are multi-layered 
identities where different religions, classes, and languages crisscross with other 
identities, particularly with political identity. Schmidinger states that “Kurdish 
national identity could be created only alongside other regional, political, 
sectarian, or tribal identities” (2011:23). Consequently the identity of 
Kurdishness or Kurdayati for Kurds in diaspora and in Kurdistan plays an 
important role. Transnational exchanges among the Kurds became more 
established after the autonomous Kurdish administration in northern Iraq in 
1990 onward, while the UK, among other European countries, played a 
substantial role in the illustration and crystallisation of the Kurdish diaspora.  
 
Transnational identities among the Kurdish diaspora generally do not replace 
nationalist ones. Sheffer 2006 argues that nationalism, in addition to 
ethnonationalism, can be increased throughout ethnonational diasporas;  
 
“…one of the main arguments in favour of considering 
ethnonational diasporas as distinct from all other transnational 
entities is that the new forms of transnationalism and globalisation 
have by no means eliminated the perseverance, and even the 
strengthening, of ethnicity, nationalism, and ethnonationalism. 
Ethnonationalism continues to have a significant role and a 
considerable impact in most states and among most of “their” 
dispersed populations living outside the national borders. In view of 
this persistence of ethnonationalism and of the ethnic revival 
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worldwide, the diaspora phenomenon should be separated from the 
general phenomenon of transnationalism and from discussions of 
that phenomenon”(2006:126).  
 
The UK, among other European countries, has provided a constructive 
environment for Kurds in diaspora in establishing and developing their cultural 
and social identity. As a result many Kurdish associations and projects have 
been established within the UK to provide a voice for Kurds in exile. The 
Kurdish Community Centre (KCC) in London is the oldest association and was 
established around 1980s to support Kurds in Britain. Soon after, almost every 
major city in the UK where Kurds live (Manchester, Birmingham, Bristol, 
Glasgow, Cardiff, Derby, Leeds, Plymouth, Exeter) established associations or 
projects to support the Kurdish community, while some of these associations 
have had direct influence upon Kurdish political parties. Khayati states that “the 
political allegiances that exist in Kurdistan have a profound influence on the 
political and associational organizations of the Kurds in the diaspora” (2006:10).  
    
 Many scholars have addressed significant differences between older 
generations who migrated as adults and younger generations, who were born or 
raised in diaspora. The present research outlines the changes that those 
generations encountered over time. Nevertheless, my research demonstrates 
that the need for homeland, identity and a sense of belonging are constant. In 
 
Figure 1.4 The Kurdish population in the European States    Source: Institute Kurd in Paris 1995 
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conjunction with nationalism, it is the key context that constructs a national and 
collective identity among Kurds living outside of the Kurdish region.  
 
1.3.2 The Kurdish Diaspora in the UK  
The Kurdish diaspora in the UK is part of a Kurdish migration to Europe and 
there are a considerable number of Kurds living in the UK. The most recent UK 
national census (2011) and other countries in Europe did not ask for the Kurdish 
ethnicity. According to the Institute Kurde in Paris (IKiP), in 1995 it estimated 
the Kurdish population in the European states as show in the figure 1.4.  
 
These numbers are estimated and the likelihood is that the population of 
Kurdish diaspora in these countries has been growing in the last two decades. 
The report published by the Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP) in 2006 
stated that “an estimated 100,000 Kurds live in the UK” (KHRP 2006:1). 
According to Bagikhani (et al.) the “Kurdish populations in the UK could be 
between 130,000 and 300,000” and the Kurdish people living in “London is 
estimated at 60,000 to 80,000” (2010:30).  
 
Kurdish migration to the UK boomed during the 1980s and 1990s (Baser, 2011; 
Akkaya, 2011), especially from Iraq as a result of conflict between the two 
political parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK). The Kurdish community in the European states are different. 
Germany, is considered to be the largest state for Kurdish diaspora in Europe,  
mainly from the Kurdish region of Turkey, while the UK and Sweden are the 
prominent destinations for Kurds from Iraq. The Kurds have settled across the 
UK and have established many organisations as well as cultural heritage 
projects to support the Kurdish community and build the awareness of Kurds 
within the wider community in the UK.  
 
Kurdish diaspora has become a progressively significant geo-political arena for 
Kurdish politics. The Kurdish transnational migration has continued as a result 
of the oppressive policies of Syrian, Turkish, Iranian and Iraqi states against the 
Kurdish people (Wahlbeck 1998).  
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Kurdish diaspora plays an important role in cultural and political developments 
as well as awareness of Kurdish people around the globe. The most recent 
Kurdish refugees joining the exile community in the UK and European states 
are the Syrian Kurds. This is as a result of the consequences of the political 
uprising in Syria (2012), which was part of the Arab Spring in the Middle East, 
and due to the war with ISIS that has led refugees to join the diasporic 
community. 
  
Many Kurdish people in the UK believe they will return to their homeland once 
Kurdistan achieves independence. The latest development in the Kurdish region 
of Iraq has built transnational relations between Kurds in diaspora. Safran 
states that “when the conditions are appropriate, they or their descendant[s] 
would (or should) eventually return to their ancestral home land” (1991, in 
Akkaya, 2011:5). The Kurdish universities and hospitals, among other 
departments within the Kurdistan Regional Government in north Iraq, have been 
welcoming the Kurdish people in diaspora to join the process of nation building 
in the Kurdish region of Iraq. Akkaya has highlighted that “those who have 
returned are mainly academics and politicians and they [occupy] positions 
mostly in the newly established universities and in the governmental offices” 
(2011:5). There is still no diaspora department within the Kurdistan Regional 
Government to tackle the issue of Kurdish people in diaspora. However, 
according to the Plymouth Kurdish Community (PKC) (2012) there has been an 
increase in the number of people returning to Kurdistan of Iraq since 2004, the 
total number of people returning from Plymouth between 2004 and 2011 is 
more than 600 people. Evidence from my research suggests that there will be 
an increase in returnees if Kurdistan becomes an independent state. Many 
Kurds in the UK are waiting to get British citizenship to return under the 
protection of UK citizenship overseas policy. The Kurds in diaspora continue to 
maintain the belief that the independence of Kurdistan will benefit all Kurds. 
  
Women are making a valuable impact on their nations of origin, but also they 
are particularly dedicated to improving and building a life for their families and 
communities in the UK. Singh states that “Engagements with various 
organisations have given many of these women the space to expand the 
discourse around women’s rights through activities focused on women’s 
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education, health and well-being” (2010:38). As a result of that the UK and other 
states have created a safe space for women in diaspora to understand the 
rights and freedoms of women within society. Further, several organisations and 
projects that support Kurdish women have been established in the UK and 
European states, to empower the voice of Kurdish women and educate Kurdish 
women in diaspora and the homeland. 
 
Diaspora studies have allowed the development of an awareness of the 
experiences of Kurdish diaspora immigrants. Theories of transnationalism are 
useful for understanding the Kurdish diaspora. As Vickerman has observed, 
“…transnationalism, by orienting immigrants back to their homelands, 
strengthens ethnicity and slows the process of assimilation” (2001:220). 
Transnationals maintain “identities that extend across national borders and 
involve participation in both their home countries and new societies of 
settlement” (Swigart 2001:3).  
 
The relevance of global migration to Plymouth is the noticeable increase of 
migration to the South West. Black and ethnic minorities in Plymouth rose from 
3% in 2001 to 6.7% in 2011, more than doubling in a decade (Ethnic groups 
2001 & 2011 Census). Plymouth`s designation as a dispersal city under the 
1999 Immigration and Asylum Act has caused a volume of immigration that 
would normally take generations. Such a fast change can exacerbate 
community tensions. Jon Burnett’s (2011) study of how geographies of racism 
are changing in a wider climate of economic challenges in the UK, has shown 
how changing patterns of migration and settlement form increasingly varied 
racist responses, exacerbating national policies. Burnett’s research findings 
have shown that although historically Plymouth has had a comparatively small 
Black Minority and Ethnic (BME) population, the demography of the city has 
changed significantly over the past ten years, leaving particular communities 
isolated and vulnerable to racist attacks. The IRR News Team (2011) was 
critical of Burnett’s research, noting the lack of local and national political will to 
challenge the causes of racist attacks, arguing that the official response to 
racism has historically been one of denial and that of downplaying the severity 
of racial violence. There has been a commitment to projects aimed at fostering 
community cohesion and diverting focus away from racial violence in Plymouth, 
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however the current economic climate has forced certain key agencies 
providing support services to close down (ibid). 
  
This study will contribute to the fields of diaspora and migration studies by 
shedding light on the current state of diaspora. It will further develop 
contemporary diaspora literature. This will include a critique of contemporary 
understandings of the experience of diaspora, identity and belonging in 
diaspora, development among diaspora through community engagement and 
finally an addition to diaspora studies via return and experiences of return.  
Moreover, this research examines the ways social specialists can work with 
marginalized and disadvantaged people and endorse their struggle for equal 
citizenship beyond discriminatory and racist experiences. The participants in 
this study confront ethnic discrimination in a range of ways including 
interpersonal discourses, strengthening differences among the self and the 
other, and deliberately ignoring racism. 
 
Figure 1.5  North, South, East and West of Kurdistan                      Source: www.pkc.org.uk 
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The Kurdish question has gained momentum since the Second World War 
within the academic community. This study seeks to focus on the Kurdish 
diaspora in Devon, particularly around the ideas of return, after the 
establishment of greater autonomy for Kurds in south Kurdistan (see figure 1.5), 
as a result of the Invasion of Iraq in 2003. The contributory factors that brought 
Kurds to Devon were predominantly conflict within their homeland against 
Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, the Gulf War and the civil war between 1994-
1998. These have all contributed to the departure of thousands of Kurds from 
Iraq to seek protection in different countries around world. The Chilcot (2016) 
report has pointed out that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 left chaos and a power 
vacuum, which was due to the lack of security and led to widespread looting 
and a growing insurgency. The UK is a major destination country which 
provides a safe and protected place for Kurds and other refugees. The city of 
Plymouth in Devon has been designated as a dispersal city under the 1999 
Asylum and Immigration Act. As a result of that designation, the largest ethnic 
minority living in Plymouth is Kurdish (PKC 2012). The Kurdish community in 
the UK has been part of the global Kurdish movement, though has faced many 
challenges a  nd problems. Especially in last two decades, the number of Kurds 
from northern Iraq seeking asylum in the UK has increased dramatically. When 
talking about immigration, it is important to see who moves, when, how, where 
and under what circumstances (Brah 1996). 
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KEY THEMES 
The central objective of this thesis is to contribute to the literature on diaspora, 
migration and community engagement in the UK. It aims to explore ethnic 
identity within a diaspora context and to develop our understanding of the 
process of diaspora return. I will now discuss each of these in more detail (see 
also table 1). 
Table 1:  Key Research Questions  
Themes Critiques of existing literature 
and research:  
Contribution of this 
research: 
 
Experience  Literature does not focus 
sufficiently on everyday racism 
in places of residence in host 
society. 
My study examines racism 
in Devon. It emphasises the 
demographic, intellectual 
and negative experiences 
of diaspora. 
Identity and 
Belonging:  
i. Dream of 
reality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii. Home  
 
i. Existing literature seldom 
discusses what happens 
when long anticipated dream 
of political change comes 
about. 
 
 
 
 
ii. The diaspora literature 
sometimes conflates identity 
and home, the diaspora 
literature reifies home. 
i. I have studied Kurdistan 
during a period of 
increasing autonomy. 
This has enabled me to 
examine some familiar 
questions in the diaspora 
studies field – like home, 
identity, belonging, and 
engagement - from this 
unique perspective. 
ii. There are multiple forms 
of identity in diaspora 
multiple places can be 
called home. 
Community 
Engagement 
Existing literature does not 
examine the consequences of 
not having a community 
engagement policy. In 
particular, it does not examine 
this when there is a national 
policy that is not implemented 
locally. 
This study examines the 
consequences of a lack of 
community engagement 
policy. What is the primary 
consequence? A lack of 
trust.  
Return  There is not enough literature 
on women and children’s 
experiences of return 
migration. In particular the 
experiences of women and 
children returning from western 
to non-western contents and 
the freedoms they leave 
behind, is neglected in current 
scholarship. 
I focus on women’s and 
children’s experiences, 
characterised by feeling 
forced, disappointment, and 
frustration. 
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1.4   Experience in Diaspora 
The aims of Chapter Four, on experience in diaspora, are as follows:   
 To explore how the demographics of a rural county impact on diaspora 
experience especially in relation towards racism and discrimination. 
 To investigate whether intercultural integration in the host country has 
benefits towards building and improving the relationship between diaspora 
people and the host population.  
 To understand the positive and negative experiences in diaspora. 
Studies on diaspora and migration have addressed the failure to situate the 
experiences of new migrants and long-standing residents within the place they 
live and interact. These studies tend to be dynamic in nature, charting migrant 
and diaspora experiences through time, or by contrasting associated outcomes 
in different places. Literature on acculturation has dedicated itself to 
understanding and describing the ways in which majority attitudes towards 
multiculturalism impact on the acculturation strategies of migrants. This 
literature does not, however, focus on lived day-to-day, experiences of racism in 
the place of residence in the host country.  
 
My research identifies that the demographics of the rural county of Devon has 
significant impact upon the experience of diasporic communities, with hidden 
racism. The contribution to literature is data that underpins ‘day-to-day’ racism, 
especially towards first and female generation migrants in Devon, who are more 
exposed to cultural differences.  
  
Exile for some diasporian people has implied traumatic experiences; however at 
the same time it has given them a space and the possibilities to establish their 
movement and identity. Some diasporian people have faced an otherness and 
alienation during the ethnic cleansing, violence and other traumatic experiences 
in their homeland, but also feel unwelcome in a new society where they have 
encountered racism on a constant basis. 
  
The data from participants demonstrates that intercultural integration in the host 
country has many benefits such as building and improving the relationship 
between the people of the host and diasporian homelands. Almost all the 
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participants in diaspora have experienced cultures within both societies, and  
acculturation toward a host culture is a reflexive process, in that it occurs in 
synchronicity with a partial, temporary or incremental ‘deculturation’ away from 
a native culture. Many participants in this study emphasized that cultural events 
and awareness are a roadmap to integration within the host society. This 
concurs with Vertovec’s view of diaspora as a social form, as a type of 
consciousness, and as a way of producing cultural awareness. 
 
My research explores the positive and negative experiences of diaspora in the 
rural county of Devon, which has distinctive demographic differences to other 
cities across the UK, such as London, Bristol and Birmingham. Challenges that 
are faced for members of the diaspora, include integration, cohesion, and 
racism. This research has identified a feeling of alienation among the Kurdish 
diaspora, and that “they [still] believe they are not – and perhaps cannot be – 
fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly alienated and 
insulated from it” (Safran 1991:83). The experiences respondents recounted, 
particularly around racism and discrimination, contributed to the feeling of 
alienation within the host community. Further, it was found that many 
respondents under-reported incidents of racism and discrimination, due 
primarily to the lack of trust within the local community. 
 
1.5 Identity in Diaspora 
The aims of  Chapter Five, about identity in diaspora, are:       
 To understand and analyse the formation of the informants’ identity, and 
the way their identity is developed in diaspora.  
 To investigate the impact of British culture on the informants’ identity. 
 To investigate whether the informants’ have developed an in-between 
cultural identity or have formed identities that are part of both cultures.  
 
Literature on diaspora and migrants has discussed the notion of identity, 
belonging, and hybridity within diaspora and how they are related to notions of 
home, ethnic identity, and homeland. It is evident that the notions of identity 
differ strongly depending on connections between individuals and within groups. 
The concept of belonging raises the issue of an emotional attachment to a 
homeland, a place of origin, whether imagined or real.   
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My study illustrates that identity and belonging in diaspora is more than having 
an affiliation/attachment to a host country, it is about attaining identity status, 
which was denied in the homeland. Participants when asked the question 
‘where are you from?’ responded with pride towards their ancestral homeland. 
The contribution to literature is important not only as a result of a connection to 
the past, but also to the present. It is significant as it determines who they are in 
their own eyes. The research indicates that identity was either important or very 
important and for many, identity provided a sense of rootedness and is 
symbolically connected to their heritage, history, culture and ancestry.  
 
Although home and homeland has a central place within diaspora studies, I 
advocate a broader focus on multiple forms of identity, due to these issues 
being intimately related to the question of belonging. I also advocate a more 
critical view of home. Experiences of Kurds often make it difficult for them to feel 
at home in one single place, individuals often develop a sense of belonging in 
multiple ways in which numerous places can be called home.  
 
Some participants in diaspora felt they had new identities in the host country 
that was denied to them in their homeland. This sense of identity was in relation 
to the community and society that participants lived in, where they could 
practise their own cultural beliefs and ethnic identity without fear of exclusion or 
reprisals, giving them a sense of belonging and ownership. However where 
some diasporas felt included into society and enjoyed the new opportunities that 
this afforded them, others felt confusions and conflicts about their identity or 
claimed they had a dual identity, for some this contributed to a sense of loss 
and exclusion from both host and homeland. 
 
The data from participants interviewed demonstrates that belonging to place 
and identity are in relation to home and where the participant’s family are 
residing. Some participants said that it was of greater significance to have the 
family living together, this became a home with a sense of belonging and 
identity to that society. A large proportion of interviewees felt they had dual 
identities, wanting to retain the identity of their parents or their own place of birth 
as well as their diaspora society. Participants had an allegiance to both host 
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and homeland and wanted their own children to retain a dual identity, though for 
some returning to homeland was not considered an option. 
 
Identity for participants was important, it gave stability and rootedness 
belonging to diaspora society, and gave identity or dual identities to participants 
who valued the host society for being a vehicle to explore their own ethnic 
identity. This sense of belonging and identity is key to successful diaspora 
integration into the host society.  
 
1.6 Community Engagement   
The aims of  Chapter Six, about community engagement, are:       
 To understand and analyse how key actors engage with diaspora groups, 
and how the new diaspora groups integrate and engage within the host 
society.  
 To understand what kinds of policies, plans, outlines and strategies key 
actors/institutions have towards diaspora communities. 
 To investigate a broader concept of the true engagement of diasporic 
community from the perspective of difference.    
The increased interest among researchers and policy makers in community 
engagement and recent literature evokes that having a voice in the community 
and feeling a sense of empowerment gives diaspora groups a stronger devotion 
to their local area. Studies in this field noted the challenges of bringing 
communities together. Existing literature explains that diversity and cohesion, in 
relation to national cohesion policies, asserting identity and challenging 
prejudice, can be exclusive as well as inclusive for those regarded as ‘others’. 
What the literature lacks is analysis of the consequences of not having a 
community engagement policy.   
  
Community engagement and community cohesion have become focal points for 
government policy. The findings of my research clearly illustrate that within local 
government (Plymouth) there is a lack of policy which is in line with national 
policy and has no clear strategic plan. The lack of such a resource has created 
mistrust among the diasporic community, believing that the lack of community 
strategy is a deterrent to community engagement. This is an important 
contribution to diaspora literature, as Devon is a relatively new destination and 
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the disparity between planning and modelling policy within Plymouth compared 
to other major cities is apparent. The data illustrates well-defined differences 
between diaspora communities which are established and new arrivals in 
diaspora. The attention in the media since the increased threat of terrorism 
since 7/7 further compounds the need for successful community engagement. 
  
Community engagement applies to the manner by which both individuals and 
organisations within a community create ongoing, permanent relationships with 
the intention of applying a collective vision for the advantage of a community 
and to promote community engagement. Recent research has found that having 
a voice in the community and feeling a sense of empowerment gives black and 
ethnic minority groups a stronger devotion to their local area. 
 
There are quite distinctive characteristic differences between new arrivals and 
the ethnic groups established in settled communities. The new community feels 
excluded from the new environment as a result of cultural differences affecting 
representations, while often their voice is not heard due to language barriers. 
 
As the movement of people crossing borders in search of safety, security and 
increased opportunities has increased, policy makers are faced with the 
challenge of migration policies from a narrow vision of control to the wider vision 
of management. This study can be used to critically review British local and 
national policies and the model of community engagement that influences 
diaspora communities.  Integration is one of the important phases of community 
cohesion and since 2001 community cohesion has been one of the most 
significant policies and has generated a range of responses from researchers, 
policy and practitioner communities.  
 
A further key context in which migration in Plymouth needs to be understood is 
the cohesion policies of the UK government.  Zetter(et al. 2006) explain 
diversity and cohesion, in relation to national cohesion policies, asserting 
identity and challenging prejudice can be exclusive as well as inclusive for those 
regarded as ‘others’. Examples of exclusionary attitudes in this context include 
issues in more recent years surrounding Islamophobia, however through 
citizenship processes there is the possibility for ‘others’ to sign up to  
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governmental social cohesion policies. This strategic choice places them on an 
inside track to influence policy agendas. However, other groups are strongly 
opposed to Britishness conceived in terms of citizenship, arguing that cohesion 
is less about accommodating diversity with shared social values and aims, but 
more crucially about issues of justice and equality of opportunity where ethnic 
minorities remain disadvantaged (Zetter et al, 2006).  
Diaspora groups are often described by public and private sector agencies as 
‘hard to reach’. However, my data shows that integration may be motivated by a 
desire to contribute to community cohesion policies and establish cultural 
connections with the place of residence. Many participants are involved within 
their local community to actively engage and participate within the new host 
society. The data shows that engagement with black and ethnic minorities is a 
slow process and takes time to build connections and trust amongst diaspora 
groups, this is compounded by the lack of localised diversity policy and training. 
 
Limitations in understanding law and culture in their place of residence was 
seen by some first generation diaspora as barriers to community engagement. 
Many of the participants were proud of their roots but identified that changes 
were needed due to the different social and cultural environments if they wished 
to assimilate into a new host society. 
  
This study shows there are concerns that organisations which work with 
diaspora groups are not genuinely committed to the importance of ethno-
cultural diversity, and that new diaspora groups have often been ignored or 
discounted by them. Therefore, as a result groups have not had incentive to be 
involved in the process of community engagement, and there is a substantial 
distinction between Plymouth as a rural city and other major UK’s cities in this 
regard.   
 
1.7 Return  
The aims of  Chapter Seven, about return, are:       
 To investigate how the diasporian imagination and discourse about return 
to the ancestral homeland, and identify the reasons prohibiting return. 
 To understand the impact and experience of return within families, 
particularly women and young people. 
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 To explore diasporian experiences from their homeland and difficulties in 
re-integrating into mainstream society.   
 
Literature on diaspora and migrants has extensively discussed the question of 
return. The concept of return has been a difficult subject, particularly for those 
considering the return to their ancestral homeland. Likewise, several studies 
have addressed the importance of temporality and circularity of return 
movements.   
 
The contribution of this study to existing literature illustrates the return 
experiences of women and young people. It focuses on the differing 
experiences within traditional social stereotypical roles in return, the clash of 
westernised ideals from diaspora with actual experiences, and the reintegration 
of diaspora returnees to the ancestral homeland.  
  
The findings of this study have identified that returnees faced many challenges 
in readjusting; this was especially related to family conflicts and weak 
interactions with the non-returnee population of the country. Male returnees had 
more political challenges than female returnees but it was also found that male 
returnees suffered less socio-cultural related adjustment problems than female 
returnees did. 
 
Some diaspora returnees have emphasized the feeling of responsibility, 
commitment and obligation they feel towards their land of ancestry, 
demonstrating the need to contribute or give back to their homeland. Young 
people particularly often said this in light of the expertise, abilities and skills they 
gained while living abroad. They felt they had a greater sense of obligation and 
responsibility as they felt, or others perceived, they had a privileged position 
living in a host country with greater opportunities. 
  
Responses from participants highlighted that the choice to return back to south 
Kurdistan may be motivated by a desire to contribute to the homeland’s 
redevelopment, building foundations for Kurdistan’s future independence (see 
chapter 7), and that it is eventually triggered by particular opportunities that 
emerge empowering them to do so. Many participants returned when particular 
32 
 
vocational opportunities arose, usually within politics, business or educational 
and health services. The explanation for some returnees was identified as the 
realisation that successful career mobility in the UK or other European countries 
was limited. It was felt they could not make a contribution in their diasporic 
place of residence, either in light of the fact that the system is well-functioning or 
on the grounds that their own resources are not perceived and recognized. 
 
The idea of return is one of the main themes of the research. This study has 
shown how Kurds speak and think about a return to their homeland (Kurdistan), 
and examines what factors prevent or discourage a permanent return to their 
homeland. It is also important to recognise that return experiences are different 
within the family context. Women and children within the family unit may have 
very different experiences of return. Women who have lived in western 
countries may have to face a very different society where their liberty and 
freedom is restricted. Children who have been born in a diasporic country may 
well be westernised and find the prospect of returning to a very different culture 
and society a daunting prospect. 
  
With the increase of diaspora returnees to homeland, South Kurdistan faces 
both challenges and opportunities in the present period of expanding stability 
and strength. Those returning, return with dreams and aspirations of the ideal 
society, demonstrated by the political frameworks and societal qualities that 
were present in the host country. This may result in a clash between the 
imagined view of Kurdistan and the realities of like in return (Christou, 2011). 
 
This study identifies that returnees more often contrast the life they left behind 
in diaspora with the life in their ancestral homeland, and this disrupts returnees 
fictional vision of the place of return and will make the realities of successfully 
reintegrating challenging and complex, as they could imagine themselves being 
regarded as strangers in their place of return. ‘Diaspora to Diaspora’, a term 
denoting double life experiences, has been generated with the changing 
geopolitical and economic situation globally. This research has highlighted the 
compelling need driven by commitment, responsibility, obligation or guilt for 
returnees to ‘give back’ to the homeland the skills gained in the host country 
with a desire to contribute towards building a better future. 
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Figure 1.6 Geographic Distribution of Kurdish and other Iranic Lang  
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1.8 The structure of the Thesis  
 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows; Chapter Two examines the 
literature that contextualises the theories that underpin the diaspora study, it 
explores definitions of diaspora, the characteristics and typology of diaspora 
and how transnationalism leads to an understanding of global migration. It 
acknowledges a lack of literature on diasporic return experiences of women and 
children. This study will contribute to the diaspora fields shedding light on the 
current state of diaspora. It will further develop contemporary diaspora 
literature. This will include a critique of concepts such as home and homeland, 
development among diaspora through community engagement and finally an 
addition to diaspora study via return and experiences of return of women and 
children.  
 
Chapter Three describes the methodological considerations and points of 
departure in the research and the methods that guided the collection of primary 
and secondary field data. The study is based on a qualitative research method 
and uses semi-structured interviews as its main data collection technique. This 
chapter provides the research questions and discusses the locations of the 
empirical study being in Plymouth in Devon and South Kurdistan (Kurdistan of 
Iraq). Ethical considerations are explored when undertaking a study of this 
nature and finally the chapter concludes with the nature of reflexivity. 
   
Chapter Four examines the experience of Kurdish diaspora in Devo. It begins 
with a historical road map, tracing Kurdish diaspora to Devon and in particular 
to Plymouth the interexchange between diaspora and host population in both 
positive and negative experiences, community integration and cohesion. The 
chapter explores key actors and their experiences with diaspora groups and will 
finally explore the demographics of Devon in relation to racism.  
 
Chapter Five examines identity and belonging. The chapter demonstrates what 
happens to Devon Kurdish peoples identities in diaspora and how their identity 
is constructed or reconstructed when encountering and interacting with another 
society such as the British society. It explores the notion of home, belonging 
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and hybridity, the Kurdish national ideology, it listens to Kurdish participant’s 
diasporic experience and how this gives them a dual and collective identity 
within the host country or a sense of confusion with lost identity. 
  
Chapter Six discusses diaspora and community engagement, defines what 
community engagement within Devon and in particular Plymouth means, 
interviews key actors involved in the process and looks at the tools used to 
engage with diaspora communities to build on integration and trust. It 
recognises that Plymouth as a city in a predominantly rural county has 
challenges with BME communities and integration. It looks at the Kurdish 
diaspora and the citizenship process. It concludes with PREVENT strategy and 
the positive and negative experiences prevent plays in the interrogation 
process.  
 
Chapter Seven is split into two sections, Part one describes the experience of 
return as both positive and negative experiences, it looks at homeland attitudes 
towards diasporas and supposition from diasporas that skills and knowledge 
acquired in the host country will support to build a better Kurdistan.  This 
chapter explores what makes diasporas want to return to homeland, the 
environmental factors, changes in safety and security, including the economic 
situation. It also examines to what extent social factors influence the desire to 
return, as well as the pressure of family expectation and obligation. Part two 
analyses the intention of return among the Kurdish diaspora, particularly in the 
case of independence and aspirational hopes for a better country for diaspora 
children. It explores the differences in attitude between first, second and third 
generation of diasporas and return.  
 
Finally the thesis concludes with chapter Eight which gives an overall summary 
of the thesis. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review of Diaspora 
 
This chapter provides a critical review of literature on diaspora, and its focus 
upon the global movement of people. Such movement from one country to 
another, typically for reasons of safety and security or economics has become 
topical not just to academic institutions but for ordinary households who see the 
increasing migration crisis in Europe unfold daily as portrayed by the media. 
This review selectively concentrates on areas of exchanges and transactions 
among theorists from the late 1980s onwards. It seeks to identify the various 
conceptions of diaspora, and how these have evolved, within academic and 
policy discourses.  
 
In understanding the field of diaspora studies the first question that must be 
answered is what is meant by diaspora? Over the last two decades, various 
understandings of diaspora have been  illustrated particularly within the social 
sciences,, from disciplines including (but not limited to) Geography, 
Anthropology, Political, Economic, Geopolitical, International Migration, 
International Relation, Sociology, Postcolonialism and Communications.  
 
This study contributes to the existing field of diaspora studies and theoretical 
understandings of the concept of diaspora, applying this to the contemporary 
situation of the global Kurdish diaspora. This will include a critique of existing 
understandings of diaspora, including notions of home and homeland, 
development among diaspora through community engagement, and return and 
experiences of return. As Alinia (et al. 2014) have pointed out, the “last two 
decades of Kurdish history can be distinguished as a period when the Kurdish 
diaspora has become mobilised on a large scale. These developments relate to 
the importance of transnational ties among contemporary migrant 
communities”(53). There is increasing interest regarding the Kurdish diaspora in 
western academic institutions and this review will examine different theoretical 
approaches and how these contribute towards the field of diaspora studies. 
   
Furthermore, this study will contribute towards the knowledge of return and the 
intention of return with a connection to the homeland and actual experiences of 
real returnees to the homeland. The imagined view of Kurdland (Kurdistan) is 
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constructed, and does not address the contested complexities between life in 
diaspora and return. Christou and King (2010) claim that returnees more often 
contrast the life they left behind in diaspora with the life in the homeland. This 
disrupts returnees fictional vision of the homeland, and makes the realities on 
the ground hard and complex, as they could imagine themselves or to be 
looked on as strangers in their place of return. Moreover, the empirical 
knowledge presented in this research serves to contribute further references for 
supporting current theoretical approaches and introduce new perspectives 
which addresses important dimensions of diaspora experiences, identity and 
belonging with a contributing emphasis on community engagement and racism 
within Devon, an area with little diaspora literature and how this effects the 
Kurdish experience of community engagement. 
 
In its endeavour to empathise, explore and acknowledge the constructions and 
negotiations of Kurdish diaspora in Devon, this study develops a number of 
different but connected theories. Within this review, I first review existing 
definitions of diaspora within the literature, noting the characteristics and 
typology of this concept. The sections that follow in this chapter address 
existing discourses on diaspora that comprise the concepts of transnationalism, 
home/homeland, community engagement and return.   
 
2.1  Definitions of Diaspora  
The term diaspora comes from the Greek diaspeirein, meaning “dispersal or to 
sow”. Diaspora traditionally originated from the ancient Greek tradition of 
colonisation and migration. At the beginning most the concept of diaspora was 
coined to describe the exile of Jewish people from their historic homeland and 
their dispersal throughout the world, and refers to people with the same 
territorial origin. However, the concepts of diaspora and diasporic communities 
in a contemporary context are increasingly used among scholars for the 
definition of ethnic minorities, refugees, immigrants, alien residents and 
displaced communities. The contemporary understanding of diaspora within 
migration, religious and cultural studies, is now also used in policy, as well as 
being used to analyse the political, cultural and social growth as a result of 
displacement and movement. Since the 1990s, the concept of diaspora has 
been used to describe numerous established communities that experience 
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displacement such as the Kurdish, Palestinian, and Chinese, African diaspora, 
and other exiled communities (Safran 1991; Cohen 1997; Clifford 1994).    
                                                                                                             
Researchers have discussed in favour of recognizing a closed set of attributes 
and actual conditions of diasporic existence (Cohen 1997), while others have 
used the concept in a broad range of human dispersal. The International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) provides a broad definition of diasporas as 
“members of ethnic and national communities, who have left, but maintain links 
with, their homelands. The term ‘diasporas’ conveys the idea of transnational 
populations, living in one place, while still maintaining relations with their 
homelands, being both ‘here’ and ‘there’” (Ionescu 2006:13). Sheffer suggests 
that “modern Diasporas are ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing 
and acting in host countries but maintaining strong links with their countries of 
origin – their homelands” (1986:3). Safran maintains that diaspora is “that 
segment of people living outside the home land” (1991:224). Docker defines 
diaspora as “a sense of belonging to more than one history, to more than one 
time and place, to more than one past and future” (2001:vii). Cohen has also 
formulated five different categories of diaspora: “victim, labour, trade, imperial 
(which may be considered a form of trade diaspora), and cultural (not 
indigenous to the area from which they dispersed, i.e., Caribbean) diasporas” 
(1997:x, 26-29). Brah’s discussion on diaspora locates “diaspora space” in the 
“intersectionality of diaspora, border and dis/location as a point of confluence of 
economic, political, cultural and psychological process” (1996:71). Cho expands 
upon the definition by noting that:  
 
“…diaspora brings together communities which are not quite nation, 
not quite race, not quite religion, not quite homesickness, yet they 
still have something to do with nation, race, religion, longings for 
homes which may not exist. There are collectives and communities 
which extend across geographical spaces and historical 
experiences. There are vast numbers of people who exist in one 
place and yet feel intimately related to another” (2007:13).  
 
More detailed definitions of diaspora, examined below, more clearly set the 
frameworks between diasporas and other communities such as nomads, ethnic 
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groups, migrants, and refugees, and implement an analytical structure to assist 
theoretical understandings of diaspora. Within this research, and based upon a 
review of the differing definitions discussed above, I define diaspora as a 
complex, social process characterised on the one hand by, deterritorialisation 
and feelings of alienation, homelessness and homesickness, and on the other 
hand collective action and creation of collective identity around issues of home 
(country) and community formation. The characteristics and typology of 
diaspora will be traced in the next section.   
 
2.2  The Characteristics and Typology of Diaspora 
There has been significant interest of academic researchers in debating and 
discussing the meanings and definitions as well as the usefulness of the notion 
diaspora since the early 1990s (see for example Safran 1991; Tölölyan 1991 
1996, 2007; Clifford 1994; Brah 1996; Cohen 1997; Wahlbeck 2002; Vertovec 
1999; Carter 2005; Brubaker 2005; Wahlbeck 2002; Tsagarousianou 2004; 
Ben-Rafael 2010; Mavroudi 2005). Within this chapter I examine the key 
arguments made by authors working in the field of diaspora studies. In 
particular, I draw upon the work of Safran (1991) and  Cohen (1996, 1997) as a 
point of departure. Safran argues that: 
 
“…the concept of diaspora [should] be applied to expatriate minority 
communities whose members share several of the following 
characteristics: 1) they, or their ancestors, have been dispersed 
from a specific original “centre” to two or more “peripheral”, or 
foreign regions; 2) they retain a collective memory, vision, or myth 
about their original homeland – its physical location, history, and 
achievements; 3) they believe that they are not – and perhaps 
cannot be – fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel 
partly alienated and insulated from it; 4) they regard their ancestral 
homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they 
or their descendants would (or should) eventually return – when 
conditions are appropriate; 5) they believe that they should, 
collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their 
original homeland and to its safety and prosperity; and 6) they 
continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one 
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way or another, and their ethnocommunal consciousness and 
solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such a 
relationship” (Safran 1991:83–84).  
 
Safran characteristics list could be used for a heuristic classification. While 
proposing that Jews were perfect for the definition he inferred, Safran 
recognized the legitimacy of the utilization of the idea of diaspora for some other 
dispersed groups that fail to have all of the six characteristics which has been 
inferred by him, this group could be acknowledged and referred to as being a 
diaspora. The concept of diaspora is usually conceptualised as being limited to 
powerless, dispersed communities. Tsagarousianou points out that “…the 
above list, although a useful one, is quite limited and limiting as it clearly 
revolves around the relationship of the diasporic group with its homeland and 
therefore plays down other important relationships and linkages that inform the 
diasporic condition” (2004:55).  
 
In response to Safran's position, Cohen (1996, 1997) has prescribed a set of 
criteria with nine "common features" by accepting and adjusting some of 
Safran's features and including four more to the list. According to Cohen, 
therefore, a definition of diaspora needs to have the following common features 
that are suggested as: 
a) “Dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically, to two or 
more foreign regions;  
b) Alternatively, the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in 
pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions;  
c) A collective memory and myth about the homeland, including its 
location, history and achievements;  
d) An idealisation of the putative ancestral home and a collective 
commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety and prosperity, 
even to its creation;  
e) The development of a return movement which gains collective 
approbation.  
f) A strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and 
based on a sense of distinctiveness, a common history and the belief 
in a common fate; 
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g) A troubled relationship with host societies, suggesting a lack of 
acceptance at the least or the possibility that another calamity might 
befall the group;  
h) A sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other 
countries of settlement;  
i) The possibility of a distinctive yet creative and enriching life in host 
countries with a tolerance for pluralism” (Cohen 1997:180).  
Cohen highlights that dispersed communities may not have all the features as 
“call this list quite consciously one of 'common features', to indicate that no one 
diaspora will manifest all features” (1996: 515).  
 
The characteristics that Safran and Cohen recognised have a strong homeland-
oriented connection with their host countries or societies. Cohen states that a 
diaspora’s group consciousness is maintained over time. Diasporas preserve a 
collective memory and identity of the past and share commonalities with similar 
communities in other regions, or a desire to return to homeland. Cohen points 
out the forced and traumatic experience at the time of dispersal. Cohen’s 
perception on the intention of diasporas to make their own homeland has 
significance to Kurds and Kurd-land. He likewise gives essentialness to 
transnational linkages between an individual’s parts of the diaspora community 
in different regions of settlement and outcomes for their victory in the host 
countries.   
Butler's (2001) definition of diaspora incorporates several of the key 
characteristics discussed above, yet additionally states the importance of 
dispersion to two or more ‘destinations’, and that a diaspora's must comprise no 
less than two ‘generations’. Butler’s defining characteristics of diaspora are:  
i. “Dispersal to two or more destinations as a necessary precondition for the 
formation of links between the various populations in diaspora;  
ii. Relationship to an actual or imagined homeland;  
iii. A consciousness, a self awareness of the group’s identity;  
iv. Existence over at least two generation” (2001:192-3).  
 
A typology of diaspora has therefore been built through the contributions of 
each of the scholars noted above, to develop ideas and definitions of diasporas 
and to develop the relationships between diaspora and the territory, as well as 
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the memories that diasporic groups have with home or homeland.  However, 
there have been numerous categories and ideas that researchers stressed such 
as the home, home-land, ethnic minorities, transnational, alienation, 
consciousness, social and cultural, nation-states, dual and diasporic, amongst 
others, that are questionable within contemporary diasporas. The concept of 
diaspora is complex and disputed, and although an endeavour has been made 
to provide a typology (Cohen 1997) there is no agreed upon, singular definition.  
Clifford argues that, “we should be wary of constructing our working definition of 
a term like diaspora by recourse to an ideal type” (1994:306).  
 
The Jews as an ideal type which was mentioned by Safran. It has been 
questioned by Clifford (1994), particularly in regards with his last three 
characteristics. Safran suggests concentrating on “diaspora’s borders on what it 
defines itself against” (Clifford 1994:307) in place of searching for the essential 
or common characteristics. Clifford likewise sees that diasporic language 
challenges ‘minority discourse’. He asserts that present-day diasporic 
discourses by diasporans are to be understood as a search for non-western 
models opposing the nation state concept. As Clifford describes “diasporic 
language appears to be replacing, or at least supplementing, minority 
discourse. Transnational connections break the binary relation of minority 
communities with majority societies – a dependency that structures projects of 
both assimilation and resistance” (1994:311).  
 
Clifford explains that this set of qualifications for diasporas is heavily related to 
the Jewish diasporic experience, and does not work for other diasporic groups, 
or as he also explores, does not include the entire picture of the Jewish 
diaspora – many groups of which would not “qualify” if held to these standards. 
While Clifford provides many examples of these definitions not “working” for all 
diasporic groups, he does agree with Safran’s motivation to do so – for without 
definitions of diaspora, it would be difficult to draw comparisons between groups 
– an approach that Clifford feels is best (Clifford 1994:306). 
 
Clifford then proposes that the best way to define diaspora might be to define 
what is not a diaspora – to define its borders. He especially focuses on the 
juxtaposition of diaspora against concepts of the “nation-state” and on the flip 
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side, against ideas of “indigenous” people. Clifford argues that “the term 
diaspora is a signifier, not basically of transnationality and development, yet of 
political battles to describe the nearby, as notable group, in recorded settings of 
dislodging” (1994:308). As he analysed the use of diasporic language in the 
context of “tribal” and indigenous people is especially interesting, since as he is 
clear to point out, “tribal societies are not diasporas; their feeling of rootedness 
in the area is decisively what diasporic individuals have lost” (ibid:310). 
Nevertheless when the discussion is about indigenous peoples who have been 
displaced, which is often the case, much of this language and framework used 
to discuss diasporas is readily applicable. 
 
Clifford believes that the study of diasporas and diasporic consciousness is 
replacing the field of minority studies and he relates how many different groups 
are being described, or describing themselves, as diasporas. Clifford focuses 
on the newly emerging “explanations of diasporism from contemporary dark 
Britain and from hostile to Zionist Judaism” (1994:302). While again, these 
“new” diasporas, may not be the “perfect style” (Clifford 1994:304) since they do 
not have a dream of returning to their homeland, as Clifford elaborates, 
“decentered, parallel associations may be as significant as those framed around 
a teleology of origin/return. Furthermore an imparted, continuous history of 
relocation, enduring, acclimatization, or safety may be as paramount as the 
projection of a particular starting point” (Clifford 1994:306).  
 
The anthropologist Steven Vertovec analyses three meanings connected with 
diaspora: “Diaspora as a Social Form, Diaspora as a Type of Consciousness 
and Diaspora as a Mode of Cultural Production” (1997:2). Although he uses his 
explanations to examine South Asian diasporas, I will focus on his broader 
explorations associated with ‘diaspora’, as his explanations can be extremely 
useful for investigating various dispersed and displaced peoples. This concept 
of defining diaspora is essential to Vertovec as a means to avoid, “the current 
over-use and under-theorization of the notion of “diaspora’ among academics, 
transnational intellectuals and ‘community leaders’ alike… [it] threatens the 
term’s descriptive usefulness” (Vertovec 1997:1). He believes that today’s 
researchers are being too cavalier in utilizing the term diaspora with an ever-
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widening range of migratory (both voluntary and forced) circumstances, where it 
could now be applicable. 
  
The initial and the majority common significance connected with diaspora can 
be through its societal type, with the emphasis on any group’s intra-
relationships despite dispersal, whether with regard to voluntary causes or even 
through pressured migration. These types of societal associations are usually 
cemented through connections to heritage, geography and history, and play out 
in political orientations and monetary strategies.  
 
In his exploration from the first “type” associated with diaspora – diaspora as a 
social form – Vertovec offers a comprehensive set of commonly held 
understandings of what constitutes a diaspora. This first “meaning” associated 
with diaspora, with its list of qualifying factors, appears to be what most 
researchers have in mind when discussing diaspora. To give an apparent image 
of diasporic traits that Vertovec examines, his full list of social relationships 
“complied from a range of descriptive and theoretical works” (Vertovec 1997:3), 
are as follows:  
a) “created as a result of voluntary or forced migration from one home 
location to at least two other countries; 
b) consciously maintaining collective identity, which is often importantly 
sustained by reference to an ‘ethnic myth’ of common origin, historical 
experience, and some kind of tie to a geographic place; 
c) institutionalizing networks of exchange and communication which 
transcend territorial states and creating new communal organizations in 
places of settlement;  
d) maintaining a variety of explicit and implicit ties with their homelands; 
e) developing solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries of 
settlement; 
f) inability or unwillingness to be fully accepted by ‘host society’ – thereby 
fostering feelings of alienation, or exclusion, or superiority, or other kind of 
‘difference’” (1997:4-5). 
 
In addition to the list above, another diasporic social form that Vertovec 
discusses is the concept of a “triadic relationship” (ibid:5), a continuing 
45 
 
discussion that flows among the dispersed diaspora, their new country of 
settlement and origin “homeland” countries (ibid 1997:5), tensions of divided 
loyalties and “political orientations” (ibid 1997:4), migrants power pressure by 
individuals or associations may be important actors in the domestic politics of 
their countries of settlement and origin. He states that “the Jewish and Irish 
lobbies in the USA are obvious examples” (ibid:4), and the “economic 
strategies” of these transnational groups could be a significant source in 
international finance and commerce (ibid 1997:4). These lists are important to 
explore yet they could be very limiting and exclusionary and lots of the 
dispersed peoples of the Indian and other lately recognised diasporas would not 
“fit” into these definitions.  
 
In addition to this list, another diasporic social form that Vertovec talks about is 
the idea of a “triadic relationship” (ibid 1997:5), an ongoing dialogue that flows 
between the dispersed diaspora, their new country of residence and their 
“homeland” countries (ibid 1997:5), tensions of divided loyalties and political 
orientations (ibid 1997:4), and the “economic strategies” of these transnational 
groups (ibid 1997:4). These lists and qualifications are important to explore yet 
they can be very limiting and exclusionary- many of the dispersed peoples of 
the Indian Ocean and other newly recognized diasporas would not “fit” into 
these definitions (ibid1997). 
 
Diaspora as a type of consciousness is the second meaning of diaspora that 
Vertovec examines and discusses. In accordance with Vertovec, it is a kind of 
awareness has been created between contemporary transnational communities 
and communities that are “being simultaneously ‘home away from home’ or 
‘here and there’ and awareness of multi locality” (1997:8). Vertovec indicated to 
Paul Gilroy the idea of “dual consciousness” described as being a most 
important or prime example of diaspora as type of consciousness, an 
awareness that places a “greater emphasis on describing a variety of 
experience, a state of mind and a sense of identity” (Vertovec 1997:8). This 
vision of diaspora is a lot more inclusive and beneficial in comparisons and 
examinations of these “non-traditional” diasporic groups. 
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The final and third meaning of diaspora that Vertovec discusses is the role of a 
mode of cultural production, which many scholars have “attributed to the notion 
of diaspora is usually conveyed in discussions of globalisation” (Vertovec 
1997:19). In accordance with Vertovec, diaspora can “involve the production 
and reproduction of transnational social and cultural phenomena” (ibid). A 
substantial part of this final meaning focuses on the “fluidity of constructed 
styles and identities among diasporic people” (Vertovec 1997:19), and indicates 
the importance of actively regarding hybridity and new ethnicities as well as 
syncretism found in may diasporas. This kind of importance of hybridity to the 
identity formation of groups in exile is a prominent factor and may easily be 
applied to other diasporic peoples whose associates and effects from their 
“homeland” are just as important to their identity formation as the connections 
and influences from their adopted land. This type of influence or affect tends not 
to be mutually exclusive, or does not allow group identification as a diaspora. 
Through viewing diaspora as a mode of cultural production all of these factors 
might be considered.   
 
Vertovec concludes with a call for diasporic studies that include “both structure 
(historical conditions) and agency (the meanings held, and practices conducted, 
by social actors)” (Vertovec 1997:24), that researchers could compare, examine 
and contextualise more, or a wider variety of, transnational and diasporic 
experiences without having completely watered down the term to the level of 
ineffectiveness.   
 
Diasporas based on historical time have been classified by some scholars. 
Sheffer’s view of diaspora comprises “groups permanently residing outside their 
countries of origin, but maintaining contacts with people back in their 
homelands” (2003:1). Sheffer defines this typology in more detail, explaining the 
new characteristics of contemporary diaspora groups. Sheffer categorises 
diasporas into three phases, ‘classical’ diasporas, ‘modern’ diasporas and 
‘incipient’ diasporas. He classifies diasporas into three periods, historical or 
“classical” diaspora “those whose origins were in antiquity or the Middle ages”; 
“modern” or recent diasporas are “those that have become established since 
the seventeenth century”; and “incipient” diasporas are “those in making” new 
communities to a region displaying diaspora characteristics and initial attempts 
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to get together as diaspora (Sheffer 2003:131). Likewise, Reis departs from the 
literature that features the Jewish diaspora as the prototype, and examines 
diaspora in the “three major historical waves that influence the diasporic 
process”, as classified by Sheffer, namely the classical period, associated with 
ancient diaspora and Greece; the modern period from 1500-1945 involves 
experiences of slavery and colonisation; as well as the contemporary or late-
modern period starts from the end of World War II to the present day “illustrates 
the progressive effect of globalization on the phenomenon of diasporisation” 
(Reis 2004:42). Diasporic groups in the contemporary period, unlike the 
classical period, have various explanations behind leaving their country. 
 
In Van Hear’s research of “new” diasporas appearing from mass migrations 
from the 1950s to the 1990s, he highlights:  
 
“…not just the making of diasporas, but also a process of de-
diasporisation, the un-production of diasporas in a specific place. 
This does not essentially explain the dissolution of a whole 
diaspora, rather it implies the migration of a large number of 
diaspora groups or members to the homeland or somewhere else” 
(Van Hear 1998:49-50).  
 
Sheffer's typology takes into account a historical inquiry of diasporas without 
losing sight of contemporary groups that are evolving into diasporas. Van Hear's 
(1998) and Sheffer’s (2003) methodology likewise opens the way to 
contemplations of agency in the diasporisation or diaspora making process. 
Schnapper identifies diaspora as “the condition of a geographically dispersed 
people who have settled in different political organisations but who maintained, 
in spite of dispersion, some form of unity and solidarity” (1999:225). The above 
reassessment of the characteristics, definitions, and classifications of diasporas 
further develops an explanation and examination of the concept of diaspora. 
Even through comprehension the parameters of diaspora permits us to make 
critical distinctions and illuminations between diaspora and different sorts of 
communities, and it promotes a comparative or metaphorical study of diaspora. 
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Human mobility, specifically migration, is an old phenomenon that has facilitated 
discussions among scholars and policy makers around the world. After 9/11 the 
subject of migration particularly the diaspora groups gave rise to central 
debates and were drawn into the protection policy agenda of security. As 
Freitas (2012) has highlighted:  
 
“…the fact that diaspora groups could also ‘import’ homeland 
conflicts into host societies-notably when homeland conflict involves 
clashes among different ethnic or religious groups. In this situation, 
home societies might become the theatre of ethnic, religious or 
political struggles which they have only a very limited capacity to 
influence as they are actually taking place elsewhere. This 
transnationalisation of conflict, though not common, may eventually 
transform some diaspora groups in threats to host countries’ 
security, instead of partners in international initiatives of conflict 
resolution” (Freitas 2012:4).  
 
As the result of conflict and fragile situations generally, they can affect large 
diaspora groups scattered among various countries. Some scholars have 
analysed this notion in terms of historical periods.  
 
It is preferable not to propose an inflexible definition of diaspora, particular 
historical connections figure in the relative significance of each of the 
aforementioned components. As Clifford highlights, “the transnational 
connections linking diasporas need not be articulated primarily through a real or 
symbolic homeland.... Decentered, lateral connections may be as important as 
those formed around a teleology of origin/return. And a shared, ongoing history 
of displacement, suffering, adaptation, or resistance may be as important as the 
projection of a specific origin” (1997:249-50).  
 
2.3  Transnationalism 
Transnationalism is a connected concept within diaspora theory. Diaspora and 
transnationalism are important hypothetical cores for understanding the 
movements of global migration. Castles (2007) states that “migration research 
in the era of globalisation is a transnational undertaking, which requires 
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theoretical frameworks and analytical tools that transcend the nation-state” 
(352). Transnationalism is often identified as border crossing. According to 
Nagel (2001) “if the international signifies relationships between states or actors 
representing different states, then the transnational refers to linkages forged by 
social groups who exist seemingly in spite of the nation-state and who, through 
their transnational activities, undermine state sovereignty and the hegemony of 
national borders and ideologies”(248). 
  
Although the term of transnationalism is the same as diaspora, through 
researchers, has become a watchword appropriated with the disciplines of 
social science. Nevertheless, Yeoh et al (2003) argues that “the field of 
transnational studies is still a fragmented one, and no one conceptual frame has 
emerged to define the shape of transnationality, or the quality and nature of the 
projects, relations and practices that it encompasses” (215). The development 
of the idea of transnationalism has been an endeavour to explore “migrants’ 
simultaneous embeddedness in more than one community” (Pasura 2011:145). 
Scholars within transnational studies have argued that “many contemporary 
migrants and their predecessors maintain various kinds of ties to their 
homelands at the same time that they are incorporated into the countries that 
receive them” (see for example Basch et al., 1994; Levitt and Jaworsky 
2007:129).      
 
It is essential to give an analytical description of transnational studies and 
discuss the distinction with diaspora studies. As Faist states, “whether we talk of 
transnational social space, transnational social fields, transnationalism or 
transnational social formations in international migration systems, we usually 
refer to sustained ties of persons, networks and organisations across the 
borders across multiple nation-states, ranging from little to highly 
institutionalized forms” (Faist 2000:189). In the same way, Guarnizo take into 
account transnationalism as “the rise of a new class of immigrants, economic 
entrepreneurs or political activists who conduct cross-border activities on a 
regular basis, that lies at the core of the phenomenon that this field seeks to 
highlight and investigate” (Guarnizo 2003:1213). Therefore, the continued 
concentration of movements between cross-borders are the key characteristics 
of transnationalism.  
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The appearance and development of the idea of transnationalism has been an 
endeavour to explore and examine migrant’s synchronous embeddedness in 
more than one society (Levitt 2001). Basch et al (1994) describe 
transnationalism “as the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain 
multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and 
settlement” (7). What then is the distinction between the concepts of diaspora 
and transnationalism? Numerous researchers highlight diasporas as an 
apparent manifestation of transnational groups (Vertovec 1999). Levitt argues 
that “transnational communities are building blocks of potential diasporas that 
may or may not take shape” (Levitt 2001: 202-203). While transmigrants are 
essentially first generation migrants with a solid connection to their homeland, 
diasporas constitute the most continuing results of both voluntary and 
permanent settlement in a host country (Sheffer 2003). 
 
Characteristically, diasporas have been exhibited as a set of social spheres 
(Safran, 1991), a mode of categorisation and typology (Cohen, 1997), and a 
unique social form, type of consciousness, and mode of social production 
(Vertovec, 1999). The notions of “homeland” and “host nation” are central 
characteristics in existing definitions of diaspora. Homeland implies the country 
of origin or the genealogical home; the nation or area from which migrants 
originally came, or with which they associate. The host or hostland is the 
country of settlement or residence. It is imperative to note that the country is not 
necessarily a created and recognized state or geographical territory because.... 
Diasporas are regularly classified as stateless or state-linked. For instance, until 
the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, Jews were recognized as a 
stateless diaspora. On the other hand, in establishing the nation of Israel, they 
became state-linked. The Kurds are an example of a stateless diaspor a – as 
Kurdistan, which geographically includes portions of several states, is not an 
independent nation state, and is not recognised by other nation states. 
Numerous ethno-national and secessionist diasporas fit into the stateless class 
(Clifford 1994; Khayati 2006).  
 
The theoretical concept of diaspora can be summarized in a few points that 
describe diaspora groups around the globe. Diaspora must begin with people 
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forcefully or voluntarily dispersed around the globe. Based on dedication and 
experiences of those who had researched this field.  Since the late 1980s there 
has been a dedicated body of research focused on understanding the actual 
conditions and difficulties as well as psychological effects of diaspora groups, 
including Jewish, African, and Armenian diasporas, amongst others.  
 
Those dispersed around the world will not completely integrate within the 
culture or country where they live. Some level of connection with their homeland 
and culture is typically maintained, thus keeping their relationship with their 
homeland alive. Most people in diaspora keep alive their connections with the 
homeland through phone and internet communications as well as by visiting the 
homeland. This connection among Kurdish communities in the West has been 
protected, especially by the first generation. To a degree we can say that 
Kurdistan was not disregarded in the diaspora process. Third and finally, there 
must also be an entity through which the group of people can define their 
identity within. For Kurds in diaspora, this identity is in being Kurdish, which is 
different from the identity of Kurds who have remained in Kurdistan, and differs 
also from the identity of people in the country the migrants live among. These 
are the three key hypothetical diaspora points that are consistent with the 
Kurdish diaspora.  
 
The concept of identity was developed in different ways by scholars in the 
1960’s. Brubaker and Cooper noted that the emergence of identity in social 
analysis and public discourse was in part due to the fragility of class politics in 
the United States of America in this period. This may have inspired the 
popularity of the notion of identity, but the conceptual clarity was ambiguous. 
Brubaker and Cooper indicate “the “identity” crisis [is] a crisis of overproduction 
and consequent devaluation of meaning [that] shows no sign of abating” 
(Brubaker and Cooper 2000:3). Identity has been over extended to analyse the 
growing range of social phenomena that has gained momentum over the past 
decades, thus the notion may have lost its analytical value. 
 
It could be argued that identity is the mechanism which makes sense of 
oneness in our social environment and gives a means of understanding in an 
individual’s social context. As Brubaker and Cooper highlighted, “[identity is] a 
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sort of vital center to which we must refer to explain certain things, but without it 
ever having real existence” (Brubaker and Cooper, 2009:9). Identity is central to 
the sense of belonging, offering opportunities and limitations. Identity in part is 
assigned by others and the environment it is immersed in, but also self-
assigned being part of a person’s individuality, with shared narratives and 
consciousness within collective action and solidarity adding to the sense of 
belonging (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000).  
As I have shown, the concept of identity has many facets and the notion can be 
challenging to grasp, thus making it difficult as an analytical concept. The 
literature places a strong emphasis on identity as dialogue; that it is plural, 
situational, contextual, relational, in flux and temporal – all words with “no 
meaning “as Brubaker and Cooper (2000) would say. Undeniably the concept is 
“blurred but indispensable” (Brubaker and Cooper,2000:12). Expanding on this 
thought, Brubaker and Cooper (2010) wrote in their article “Beyond Identity” that 
too much or conversely too little emphasis is placed on identity, they suggest 
that identity could be substituted for the concept of identification, on the subject 
of identification they say, “It invites us to specify the agents that do the 
identifying. And it does not presuppose that that such identifying (even by 
powerful agents, such as the state) will necessarily result in the internal 
sameness, the distinctiveness, the bounded groupness that political 
entrepreneurs may seek to achieve. Identification – of oneself and of others – is 
intrinsic to social life, “identity” in the strong sense is not” (Brubaker and 
Cooper, 2000:14). They suggest that identification is either assigned by others 
or owned by oneself, self-identification is a process, opposed to identity, which 
they argue is a condition. 
 
Looking at the Kurdish diaspora in Devon I would argue that identity and 
identification are not separate notions but work in partnership. Individuals or 
groups with shared narratives whether ascribed by others or self-ascribed have 
a commonality in identity, whether that is the strong bond of national identity, 
family identity, or homeland. When identity becomes so powerful then indeed it 
could be called a condition. Collectives and individuals can give meaning and 
understanding to their own and others’ identity, the action of choosing for self or 
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labelling of other then becomes the classification of identification. Both identity 
and identification become unique to the individuals or collectives in question. 
 
The Kurdish diaspora plays a critical role in supporting community and 
strengthening identity especially in times of crisis. In many ways Kurdish 
refugees continue to be part of their old social society. Diasporic communities 
can operate as a diplomatic bridge during times of transition. The diaspora 
community can be seen as a universal tribe, sharing history, social and cultural 
experiences. 
 
The UK among the other European states offers the Kurdish community 
substantial opportunities for establishing, conserving and developing the 
Kurdish culture, language and ethno-national identity in the diaspora. The 
establishment of a Kurdish autonomous region in Northern Iraq, particularly 
after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 has “drastically accelerated the process of 
transborder exchanges among diasporian Kurd” as a result of many direct 
flights between Europe and Kurdistan (Khayati 2006:11).  
 
National identity also differs in its definition depending on who or what is 
defining it and for what reason (Skulte 2005, Gellner, 1983; Lijphart, 1977). 
Nationalism, by contrast, exists to mobilize a group (or groups) around an 
existing nation or draws them together to attempt to create one (Kedourie, 
1960; Anderson, 1991). However, Waldinger and Fitgzerald illustrated that the 
character of nation-states as trasnational “deprives the concept of analytic 
leverage, as it is meant to distinguish cross-border, non-state actors from states 
and to show how the two constrain and shape one another” (Waldinger and 
Fitzgerald 2004:1180). In the current analysis of national identity’s connection to 
nationalism and diaspora. The national identity discourses should support and 
elucidate the interplay between national identity and diaspora. Furthermore, 
Vertovec highlights six different ways to conceptualise transnationalism, as 
“transnationalism as a social morphology, as a type of consciousness, as a 
mode of cultural reproduction, as an avenue of capital, as a site of political 
engagement, and as a reconstruction of place or locality” (Vertovec 1999:447). 
Transnationalism as a type of consciousness is classified by diaspora groups’ 
awareness of their multiple identifications, that is, simultaneously being “here” 
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and “there” (Pasura 2011:146). It can be argued where diaspora groups are well 
integrated, a transnationalism which is predominately cultural in character can 
emerge. As a mode of cultural reproduction, “transnationalism is often 
associated with a fluidity of constructed styles, social institutions and everyday 
practices […] often described in terms of […] cultural translation and hybridity” 
(Vertovec 1999:451).  
 
Receiving citizenship or naturalization within western countries represents a 
level of security in many Kurdish lives in diaspora. Brnic’s (2002) study identifies 
that nationality can be examined as two separate processes. First, an 
identification with a certain nation and people, and second, an administrative 
association to a specific state. Brnic states that these two processes are 
intrinsically related. However, Brnic maintains that citizenship is “not necessarily 
a symbol of one’s sense of national belonging. It can simply be seen as a 
document that relates to one’s rights and to the state’s obligation to protect, or 
provide for, the individual” (8). Kurds distinguish between the possession of a 
British passport and a national identity as English.  
    
2.4  Home and Homeland 
The concept of home that several studies stress is questionable, as the matter 
of home within contemporary diaspora becomes somewhat irrelevant. It is 
necessary to point out that there is a clear translation of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ 
in Kurdish. In Kurdish home is ‘Mal’ or ‘Khano’ a dwelling where you live and 
‘Neshtiman’ or ‘Welat’ refers to homeland as a country of belonging, and 
identity. The constriction and dynamic of the home and homeland will be 
imagined differently by Kurds in different situations. The portrayals of a Kurdish 
homeland are different from the findings of ethnographic and anthropological 
studies. Alinia’s (2004) study on Kurdish migrants in Sweden found that 
homeland meanings are multiple in a real as well as an imagined sense, and 
can be both idealized and associated with traumatic experiences due to 
conflicts and oppression from the sovereign state. In the same way, for the 
Kurdish diaspora in France as Khayati has pointed out, “homeland is associated 
with movements, war, persecution, political instability, states of emergency, 
atrocity, assimilation, national struggle, and nostalgia”(2008:158). Khayati and 
Alinia both emphasise that, in contrast to diasporic fictional narratives, the 
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traumatic experiences narrated by the respondents are mainly based on 
external factors such as war, state oppression, and persecution (Khayati 2008; 
Alinia 2004). In addition, Demir points out that “home has always been a central 
aspect of the battles diaspora engage in as they think through how to relate to 
both the home they have left behind and the new home in which they are 
settling” (2012:815). It can be described in the Kurdish diaspora connections to 
the home-land as a “dual-home construction” (ibid:816), and the impact of the 
Kurdish diaspora on the home-land is real.  
 
Studies employing human migration theory tend to make clear distinctions 
regarding the pull and push factors of human migration. Several causes ‘push’ 
people out of their homeland, while other causes ‘pull’ people from their 
homeland. For example, an individual would be ‘pushed’ from their homeland 
due to a lack of job opportunities there, and would be ‘pulled’ to an alternative 
destination based on the opportunities offered there. These factors have 
frequently been denfined as economic choices, whether on the micro or macro 
scale. However, as Haas has pointed out “an improved theoretical perspective 
on migration and development has to be able to account for the role of structure 
– the constraining or enabling general political, institutional, economic, social 
and cultural context in which migration takes place – as well as agency – the 
limited but real capacity of individuals to overcome constraints and potentially 
reshape structure” (2010:241). In addition, the connection among development 
and migration must also “be scrutinized as a field of struggle where different 
actors are involved in trying to establish their visions of development and 
change” (Dannecker 2009:122).  
   
As opposed to the importance that researchers like Safran have placed on the 
significance for diasporic groups of keeping up solid connections and 
identifications with the cultures of their homeland, Hall calls attention to “the link 
between these communities and their ‘homeland’ or the possibility of a return to 
the past are much more precarious than usually thought” (Hall 1993, 355, in 
Tsagarousianou 2004). The concept of the home therefore is much more 
complex than appears to diasporas premised on the power of nostalgia would 
want us believe. As Brah points out;  
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“What is home? On the one hand, ‘home’ is a mythic place of desire 
in the diasporic imagination. In this sense it is a place of return, 
even if it is possible to visit the geographical territory that is seen as 
the place of ‘origin’. On the other hand, home is also a lived 
experience of a locality. Its sounds and smells, its heat and dust, 
balmy summer evenings, sombre grey skies in the middle of the 
day…all this, as mediated by the historically specific of everyday 
social relations. In other words, the varying experiences of pains 
and pleasures, the terrors and contentments, or the highs and 
humdrum of everyday lived culture that marks how, for example, a 
cold winter night might be differently experienced sitting by a 
crackling fireside in a mansion compared with standing huddled 
around a makeshift fire on the streets of nineteenth century 
England” (1996,192).  
 
The complexity of the notion of home among the diaspora communities links to 
an original homeland, for Brah it “is intrinsically linked with the way in which the 
processes of inclusion or exclusion operate and are subjectively experienced 
under given circumstances. It relates to the complex political and personal 
struggles over the social regulation of ‘belonging’” (ibid, 194). Furthermore, what 
is essential in diasporic ideas of home is their relationship to a variety of areas 
through cultural and geographical boundaries, as Fazal and Tsagarousianou 
point out:  
 
“…within the frame of contemporary diasporas, the notions of 
‘home’ and when a location becomes home are therefore linked 
with the issues related to inclusion or exclusion which tend to be 
subjectively experienced depending upon the circumstances. When 
does a location become a home? How can one distinguish between 
‘feeling at home’ and staking a claim to a place as one’s own?” 
(2002:11).  
 
It can be said that the depictions of a Kurdish homeland are unique in relation to 
the discoveries of ethnographic and anthropological examination. The research 
data on Kurdish diaspora has identified homeland meanings which are multiple 
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in real as well as an imagined sense, and could be both idealized and/or 
associated with traumatic experiences due to conflicts and oppression from the 
sovereign state (Alinia 2004).  
 
There is, as previously mentioned large differences in the Kurdish diaspora. The 
Kurdish diaspora has different meanings for different categories and individuals, 
but common to all is that Kurdish culture and language represents resources 
that they can mobilize to gain a platform from which they can meet the 
community and create their identity, feel safe and enjoy their lives as 
meaningful. Kurdish family networks, relationships and the movement becomes 
‘home’ where they can find peace, a sense of belonging, affirmation, self-
respect and self-confidence. However, there are multiple forms of identity in 
diaspora and therefore multiple places that can be called home.     
 
2.5  Community Engagement and Diaspora  
During recent years, community engagement is being used by governments to 
establish a more democratic or political ground. Although there is no agreed 
definition by Communities and local Government (CLG) define community 
engagement as “the process whereby the public bodies reach out to 
communities to create empowerment opportunities” (2007:12). In the UK, the 
Metropolitan Police define community engagement as, “the proactive 
harnessing of the energies knowledge and skills of communities and partners 
not merely to identify problems but also to negotiate priorities for action and 
shape and deliver solutions” (M.P.A 2006-2009:5). Rogers and Robinson define 
community engagement as “the opportunity, capacity, and willingness of 
individuals to work collectively to shape public life” (Rogers and Robinson 
2004:434). Community engagement can provide opportunities for marginalized 
residents to develop the skills and networks that can enable them to tackle 
social exclusion.  
 
There is no single definition to capture the position that community engagement 
plays within black and ethnic minority groups in the UK. The terms ‘community’ 
and ‘engagement’ both have numerous meanings and definitions with 
academics and policy makers. For example the meaning of engagement can 
include how black and ethnic minority groups or the wider population can 
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engage with projects, activities or any strategic planning. However, this 
insufficiency of definition could be measured as a strength rather than a weak 
point, provoking local discussion as to what these terms might mean in different 
frameworks. Madison and Laing outline that community engagement “takes a 
particular form, and is context-dependent – arising for institutions from their 
individual histories and locations, and from their views about their strategic 
position” (2007:10-11).  
 
In many community engagements there are different ways used in describing 
community. There are geographically defined communities, which could identify 
a city, number of streets or communities of interest where the members share 
specific features or concerns. The term of community is also defined as an 
informally organized social entity that is characterized by a sense of identity 
(White, 1982). Community also can be defined differently by researchers for the 
purpose of their project. It is likely to engage with groups or residents in a range 
of different routes but it is important to empathize which kind of engagement it is 
that specific residents or community groups like better and are able to use, in a 
way that supports citizens and communities. 
 
The term Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) communities will be used in this 
thesis to identify the limits on those being examined in the research. As Platt 
emphasizes, “an ethnic group is, theoretically, one where the association with 
both a particular origin and specific customs is adopted by people themselves to 
establish a shared identity” (2007:18). However this statement shows that 
ethnic groups share comparable features and can be used as an identity 
characteristic, it is vital not to overstate these commonalities as a ‘homogenous’ 
group. The study is aware of the term ‘hard to reach’ when it is not to be a label 
to all black and ethnic minorities but the intersectionality of black and ethnic 
minority residence is dependent on that engagement. Nevertheless all black 
and ethnic minorities share an important part, in which not all white populations 
are included. Isajiwa (1993) has highlighted “the majority ethnic groups are 
those who determine the character of the society’s basic institutions, especially 
the male political, economic, and cultural institutions. They determine the 
character of the norms of society as a whole, including the legal system. Their 
culture becomes the culture of the total society into which the minority ethnic 
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group assimilate” (12). This statement illustrates how similar experiences are 
shared within black and ethnic minorities, and in some studies the term of 
‘other’ is used toward black and ethnic minorities to identify them among 
communities. As a result of a lack of resources, this research will locate the 
black and ethnic minority in localities whose ethnic origin is not white.             
 
Highlighting the ideological link between active participation and governance 
which is community oriented, King and Cruickshank review the key components 
of community engagement as involving:  
 
"…continuity and sustainability of good engagement, trust and local 
relationships; opportunities for deliberation; the ability to deal with 
anger and the legacy of previous poor engagement; tailor-made 
opportunities for various stakeholder groups to participate; . . . 
facilitat[ing] joint influence over issues; mak[ing] use of community 
‘hubs’ and existing communication link- ages, understand[ing] the 
engagement needs and aspirations of community groups and 
produc[ing] effective engagement networks” (2010, 3).  
 
Community engagement is high on the UK government’s agenda and it is 
particularly related to the concept of ‘Big Society’, which aims “to put more 
power and opportunity into people’s hands” (Cabinet Office 2010).  
  
The concept of multiculturalism as well as integration presupposes that 
immigrant relationships to the host society are problematic. These problematic 
relations must therefore be regulated and controlled by the state. As Wahlbeck 
argues:  
 
“Multicultural policies presume that there are easy recognizable 
communities which have clear cultural boundaries and constitute 
viable ethnic communities. These policies have also played a part in 
the racialization and culturalization of differences between groups in 
society” (1999:14)  
 
60 
 
For Berry the integration of international migrants will be part of a much wider 
process of ‘acculturation’, a phenomenon that involves the cultural changes that 
take place when individuals, groups or even communities from other cultures 
come into first hand and continuous contact with a host culture (2006). 
 
Thomas illustrated “Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) in the way it has been 
designed and implemented is contradictory to other key governmental priorities 
such as community cohesion” (2010:443). Thomas also suggested there was 
clear tension between preventative strategies that targeted Muslim groups for 
funding and community cohesion initiatives that aimed to end such community 
specific initiatives, and to mainstream public funding streams (Thomas 2010). 
As Kundnani (2015) points out;  
 
“…over the last five years, policies have been subjected to ongoing 
critical scrutiny and reform [...] the Preventing Violent Extremism 
(PVE) programme that seeks to stem radicalization and extremism 
has developed through a number of iterations in response to 
challenges from various constituencies. On a fundamental level, 
though, the legacy of policy failures in the last six years after 9/11 is 
well documented, there has been little attempt how the UK 
government responded to the events of 9/11 and the 7/7 London 
bombings, particularly in relation to domestic counter-terrorism 
policy” (8).  
  
Cultural differences have been at the heart of people’s behaviour throughout the 
history of global migration. Intercultural contact does not always translate into 
progressive and long-term social relations and can in certain circumstances 
reinforce prejudices and exacerbate tensions (Vertovec 2007; Clayton 2009; 
Amin 2002). For Berry (2006) the integration of international migrants is part of 
a much wider process of ‘acculturation’, a phenomenon that involves the 
cultural changes that take place when individuals, groups or even communities 
from other cultures come into first hand continuous contact with a host culture. 
 
The ethnic identity among diaspora groups has become nearly everyone 
intermutual classifications peoples use to structure their ideas about who they 
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are, to take account of their behaviours and experiences, and to be aware of the 
world surrounding them. The difficulty around ethnic identity is also exacerbated 
by the fact that “ethnicity is not equally important to all people and the degree of 
ethnic identity and attachment differ strongly between individuals and within 
societies” (Hiebert, 2000:235). The terms of dual citizenship and hybridity have 
been used among researchers in the field of diaspora study.  Hall (1992) 
highlights that hybridity is particularly linked to the idea of ‘new ethnicities’, and 
he adds, identity should be thought of as a “production” because it is an 
ongoing process. Gilroy (1993) uses the notion of ‘double consciousness’ to 
denote the hybrid and diasporic condition. Palmer (1999) suggests that “a 
national identity is thus a very personal concept as individual’s draw upon the 
differing identities available to them in order to construct their own sense of who 
they are and how they fit in” (314). 
According to Sheyholislami “national identity is a social construct, but it has 
historical and ethnic roots […] even if such roots often are invented […] But 
differently, those involved in great number of cultural and political symbols and 
myths as ways of strengthening national ties” (2010:291). To have national 
identity is to possess ways of discussing the homeland and nationhood. Having 
recognized that discourse is a means of articulating nation, and theory is a 
socially constructed political unit, discourse is now focused on? the concept of 
identity.  
 
Within this research, the connotations attached to the term ‘nasnamah’ in the 
Kurdish language will first be considered, followed by how identity is to be 
understood in this study. The term ‘nasnamah-i natavi’ is used in the Kurdish 
language in discourse on national identity. Nonetheless, just as natavi and 
nataviat are not directly equivalent to the nation or national in English, neither, 
truly speaking, is nasnamah equivalent with identity.  
 
Hall clearly describes three main concepts in relation to his discourse on 
cultural identity: ‘enlightenment’, ‘sociological’, and ‘post modern’(1996: 597). 
Enlightenment was an ‘individualist’ conception of identity that explained that 
the self remained the same throughout its existence. The ‘sociological’ concept, 
however, was an ‘interactive’ concept that saw that the self was “formed in 
relation to significant others”. Finally, the ‘post modern’ concept saw the self as 
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“having no fixed, essential, or permanent identity” (Ibid. 597-8). In his 
discussions of cultural identity and the Afro Caribbean diaspora, Hall adds that 
“identity is not as transparent or unproblematic as we think. Perhaps instead of 
thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact […] we should think, instead 
of identity as a production, which is never complete, always in process, and 
always constituted within, not outside representation” (1990:222). Rather than 
thinking of identity as an “already accomplished fact, which the new cultural 
practices then represent,” Hall thinks instead of “identity as a production which 
is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not 
outside, representation” (Hall 1993:392). In other words identity is in a constant 
state of evolution and reconstruction. Hall claims to offer a “different way of 
thinking about cultural identity” by theorising identity “as constituted, not outside 
but within representation”(ibid:402).  
 
Dwyer likewise discusses the contestation of ideas of identity and community by 
exposing the instance of British Muslim women. She contends that identities 
and communities are situated between the local and global - where another 
envisioned community based on gender is created. This envisioned and 
gendered community acts as constructors of ambivalent groups in connection to 
space. She clarifies that for British Muslim women Muslim groups can contribute 
to discourses of belonging, however in the meantime contrasts with different 
groups in the Muslim world act creators of contested identity based on talks of 
distinction (Dwyer 1999). Indeed, as Mavroudi (2010) states, concepts of 
community get to be challenged when those in diaspora negotiate their 
belonging and identity, and therefore, community can act as a unifying space, 
additionally as a space for tensions and constructions of distinction.  
 
The past decades have seen a vast amount of scholarly literature on 
transnationalism, defined as “the processes by which immigrants build social 
fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement” 
(Basch, Schiller, and Blanc 1994:1), immigrants have explored these cross-
border connections which enable communities to build bridges between nations. 
The diaspora literature does not examine the consequences of not having a 
community engagement policy in particular it does not examine this when there 
is a national policy that is not implemented locally. This study will examine the 
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consequences of a lack of community engagement policy with the primary 
consideration being a lack of trust among the diaspora and host society and 
contribute to the existing literature.  
 
2.6  Return and Diaspora 
The strength of the concept of return as used in this study lies between the 
intention of return with a connection to the homeland and actual experiences of 
real returnees to the homeland. The teleology of an eventual return to the 
homeland is variable between diasporas, across time, and amongst individuals. 
The causes of returning diaspora are very diverse in nature and can vary from 
state to state and from individual returnee to another even within the same 
place of return. Tsuda differentiates between two primary types of diasporic 
returnees: (a) “first generation subjects who move back to their country of birth 
and (b) ethnic return migrants, or later generation descendants who return to 
their countries of ancestral origin after living outside their ethnic homelands for 
generations” (Tsuda 2009:1).  
 
In the last century, some diasporic groups, such as Greeks, Jews and Germans 
opted for “purposive voluntary” return while certain other groups, “like Egyptians 
from Iraq and Yemenis from Saudi Arabia, were subjected to forced 
repatriation”(Khayati 2008:21). It has also been stated that, in some countries 
“like Greece, Israel, India or China, wishing to redress problems of brain drain 
or economic stress, have tried to encourage successful members of their 
diasporas to return”(Khayati 2008:21). Jennifer Skulte believes “the reasons 
that members of a diaspora return to their homelands – whether they 
themselves were born there or they are descendants of those who did – are 
both numerous and yet fairly easy to narrow down to one broadly generalizable 
reason” (Skulte 2005:4). Further, Skulte argues that “members of a diaspora 
return once the conditions that prompted their departure no longer exist. This is, 
of course, assuming that the feeling of being tied to the homeland is strong 
enough that individuals from the homeland did not decide to leave because they 
no longer want to be an integral part of the country (or nation) in the first place” 
(Skulte 2005:4). Consequently, for Brah (1996), return home is a mythic place 
of desire in the diasporic imagination. Their standard of living in their host 
country and what they can expect when they return to the homeland also has a 
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direct bearing on whether to go back or to stay put. Continuing resilient 
connections to the homeland frequently requires sacrifices on the part of the 
diaspora, such as living abroad close to their communities, and maintaining 
language, culture and intermarriage within the community. Mavroudi argued that 
“those in diaspora may dip into and use different strategies at different times 
and different spaces in order to better or deal with their lives, drawing on as 
many resources as possible and using the cross-border connections they have 
available to them”(2005:64). 
  
From 1990s onwards the question of return migration was the subject of several 
theoretical interpretations and empirical studies that succeeded in 
characterising and identifying the principal mechanisms at work. Dumont and 
Spielvogel (2007) found four reasons for return migration, “i) failure to integrate 
into the host country and changes in economic situation of the home country, ii) 
individuals preferences for their home country; iii) the achievement of a savings 
objective, or iv) greater employment opportunities for individuals in their home 
country […] to experience gained abroad” (178). The economic situation is 
important in the place of return. This study identifies that return or hope of return 
to the homeland is a major defining moment. Saarela and Rooth (2012) claim 
that return from exile might happen due to wrong decisions being made at the 
beginning of the process of leaving homeland. For example, individuals who 
leave their homeland may have had access to incorrect information regarding 
the destination of a host country. Therefore, Durugonul (2013) argued that 
reasons of returning to the homeland could be motivated by disappointment, as 
result of failure to obtain the economic aims offered by the host countries. In 
fact, Colton (1993) asserts that returnees and especially younger migrants find 
they are unable to reside in their ancestral homes.  
 
The last decade has seen a return movement of diaspora to homeland due 
primarily to the temporary boost to the Kurdish economy in Iraq, with 
international companies investing in the region. This is due to various factors. 
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the autonomy of the Kurdistan region from 
central government in 2005. In addition, the open door policy created a new era 
for the Kurdish region as this policy invited many international companies to 
invest in this area. The Kurdish government believed, to grow and make the 
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Kurdistan economy a success they must invite international companies to invest 
in Kurdistan. Waladbagi (2013) indicates that living conditions and quality of life 
in the homeland increased encouraging a return of individuals and familys from 
diaspora.  Moreover, Coniglio (et al. 2009) argued that better skilled migrants 
find it optimal to return to their homeland. This study has identified that 
returnees who had better skills and knowledge gained in the host country, were 
valued and more successful in gaining highly paid and skilled work as soon as 
they returned back to homeland. Aitkins acknowledges the value of diasporas 
and says “Now we have huge shifts of knowledge, talents and skills across 
borders. Traditionally Diasporas were looked to for remittances and 
philanthropy which, is perhaps, to take a limiting view. Now Diasporas are 
bridges to knowledge, expertise, networks, resources and markets for their 
countries of origin Atkins goes on to say “what were once ‘lost actors’ can now 
become ‘national assets. 
      
An enthusiasm for return migrations can be traced back to the 1960s. However, 
up to this point, it was an irregular consideration in migration studies (King, 
2000). This lack of studies into return migrations is clarified in the literature 
through researcher's observations that the return assumes failed migrations 
(Cessarino, 2004). In contrast, the complexities presented by globalization and 
transnationalism have stirred a dynamic interest for this topic. Several 
researchers have compared diaspora with transnationalism (Tőlőlyan, 1991). 
Some different researchers push that migration suggests a returning back to the 
country of origin. Brubaker (2005), for instance, credits three elements to 
diaspora which position diaspora in the typology of return migrations. Firstly, he 
declares the dispersion of population from the place of departure. Secondly, a 
genuine or an imagined connection to the homeland. And lastly, he proposes 
the element of 'boundary maintenance' which focuses on the significance of the 
homeland and the need of return. King and Christou (2011), for instance, assert 
that a return diaspora will probably be built up taking into account emotions and 
believes in connection to the homeland and return, rather than in connection to 
statistical records.  
 
King and Christou (2010) make particular reference to return to the ancestral 
home, represented by the instance of ethnic Germans return to Germany. On 
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one hand, they contend that their return to the homeland is a ‘misnomer’ as 
these migrants have not been to their country of origin for quite a long time. 
However, on the other hand, they attribute to these returns the concept of 
‘counter-diaspora’ and claims that the ancestral return aligns with the typology 
of return migration. Such approaches might likewise clarify why the focus of a 
few studies is on returnees’ developments and contestations of identity and 
community in the country of origin. Moreover, Friedman (2002) argued that 
“roots signify emotional bonds with the physical environment but often also 
contain notions of local community, shared culture, and so forth” (670). The 
theory of roots and authentic identity played a significant role in the identity 
formation of participants.   
  
Returnees’ identities are frequently seen as being constructed and contested in 
connection to space and place, in the middle of home and homeland, and 
therefore, assume various strands of identity and belonging. This adjusts to 
Christou and King's (2010) contention: “the ambiguous view of home (Where is 
it? What does it mean?) signifies that homecoming is not a static state of being 
but a fluid process of becoming, a journey into spaces of selfhood” (644). 
Mavroudi on Palestinian diaspora, contends that through active strategies of 
politicisation, Palestinians in Athens contest diasporic identities in relation to 
space and place through choosing belongingness or imagined belongingness, 
rather than perceiving identity as a ‘given’ (Mavroudi 2007). It can be argued 
that homeland oriented politics in relation to identity or community create 
informal or imagined political spaces which maintain or contest identities or 
community by acting as factors of empowerment or disillusionment.  
 
One route for comprehension arrangements of identity and belonging in 
diaspora and/or return diaspora is, as Christou emphases, to concentrate on 
'gender performativities' and 'emotional acts'. In doing so, she uncovers that 
Greek migrants in Denmark and returnees in Greece, in their search of identity 
and homeland “through place-based emotional attachments” (Christou 
2011:249), arrange and challenge being and becoming in diaspora with feelings 
for an imagined homeland. Therefore, identities and belongings are seen as 
fluid and really taking shape (Hall, 1990). Such perspectives stress the 
incomplete character of identities and/or collective identities in general, situating 
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them in boundaries of space and place. These relationships between home and 
homeland do not just make ambiguities and complexities in connection to 
identity but also, can be expressed that migrants see themselves to have a 
place in more than one country, or even to a number of diasporic spaces. 
Teerling's (2011) study on British-born Cypriot returnees to Cyprus is 
explanatory in this sense. He goes beyond disciplinary boundaries of identity 
and community, of home and belonging of ‘them’ and ‘us’ and emphases that a 
'third-cultural space of belonging’ is shaped by components to which returnees 
feel they belong. He asserts this new 'third-cultural space of belonging is 
hybridized through returnees place, time, unity and experience have with their 
homeland societies. 
 
Christou and King (2010) contend that returnees generally compare the life they 
abandoned in diaspora with the life in the homeland, and this disturbs their 
imagined perspective of the homeland and can make the substances on the 
ground difficult or, they can see themselves or be seen as ‘strangers in their 
ethnic homeland’ (Tsuda, 2003). Cohen for instance, contends how homelands 
promotions of an ethno-national justification for returnees are covered by 
economic rationalism and the selection of ‘quality migrants’ can make strains 
between the homeland and its returnees (Cohen 2009). 
 
There has also been a trend of studies on homecomings and present 
connections between homelands and returnees frequently from the returnee’s 
point of view. However, there are some contemporary studies that analyse and 
break down these connections from the host country’s perspective. Therefore, 
Ben-Porat (2011) argues that; 
 
“…return diasporas can be a product of ‘homeland’s needs and 
policies, this determines fluid relations between diaspora and 
‘homeland’. Therefore ‘homeland’ also becomes fluid by claims, 
reclaims or renounces the status of certain groups as its diasporas 
according to its changing needs and goals, thereby indicating its 
own fluidity” (91).  
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Furthermore, Sheffer indicates that the connections between the homeland and 
diaspora are heterogeneous, as both returnees and hosts perceive themselves 
as different. This heterogeneity is perpetuated through the diasporas’ attitudes 
of preserving identity and continuity and the homeland focus on the nation’s 
centrality when situating themselves in connection to their diaspora (Sheffer 
2010). Unlike the other countries, whose prime reasons of return are dominated 
by political, social and economic factors, Kurdish returnee’s experiences are for 
slightly different reasons, the most prominent factor that drove the majority of 
returnees to return south of Kurdistan was identified during the interviews as 
political and economical of the region after the invasion Iraq 2003. The Kurdish 
diasporas retained a keen interest in regaining independence for their 
homelands and from the beginning of their experience in the diaspora worked to 
keep this dream alive though individual and community activities. 
 
When members of diasporas return they bring with them their experience living 
outside the homeland, including values, skills and relationships. Returning 
members of diasporas were keen to use their new knowledge and experiences 
gained in host nations in supporting the building of a new Kurdistan. This 
extended knowledge and skills base was seen by those interviewed to bring 
new opportunities to their returnee communities and the wider regions but it was 
also felt that it can also bring alienation and mistrust. Some diaspora have 
feelings of guilt for leaving Kurdistan in the first place and then guilt for returning 
either because the reality of  life in the host country  did not match preconceived 
ideas and returning has a stigma of failure or have encountered mistrust from 
friends and family as being ‘Westernized’.  
 
Gender plays a significant part in attitudes towards return. Christou and King’s 
(2011) research highlighted “diasporic imaginaries and mobilities, including 
rootedness and rootlessness, which are experienced differently by men and 
women” (287). The decision to return was predominately a male decision while 
female returnees did so with little alternative, women who felt liberated from the 
social norms and gender roles expected of them from their extended families, 
experienced freedom in the host countries away from the matriarchal influence, 
the decision to return was not self-determining. However, it can be argued that 
there is not enough literature on women and children’s experiences of return 
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migration. In particular the experiences of women and children returning from 
western to non-western societies and the freedoms they leave behind, is 
neglected in current scholarship. 
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Chapter Three: Methods  
 
This chapter outlines the methodological premises underpinning this study, as 
well as a description of the methods used to study the diaspora experience of 
Kurdish people in Devon and returnees in south Kurdistan. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, this research is based upon qualitative research that has employed 
the use of semi-structured interviews, in which several questions emerged from 
engaging with the research participants.  
 
The use of semi-structured interviews “allows people to answer more on their 
own terms than the standardised and more highly structured interview permits” 
(May 1997:129), and allow greater insights into people’s feelings, opinions, 
experiences and attitudes. This research focuses on qualitative analysis, an 
examination of how I comprehend constructionism and apply it in this study 
while researching identity and belonging. The rationale behind the use of this 
form of interviewing was explained to each interviewee, and all agreed to 
contribute and participate fully with the study.  
 
The study has set out to explore how experience can be comprehended as a 
mediated site of knowledge and information. Experience is comprehended and 
interpreted in connection to the common predominant discourse that enables 
diverse social areas, perspectives and perceptions about what sort of society 
we live in and imagine, and how we comprehend ourselves in connection to 
surrounding people, social structures and collectivities. Furthermore, this 
research has implemented thorough discourses of the questions of sampling, 
interviewing as a method for gathering material, ethical considerations in 
connection to minoritized subjects, and content analysis as a method to break 
down the interview material and the relationship between the interviewees and 
researcher. In this study, constructions of place through discourses of 
home/homeland are centrally important, as they are discursively constitutive to 
identity formation of these diaspora individuals and the ways they attach and 
develop a sense of belonging to places. 
 
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section explains the use of 
sampling and discusses the key issues in data collection and analysis. The 
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second section describes the interview process, as well as location and 
empirical of study. The third section addresses the ethical considerations of this 
research. The fourth section is concerned with providing an understanding of 
how research is affected, in terms of outcomes and process, by my own 
position as a researcher. Finally, fifth section explains the suitability of a 
qualitative analysis for this research.  
 
In using a variety of different materials and data collection techniques this study 
demonstrates a broad range of ideas and perspectives to help analyse the four 
key themes of this research. The use of the semi-structured interview technique 
is to have knowledge of how individual people experience and make sense of 
their own lives (Valentine 1997). A central benefit of semi-structured interviews 
is their free structure that allows not only the ability to compare the collected 
data, but also to look closely at the individual meaning and comprehension of 
the process and experiences of diaspora.  
 
This research reflects my journey to discover exactly who I am, where I belong, 
and other questions that have developed due to my own diasporic experiences. 
My interest in these questions began at a young age, piqued by reading history 
books and listening to stories passed down in the oral tradition, and through 
speaking to the elders of many villages and the Peshmarges (Kurdish Army), 
recording their accounts. Later I began academic research, collating information 
using various methodological tools, including archival research of records from 
the Kurdistan community organisation, political poetry, art and other Kurdish 
migration research and books and journals. It is hoped that these tools will 
provide answers to these lifelong questions regarding homeland and identity. 
 
3.1  Sampling and Secondary sources 
This study has used self-selecting sampling methods. E-mails were sent out 
asking interested people within the Kurdish diaspora network if they wanted to 
participate in this study. Network sampling relies on lists gathered from 
acquaintances, while purposive sampling allows the researcher to use their 
decision in selecting respondents with the required experience and knowledge 
that would best allow them to respond to the research questions and study 
objectives. As participation was completely voluntary I had to rely on the 
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generosity and availability of the people I contacted. The process of selecting 
participants allowed me to capture a diversity of diaspora members and their 
activities, addressing gender, population, organisations, demographic and 
geographic locations in Devon.  
 
According to Flick, sampling is an important part of study procedures because:  
 
“…we have to select the right cases, groups and materials in a 
somehow defined way – so that we can do our study with limited 
resources – from a more or less infinite horizon of possible 
selections. And with what we select, we want to make statements 
that we can generalize in one way or the other” (Flick 2007: 25).  
 
For this study I have decided to use purposive  sampling, quota sampling and 
snowball sampling in order to choose information and reach individual 
experiences. Flick (ibid) underlines that sampling is not only a question of 
selecting individuals to be interviewed, but also involves the selection of sites 
where you can find such individuals and situations. Uniqueness and shared 
patterns that cut across cases are, according to Patton (2002), other important 
benefits with sampling in qualitative research. Patton argues that the matter of 
sample size holds an ambiguous place within qualitative research. The size of 
the sample depends on what you want to know. Besides this, the purpose of the 
inquiry and the available time and resources are other important issues that 
should be considered when determining the sample size (ibid). 
 
Other advantages of secondary sourced data include deepening the 
understanding of a research topic; by providing a basis of comparisons of 
former research this type of research is valuable for its economical aspects, 
saving both money and time. McCaston (2005) explains the disadvantages of 
secondary data:  
 
“Secondary data helps us understand the condition or status of a 
group, but compared to primary data they are imperfect reflections 
of reality.... The person reviewing the secondary data can easily 
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become overwhelmed by the volume of secondary data available, if 
selectivity is not exercised” (7). 
 
Further challenges of secondary data, according to McCaston, are secondary 
sources which may conflict with each other, and also secondary data that may 
be out-dated, rendering the research information inaccurate or flawed. 
Therefore it is necessary to analyse this type of data with great care and 
attention. My secondary sources have not been pre-selected. I followed the 
natural flow of my search, during which I drew from a range of contexts – 
academic sources, policy and research studies. I welcome the interpretivist 
aspect of secondary sourced methodology as I believe all sourced information 
is interpreted to a degree.  
 
3.2  Description 
This study is concerned with the ways that individuals comprehend the world by 
sharing their experiences to others through discourse. It is steeped in social 
constructionism, the precept that holds that human knowledge or importance 
originates from engagement with realities in the world, that is, knowledge is 
constructed and not simply “a disinterested reflection of reality” (Nash 1994:68). 
Interviews were conducted in two geographically separate locations. The first 
phase of face-to-face and semi-structured interviewing took place in Devon with 
individual Kurdish community members and key actors that work closely with 
diaspora communities. The second phase of interviewing was conducted in 
South Kurdistan (Kurdistan of Iraq) with returnees who had returned from 
diaspora. These interviews were conducted to explore returnees experiences 
related to transnational practices (see Appendix for participants table).  In 
qualitative interviews knowledge is built up through an exchange and interaction 
of opinions of ideas among two individuals who discuss a topic of common 
interest (Kvale 1997). The use of the voice recorder was mostly accepted by the 
participants, with the condition that interviews would remain anonymous. Local 
material and articles were also investigated to contribute the essential 
contextual data and information needed.  
 
Another method that was been useful for the study in data collection is the 
Internet. This method provided a great deal of factual information on Kurdish 
74 
 
issues. The internet is an effective and fast method for the global distribution of 
information with a variety of articles. I have also used articles and 
newspapersas as due to the rapidly changing geopolitical situation in Kurdistan, 
there is often a lack of information available from other sources. 
 
The procedure from research proposal to submission took four years. The study 
was designed to be carried out in two stages. Essential within the first year, the 
study was dedicated to discourse analysis. Both study areas were returned to 
throughout the study to keep them up-to-date. It was important that the study 
procedure was a flexible and iterative one, so that it was able to deal with such 
changes that took place. During the second and third years of the research 
contacts were made with participants to conduct interviews, as well as 
transcription along with sustained periods of data analysis and writing. The data 
is bridging research and developing a service response to case study both in 
Devon and Kurdistan. 
 
Prior study has found that the majority of Kurds residing in Devon are first 
generation, male and female aged between eighteen and fifty years. Due to 
ethical considerations regarding confidentiality, I did not present the 
respondents more closely. To avoid the risk of identifying individuals, it has 
been necessary to exclude certain information, and the names of participants 
used in this research have been changed.  
 
The majority of interviews were conducted in their place of work: only two were 
conducted in a public place (a coffee shop in the town). The majority of Kurdish 
interviewees were interviewed at their own homes or at the Kurdish community 
centre in Plymouth. Some participants were interviewed twice, as over time new 
questions arose that required follow-up interviews to be conducted.  
 
Between January 2011 to June 2011 I travelled to South Kurdistan to conduct 
interviews with members of the Kurdish diaspora who had returned to 
Kurdistan. The participants presented their views on topics related to return and 
the experiences they have had since their return to South Kurdistan (Kurdistan 
of Iraq). In total thirty-three participants of diverse backgrounds were 
interviewed, of which twenty-three were male and ten were female. The majority 
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of these people stressed that returning to Kurdistan become much easier after 
2004. Within this study I have sought to look beyond the meaning of return to 
instead discover individual’s experiences, motivations and hopes while living 
across different states. 
 
The benefit of semi-structured interviews also allowed me to gain a wide range 
of data, and at the same time to research certain subjects beyond my initial 
questions, while avoiding ambiguity and confusion. Qualitative research allowed 
my study to examine return not as an independent procedure, but rather as 
connected to other concepts such as belonging, transnationalism, identity and 
integration. Specifically, interviewee’s views regarding return were analysed 
with reference to belonging, transnational and integration activities, which 
constitute the core for understanding social life. The perceptions of participants 
in the study allowed provided insights in to how the social world was built with 
the sources from an insider point of view. I was not simply watching, but rather 
encountering and taking an interest in specific activities and maintaining trust. 
The use of semi-structured interviews was therefore the most appropriate 
method for collecting knowledge on the Kurdish diaspora, and particularly to 
comprehend an individuals' link between the country of settlement and the 
country of origin.   
Contacts with participants were made through the Kurdish diaspora network. All 
interviews were conducted in either English or in Kurdish, and audio recorded 
before being transcribed into English. On average, interviews were 
approximately 75 minutes long and were structured by the study themes. At the 
end of each interview participants were asked how they felt about participating 
in the research. Eight interviews were conducted with a family member present. 
After conducting the interviews I wrote the theoretical background based on the 
interview analysis. Throughout this study, a significant number of direct quotes 
taken from the interviews are used, allowing the voice of interviewees and their 
contributions to be presented clearly within the study. Transcriptions of each 
participant’s interview were completed within five days of the interview, ensuring 
that the discussion was still fresh, allowing also more accurate coding of data.  
 
During the research there were areas which did not work or hampered the 
study. Losing data due to technical error without a backup system was costly 
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and some data was lost which could not be replicated.  During the translation 
process some of the literal meaning was lost in the data collection due to 
language differences or misinterpretation of vocabulary. It is clear to see in the 
participant’s interview table below (see Figure 3.1) the disparity between gender 
participants. This is in part because there is a relatively small population of 
3,700 Kurdish diaspora in Plymouth, which is comprised of 750 females and 
2900 males (PKC, 2014), so acquiring an equal cross section of gender 
participants was not possible.  Over the four years that this research has been 
undertaken there has been a steady change in the geopolitical situation in 
Kurdistan of Iraq, resulting in less disaporic returnees due to the economy and 
the current war. 
 
Figure 3.1  Research participant interviewees  
 
1. Interviews with key Actors  
All interviews have been conducted in Devon, related to the theme of research.  
 Interviews with various key actors in Devon, (see appendix 2 for the list of organisations who 
participate in this study).  
 Interviews with the key Kurdish people in Devon such as leader, community worker and 
business people. 
 Interviews with other agencies that work with the Kurdish people in Devon and that includes 
other diaspora group.  
2. Interviews with Kurdish individuals   
All interviews have been conducted among the Kurdish community in Devon and related to all questions.  
 Interviews 48 people in Plymouth 
 Interviews 10 people in rural area 
3. Interviews with returnees 
This has taken place in Kurdistan of Iraq and related to the themes of return. I have conducted interviews 
from a broad spectrum of people from a range of professions, this has also included family members 
(spouse, and Children over age of 16).  
3.1 Diaspora to diaspora 
With the change in the security and economy situation in South Kurdistan (Kurdistan of Iraq) and the 
imergence of ISIS, the study interviewed 7 people in diaspora in Devon who returned to Kurdistan of Iraq 
but came back to Devon due to the war. 
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Secondary Sources     
I have used a wide range of secondary resources in compiling this research. 
These tools have enabled me to extensively research themes which are related 
to the study, as shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
 
                                            Figure 3.2: Secondary sources. 
 
The analysis of secondary data from other sources has been used to support 
my own research data. I have used both internal and external secondary 
sources, as shown in figure 3.2.  
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3.3  Research Questions    
The Kurdish community is a particularly unique study, since this community 
consists of refugees from a country of origin (i.e. Kurdistan) that has never 
formally existed through international recognition. In this study I discuss and 
challenge the concept of identity, and the notion of homeland and belonging, in 
regards to contemporary hypotheses of diaspora and migration studies. This 
research was carried out in Devon, and the majority of the study in the City of 
Plymouth. The Kurds have been present in the UK for many years, but there 
was a significant arrival of Kurdish refugees to Devon beginning in early 2000. 
By the end of 2015, according to a Plymouth Kurdish Community (PKC 2012) 
report, more than 5000 Kurds were resident in Devon and Cornwall. In some 
areas in the UK the Kurdish communities are the largest single ethnic group. 
This research examines the Kurdish diaspora in this region with regard to four 
general themes, each of which are discussed below in greater detail: diaspora 
experience; identity and belonging; community engagement; and return 
(comprising intention of return and experience of return). 
 
Diaspora experience 
Diaspora for some diasporic people has implied traumatic experiences, 
however at the same time it has also given diasporic people a space and the 
possibilities to establish their movement. I explore evidence based on local 
experiences of diaspora in Devon. The sub-questions below support this 
analysis in addressing the main themes of experience in diaspora between the 
Kurds and their place of residence:  
a) Have diasporic people experienced discrimination? How has it been 
presented?   
b) Does intercultural awareness in the host country have benefits towards 
building and improving the connection between diaspora and the host 
society? 
c) Do diasporians feel at home in the host society? Why or why not? 
d) Has diasporian attachment to ancestral homeland changed over the 
years, if so how?  
e) Is it  possible to be attached both to the UK and Kurdistan?  
f) Do diasporian’s feel part of UK society? Why or why not? 
g) Is moving to diaspora a positive or negative experience? 
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Identity and belonging  
In this study I analyse the identity and the concept of belonging among the 
Kurdish diaspora. Many scholars believe that the Kurds in diaspora have 
discovered the Kurdishness or Kurdayati in diasporic life (Hassanpour 1995; 
Ahmadzadeh 2003; Khayati 2008; Alinia 2004; Wahlbeck 1998). The Kurdish 
diasporic experience has allowed the Kurdish people in diaspora to have 
multiple identities. The sub-questions below will support me to find and analyse 
the main themes of identity and belonging in diaspora among the Kurds in the 
UK: 
h) Do diasporas believe their identity has changed since arriving in the 
host society?  
i) Has the concept of Kurdishness been lost while living in diaspora? 
j) Does the Kurdish diaspora community reinforce a sense of belonging? 
k) Is there a loss/gain of belonging since arriving in the diasporic 
Kurdish community? 
l) Does living in diaspora create dual identity?  
m) Is diaspora a positive or negative experience? 
 
Community engagement  
In order to identify the Kurdish community engagement, the following sub-
questions support and analyse the main theme of community engagement:  
n) What are the contours of the Kurdish community in Devon?  
o) What route brings the Kurdish diaspora to Devon?  
p) How do diasporas engage with the host society and other diasporic 
groups? 
q) What models and policies are available to engage with diaspora 
communities?  
 
 
Return 
The concept of return was a central concept in the design of this research. I 
analyse how Kurds speak and think about return to their homeland (Kurdistan), 
and examine what factors prevent or discourage a permanent return to their 
homeland, as well as criticising the role of British and Kurdish governments for 
their lack of support of individuals from the UK when returning to their 
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homeland.  I therefore examine both the intention of return and the experience 
of return among the Kurdish diaspora in Devon. 
  
It is important to recognise that return experience is different within families. 
Women and children within the family unit may have very different experiences 
of return in contrast to the male heads of the household. Women who have lived 
in western diasporic countries may have to face a very different society where 
their liberty and freedom is restricted, while in contrast, children who have been 
born in a diasporic country may have become westernised and find the prospect 
of returning to a very different culture and society a daunting prospect. 
 
Intention of return  
This section is concerned with first and second generation Kurds resident in 
Devon, and explores the issues of returning to their homeland. It seeks to 
understand the reasons stopping diasporic Kurds returning to their country of 
origin, as well as examining how Kurds think and speak about returning to 
Kurdistan permanently, analysing the way in which potential dreams of returning 
are likely to clash with practical considerations. The following sub-questions 
support my study to analyse and help the main theme of return:  
i. Do returnees mourn their diasporic communities and want to return? 
ii. What are the key concerns for returnees, and what would encourage 
diasporas to return to their ancestral homeland? 
iii. What, if any, policies does the Kurdistan Regional Government have in 
place to support returnees? 
 
Actual experience of returnees  
This part of the study was conducted in Kurdistan of Iraq among the permanent 
members of Kurdish diaspora returnees. It explored their experiences from their 
homeland and difficulties in re-establishing into mainstream society, the reaction 
of the homeland to diaspora, and whether they would consider a return to 
diasporic life. The questions listed below have helped to analyse the main idea 
of return:  
i. What are the individual experiences of returnees to ancestral diaspora 
homeland? 
ii. Why do diasporas return?  
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iii. Has returning to homeland exceeded expectations or disappointed? 
iv. Has returning to homeland led to a loss of belonging? 
v. Since returning what difficulties have been encountered? 
vi. Does the experience of return vary according to age and gender? 
  
3.4  Empirical research field sites 
This research was conducted within two distinct geographical locations. Large 
sections of the study took place both in Devon, United Kingdom and South 
Kurdistan (Kurdistan of Iraq), in order to discover the theme of return among the 
Kurdish diaspora (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4).  
 
Figure 3.3 Map of Devon 
  
 
Figure 3.4  South Kurdistan 
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3.5  Ethical considerations 
According to O’Leary (2010) ethics are central to practitioner research. The 
researcher has power over the researched, and with power comes 
responsibility. There is an important distinction between ethical and moral 
obligations. Ethical obligations include giving respondents all relevant 
information about the research, ensuring that no harm comes to them as well as 
ensuring confidentiality and anonymity. I have done my best to comply with 
these regulations as can be seen in the email/letters written to respondents. 
Furthermore, prior to conducting interviews I informed all participants about the 
ethical obligations. Although it has been straightforward to get ethical approval 
from respondents and the trustees of the organisation I worked with, I 
understand that often  “practitioner researchers need to jump through a number 
of hoops before the research can start” (Fox et al. 2007:95). We live in a society 
where our actions are increasingly controlled and regulated and we are 
constantly threatened with legal action and repercussions should we not 
conform. For example, Gorman (cited in Campbell et al., 2007:10) argues that 
“society has become increasingly nervous and litigious and that research ethics 
is in danger of being reduced to an easy means of institutional risk rather than 
something intrinsically valuable to the research project.” 
 
Nevertheless there are also moral obligations for the researcher which include 
conscientiousness, equity and honesty (O’Leary, 2010). For my research this 
meant that I constantly kept in mind the wellbeing of the participants and those 
who approached me informally. I contacted all interested people I had access to 
and invited all of them to participate in the design of the research methods. I 
informed people about the true nature of this research project and, most 
importantly, I paid special attention in involving those who might benefit from the 
project.    
 
Informing of any likely consequences, confidentiality and permission are seen 
as the three major aspects of ethical issues in interview research (Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2009). Clarification of consent was undertaken prior to 
commencement of interviews with participants.   Interviewees were reassured 
that they had the option of not answering any questions that they did not want 
to, and could withdraw from the research at any time. Interviews were only 
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conducted after consent was given. Interviewees were also informed that 
confidentiality of individual data under data protection would be adhered to, and 
the research would not reveal any data directly or indirectly about the 
interviewees. In writing the research, pseudonym names were given when 
individuals were named to ensure anonymity. I have given careful consideration 
to the outcomes of the study on two counts. Firstly, I was mindful of some 
unlawful activities that were noted as observational, particularly illegal 
employment, money transfers, identification, etc.  I have taken this phenomenon 
in the information data analysis, however I did not utilize such data widely in the 
articles. Secondly, sympathy towards consequences is about the effect of the 
study on the groups involved in this research.  As a general ethical direction, I 
have followed the guidance provided by the University Research Ethics in the 
Social Sciences and Humanities for social researchers. 
 
Awareness of my own bias can be viewed as a negative aspect, however being 
aware of this bias has allowed me to give an honest account of my outlook on 
the chosen research. I did not feel it was appropriate to undergo an empirical 
study at this point of my development as a practitioner-researcher, as I did not 
feel confident in approaching potential participants with the necessary sensitivity 
and informed understanding. It is essential to heighten awareness for issues 
surrounding vulnerable people while being very much informed of the potential 
hardships endured and sensitive subjects that may affect a participant in a 
research study after taking part in interviews. Participants can suffer from post-
traumatic stress when recounting their experiences of diaspora, refugee and 
seeking asylum. This is confirmed in research studies such as Chance or 
Choice?; this study  describes how participants became  visibly distressed 
during interviews to the extent of breaking down, crying and requesting several 
breaks throughout  the interviews. 
 
3.6  Reflexivity 
It is impossible for people to be free from their own values, feelings, opinions 
and prejudices, including academic researchers. Researchers can also be 
biased due to their attachment to organisations and client groups, and due to 
their own ambitions, views and opinions. Hammersley (2000, cited in 
Groenewald, 2004:7) argues that “the researcher cannot be detached from 
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his/her own presuppositions and that the researcher should not pretend 
otherwise.” Associating reflexivity to a qualitative study intensifies the 
researcher’s alertness as to how the different aspects of their identities (such as 
class, race and gender) become crucial at the same time as the research 
process. As Alvesson and Skoldberg point out, reflexivity is a continuous 
awareness and attention to “the way different kinds of linguistic, social, political 
and theoretical elements are woven together in the process of knowledge 
development, during which empirical material is constructed, interpreted and 
written”(2000:5).  
 
Throughout this research my views and perceptions I have had about the study 
were continually challenged. At times I was questioning the study itself 
regarding how feasible it was to put the idea into practice. At other times I was 
overwhelmed with the amount of different ideas and opinions I was confronted 
with during the duration of the research. My own views and values were 
therefore tested on an almost daily basis. As Fox (et al., 2007: 186) argue, 
“reflexivity is about understanding how research is affected, in terms of 
outcomes and process, by one’s own position as a researcher”. In order to 
understand ourselves as a researcher “we must engage with ourselves through 
thinking about our own thinking” (Johnson and Duberley 2003:1279). 
   
Reflexivity has been identified by researchers as an important tool in regards to 
their subject of the study and the interactive procedure of knowledge creation. 
To exhibit reflexivity is to identify one’s background, preferences that will leave 
their marks on the result of the examination (Gibbs 2007). However, what does 
this mean to me as coming from and belonging to the same ethnic community 
as I am researching? I adhere to the principle that my Kurdish background 
leaves its traces on the text. My outlook and perspectives are coloured by my 
experiences connected to my Kurdish background. Conducting research about 
the Kurdish diaspora community with Kurdish backgrounds obliges me to 
navigate among the horizons of distance and nearness. Certainly I record 
myself in this research with a position of power to present as a historical subject 
that can talk, and write, however in addition with a honour to raise other subject-
positions and speak to, for, with and about them. To speak and write is to take a 
position towards those issues under research, but additionally an approach to 
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maintain, challenge, or change existing social knowing and request. However, 
those positions one takes should be very much grounded in prevailing 
hypothetical and experimental discoveries. It is essential to bear in mind that 
every researcher takes control of a diverse range of positions inside the social 
space that we inhabit and therefore it is essential to discuss the impacts and 
reflections about what sort of traces the subjectivity of the researcher leaves on 
the study process. According to Eliassi, “reflexivity is not only an activity for 
researchers who do not or are not allowed to belong to mainstream society with 
an assumption that they are more subjective than ‛us‛, or that ‛we‛ can provide a 
perspective that is the horizon of all perspectives that is capable of transcending 
the straightjacket of subjectivism in which the ‛other‛ is trapped” (2010:61). 
Objectivity turns into a way to disavow social relations organized in dominance. 
It empowers the standard to claim its perspective as a general human purpose 
of departure that should to be aspired to and defended (Radhakrishnan 2003). 
Reflexivity is additionally an issue of power disagreements about 
representation, relations, and the thorny terrain of meaning-makings and 
impacts of the researcher’s structure of translation on our comprehension of the 
study member’s life-biographies. 
 
My position as a practitioner-researcher and my alignment with Anti Oppressive 
Practice (AOP) drew me, quite naturally, to a critical approach. My methodology 
is based on qualitative research methods and uses semi-structured interviews 
as its main data collection technique as well as secondary sources. This is 
interpretive to the extent that my own views and opinions have naturally guided 
me through the participants and secondary sourced information I have 
gathered.  
 
Through reflective practice during my research, I have realised my own 
polarities to critical perspectives when reading critical policy responses of the 
migrants and diaspora. My bias informed and shaped by my life experiences as 
well as my academic learning and caused me to pay greater attention to certain 
information I agreed with and lead me to give more time and consideration, as 
opposed to studies I came across that challenged my own beliefs and 
perspectives on diaspora and migration (asylum seekers and refugees) and 
how they are viewed and ‘dealt’ with by others i.e. through policy especially 
86 
 
policy regarding the migrants, asylum seeking process, communities and the 
media. 
Being Kurdish and my positionality as community leader had significance in 
interviewing participants.  Interviewees commented that a shared background 
and living experience enabled them to talk open and transparently, they felt at 
ease. There was an expectation of understanding concerning their issues, 
which would not have been available from a non-Kurdish interviewer. 
Interviewees felt that as a community leader I could be trusted especially with 
personal answers regarding issues surrounding family. Paree (29:F) said: 
 “Talking to you made me feel safe, I knew that as the leader of 
the community I could talk to you in confidence about the way I 
felt, especially where my family was concerned, it would not be 
a problem. If you were not Kurdish or the PKC leader, I don’t 
think I would feel confident talking.”  
After each interview participants were asked, whether my background had 
influenced the interview, some of the participants answered that being Kurdish 
was a benefit as it was a point of knowledge. Nasreen (23:F) said: 
 “The difference between you and other researchers is that you 
understand me better. I feel in some way that you don’t feel 
sorry for me. I was interviewed by another researcher and 
every time he asked a question and I answered he said, ‘oh 
dear, that is so sad’. and he thought that he knew how it was to 
be a Kurd. No, he doesn’t, he is only heard about it”.  
In the case of Nasreen she acknowledged that a non-Kurdish researcher 
arrived at the interview with preconceptions of Kurds as oppressed victims, 
Nasreen felt that there were no preconceived ideas emanating from myself as I 
was a Kurd. 
 
3.7  Qualitative analysis 
Writing the literature review for this research, especially the recent research on 
diaspora as well as the migration, geography and political history of Kurdistan, 
the research used a mixed method of basic qualitative analyses. Qualitative 
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analysis has been defined by Strauss and Corbin (1998,11) as a 
“nonmathematical process of interpretation that is carried out to discover 
concepts and relationships in raw data and to organise these into a theoretical 
explanatory scheme.” Also, this research embraces an experimental qualitative 
research approach; in types of ethnological examination. “Ethnography is a way 
of understanding social life in relational and holistic terms” (Gillespie 1995:54). 
Qualitative research becomes a choice based on the fact that the research 
questions require deep insight and understanding of the participatory subjects 
of the research (Robson and Foster 1989).  
 
The methodology is qualitative as it is based on interviews, communication and 
interpretation, it is subjective and value based (Sarantakos 1998). Although I 
have counted the people who have participated in this study and created a table 
of how many people said what, the main methods of data collection and 
analysis of this research are qualitative as they focused on what individuals 
have communicated to me. The majority of the research used in this study is 
content analysis looking for patterns when analysing the data. However, it also 
fits into a grounded theory approach: this can be described as a “study of what 
people actually say” (Fox et al., 2007:14). Furthermore, Fox et al. (ibid) argue 
that grounded theory operates almost in a reverse fashion from traditional 
research as it does not begin with a hypothesis but with the data collection. 
After the first data is analysed it can then be used as a theory for further data. 
This fits with this studies’ approach as I have tried to be as open as possible in 
order to get an objective view of what people have said. I have used various 
methods in this research for data collection, including interviews and 
observation, and I have analysed the data extracting key points from the text, 
which I have sorted into different categories.  
 
The Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) (O’Leary 2010) cannot be put into just one 
or two of the many approaches that have been developed. O’Leary (2010) 
describes QDA as a critical and reflexive process that generally involves 
identifying biases, noting impressions, reducing, organising and coding, 
searching for patterns and interconnections, mapping and building themes, 
building and verifying theories and drawing conclusions. Furthermore O’Leary 
argues that the researcher does not have to adopt one particular approach and 
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that “it is possible to draw insights from various strategies in a bid to evolve an 
approach that best circles between your data and your own research agenda” 
(ibid:269). This is exactly what I have done during my research. 
 
3.8  Conclusion 
Methodology is an essential section of scientific study as it informs the 
theoretical background of the research, the ways the subjects are constructed in 
the study, and how their accounts and experiences can be translated inside the 
prevalent political and historical circumstances in which the contributors in the 
study and the researcher are positioned. Scientists are influenced towards 
different methodologies by different epistemologies and models of human 
nature. The connection between the scientist and the content is an intricate 
case in the light of the fact that the researcher is the tool, and the subject of the 
representation of the interviewees or the studied subjects that will be presented 
to a wider people. Methodological theories are full of inconsistencies and 
contradictions mainly because they are far from being clear-cut or “defined in 
such a way as to be able to differentiate between and across them on the basis 
of a fixed set of principles and procedures” (Goulding 1999:862). However, 
 researchers who undertake a study must ensure that their chosen “methods 
are carefully selected and carefully and conscientiously applied” (Wallendorf 
and Brucks 1993:355). Research methodology is a generic term for the mixture 
of techniques used to analyse specific circumstances and methods are personal 
techniques to collect data and analysis. Figure 3.5 demonstrates some research 
processes (Source: Adapted from Crotty 1998). 
 
Figure 3.5 The Research Process 
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Eventually, the methodology explores the degree to which environmental 
pressures and individual attributions impact the procedures, and results of 
diaspora groups. Additionally, it builds up to what extent would the attempt at 
incorporating the forerunners and outcomes of diaspora individuals assist with 
defining a demonstrative diagram that would, in turn, help in creating focused 
procedures in the advancement and assessment of diaspora groups/individuals. 
The route incorporates an investigation of the part of diaspora associations in 
the formation of a diaspora group infrastructure, including ethics and the 
procedure of cultural identity recreation.  
 
Stressing a qualitative strategy in the gathering of information and data gives 
the chance to discover results through interviews and includes quantitative 
techniques i.e. statistics and measurements, will allow to back up the 
participants arguments. Constructivism and interpretivism will be the principle 
epistemologies. Interpretivism concentrates on a more human methodology of 
researching and there are no limits between the researcher and researched. As 
argued by Burrell and Morgan “all social scientists approach their subjects via 
explicit or implicit assumptions about the nature of the social world and the way 
in which it may be investigated” (Burrell and Morgan 1979:1). This associates 
with (i) ontology of the phenomenon under investigation whether the reality 
being studied is external to the individual or a product of individual 
consciousness and, (ii) epistemological assumptions “about how one might 
begin to understand the world and communicate this knowledge to fellow 
human beings” (Burrell and Morgan 1979:1).  
 
This study has chosen to use qualitative research interviews as a data 
collection technique due to their “uniquely sensitive and powerful method for 
capturing the experiences and lived meanings of the subjects’ everyday world. 
Interviews allow the subjects to convey to others situations from their own 
perspective and in their own world” (Kvale, 2007:11). Interviewing has many 
unfixed features that can come to expression during an interview. It is very 
important as a researcher to show openness towards the interview process as it 
can lead to unexpected questions and phenomena. The focus of a research 
interview is often directed toward particular themes and as a researcher you 
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lead the interviewee towards the themes in order to see how the subject 
understands and connects to study themes. 
 
Doing qualitative analysis often entails a creative process where the qualitative 
analyst seeks patterns, themes and categories and makes judgements about 
what part of the data is significant and meaningful for their study (Patton, 2002). 
Content analysis involves using written statements and analysing their contents 
on different levels (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). According to Patton content 
analysis refers to any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that 
takes a volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core 
consistencies and meanings‛ (Patton, 2002, p. 453). From the beginning it was 
thought that quantitatively oriented content analysis would function as an 
objective and neutral way to describe the content of different forms of 
communication (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). Conversely, content analysis is 
used in this dissertation as a method to describe and interpret the account or 
the constructed ideas or objects of a society or a social group (see Berg, 2004), 
through focusing on certain passages that are of interest for this study related to 
the politics of belonging among young people with Kurdish backgrounds. 
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Chapter Four: Experience of Kurdish Diaspora in Devon 
 
The number of people fleeing their homes to escape repressive regimes, war 
and poverty globally is the highest it has been since the Second World War. 
The United Kingdom (UK) has witnessed a marked rise in the number migrant 
arrivals, often the last destination for many arriving in the UK. The public view in 
the UK has shown that many have the opinion that new migration is having a 
major impact on settled residents in affected locations. Kurdish migrants have 
been living in the UK for many years, but there a large number of Kurdish 
refugees to Devon and Cornwall began arriving from early 2000. According to 
the Plymouth Kurdish Community (PKC) 2012 report, there are more than 5000 
Kurds resident in Devon and Cornwall. In some areas the Kurdish communities 
are the largest ethnic singular groups. The Black and Minority Ethnic population, 
which includes the Kurdish community, in Plymouth rose from 3% in 2001 to 
6.7% in 2011, and therefore has more than doubled since the 2001 census. The 
census data suggests that Plymouth has at least 43 main languages spoken in 
the city, and that Kurdish, Chinese and Polish are the top three (Ethnic groups 
2001 & 2011 Census). Compared to other places in the UK, Devon does not 
have a significant ethnic minority population. Many of the immigrants in Devon 
previously lived in areas of the world that suffered civil war, famine, natural 
disasters, and other catastrophic events, causing them to flee their country of 
origin with little or no preparation. The evidence shows that many Kurdish 
immigrants had direct experience with war, government oppression, 
imprisonment and torture, as well as Anfal in their country of origin. Anfal was 
the genocide of the Kurdish people in south of Kurdistan (North Iraq) led by the 
Ba’athist Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, between the 1970 to 1990. These 
experiences have created psychological issues within the immigrant population 
that are most commonly associated with a sense of fear, loss, and 
powerlessness. People have always migrated to other countries for reasons 
that range from the life threatening to the life enhancing.  
 
International migrants are expected to live lives that are not fragmented from 
British culture, and to attach and integrate themselves to the core values of the 
local area and nation by learning to communicate in English and by 
understanding the British way of the life (McGhee 2006). For refugees and other 
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groups wishing to become citizens for whom the terms of their ‘leave to remain’ 
in the UK are the prerogative of the state (Sales 2007), the ‘clear sense of 
citizenship’ stressed by the UK government’s cohesion agenda has manifested 
itself through a set of bureaucratic processes that requires them to demonstrate 
an understanding of the UK, the obligations and duties that will be attached to 
‘citizenship’ (Osler 2009), and a commitment to Britain (McGhee 2006).  
 
This chapter will set out to test these claims through a review of the evidence 
relating to local experiences of Kurdish people in Devon, promoting community 
relations and cultural norms and values. The process of negotiation associated 
with everyday encounters within the space of the Kurdish community is an 
uncertain process and the outcomes can sometimes be problematic; evidence 
of practical conviviality can exist alongside evidence of limitations, difficulties 
and tensions. This chapter explores community relations between the Kurdish 
diaspora in Devon and the host population. It will begin with historical overview 
of the Kurdish diaspora to Devon, and in considering positive and negative 
attitudes regarding the migration from both the host population and the Kurdish 
people’s perspective. The chapter will focus on intercultural and cultural 
experiences spanning across the generations of Kurds and key individuals that 
work closely with diaspora groups in the host society, and then finally explore 
the demographics of Devon in relation to racism. 
 
4.1  Kurdish pathways to Plymouth   
The exile of the Kurdish people is understood as “an increasingly important 
dimension of Kurdish history and particularly of the advance of Kurdish national 
solidarity” (McDowall 2004:455). For Alinia, the Kurdish population are classified 
as a “non-state nation” or “Proto-nation”. Both of these terms represent groups 
that operate in a manner normally associated with a nation state (Alinia 2004). 
Kurdish diaspora has spread into many countries, though predominantly to 
western countries. The United Kingdom (UK) is one of the European countries 
that have received Kurdish refugees for many years. It is difficult to find 
accurate statistics about when and how many Kurds have fled to the UK, and 
even current numbers are impossible to find, because of their statelessness. 
However, this study will focus on the Kurdish diaspora in Devon, particularly in 
Plymouth. Since the year 2000 the city of Plymouth became a home for many 
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Kurds. According to Plymouth City Council (PCC) commissioning plan for the 
Plymouth domestic abuse partnership (2012), “The largest BME communities 
are Kurdish Iraqi, 3000; Polish speaking migrant workers, 2700; Indian, 2500; 
Chinese, 2000; Russian speaking migrant workers, 1500 and Black African, 
1,000” (PCC 2012:6).  
 
Many first generation Kurds have managed to integrate into British society; 
many have taken jobs within the area of their professions as well as 
establishing small businesses in the service industry area such as restaurants, 
barbers, takeaways, mini market owners, hand car wash operators, as well as 
self-employed occupations including taxi drivers and builders. For almost all the 
Kurds who arrived between 2000 and 2001, they have experienced a new life 
within a new society with significant cultural differences. Ali mentions that: 
  
“I came to Plymouth in the year 2000. We were about fifteen 
Kurds in the bus coming from London and we had never met 
each other before, but it was organised by National Asylum 
Support Services (NASS), who was supporting us during our 
asylum process. We didn’t choose Plymouth and when I first 
arrived it was night time, the next day I went to find the 
shopping centre and I followed the map the man from NASS 
gave to us, it was very difficult to find. All of us inside the bus 
were split into different areas of the city and then more Kurds 
arrived, I think around 300 people we met each other 
sometimes in college activities and the city centre. It was very 
hard at that time because the majority of us couldn’t speak 
English, and the city didn’t have any other black people like us, 
but nowadays it is much easier for asylum seekers because 
they will get contact and information from other BME people 
that have been here a long time” (Ali 44:M). 
 
Ali confirms that coming from a different cultural background to a new society 
has been very difficult. He describes the process of being a new arrival in the 
UK as self-learning, and as the diasporic community has grown it is has 
become easier for the new arrivals with support among the diaspora community 
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and other support agencies. Wahlbeck finds that Kurdish associations can be 
useful resources for refugees in order to solve new problems they face in the 
country of settlement (Wahlbeck 1999). Ali also describes that new arrivals to 
the city receive greater advocacy, particularly from the diaspora community, as 
well as support from different Black and Ethnic Minority organisations and 
businesses as points of contact, than the first arrivals in the city. However, 
Kurdish diaspora can be split into four groups; (i) Asylum seekers like Ali with 
no choice of destination, where the host destination was determined by NASS 
(Gill 2016), the numbers of diaspora within this group have increased 
dramatically within the last twenty years; (ii) Kurdish diaspora from other parts 
of the UK and European countries;(iii) groups of diaspora joining spouses and 
family members; (iv) second and third generation that were born in the UK. 
Rizgar arrived in Plymouth as part of first generation and he explains his route 
to Plymouth: 
 
“I was in Kent when I arrived in the UK but after two weeks in a 
bed and breakfast which was provided by UKBA people. I was 
told that I needed to wait until my name was put on a list to 
remove me from here to a permanent address in one of the 
cities in the UK. The list came and next to my name was 
Plymouth City. My journey to Plymouth started from that day, I 
did not know anyone in Plymouth and it was a Friday. I arrived 
here in the late afternoon didn’t know anywhere and the officer 
from the housing provider collected me from the bus and took 
me to my new address and gave me a map of Plymouth and 
told me where I could meet other Kurdish refugees and a post 
office to collect my support. It was very difficult for the first two 
weeks but after meeting other Kurdish people and building 
relationships with them, as well as attending college things 
became easier. After two years we set up a Kurdish 
organisation to be the voice of Kurds and advocacy for the 
refugees and asylum seekers and promote cultural awareness 
training to wider communities in Devon and Cornwall” (Rizgar 
46:M). 
 
95 
 
Almost all the experiences among the first generation that arrived in Plymouth 
between the years 2000 to 2002 are similar: Rizgar, like Ali, went to an 
unknown destination with the decision made by NASS. Ali explains how his 
experience of arrival challenged him to advocate and support new arrivals in the 
city. Recognising the needs of the Kurds and the establishment of a Kurdish 
community was institutional among the Kurds in diaspora after a period of time. 
Rizgar mentioned supporting and advocacy, this can also be seen as a path for 
the Kurds in Plymouth to feel connected to the community, as well as promoting 
cultural awareness programmes to educate others about the Kurds and 
integrate with the new society. For Berry, integration of migrants will be a part of 
much wider process of ‘acculturation’ (Berry 2006). Kurdish people in diaspora 
have received opportunities that they did not have in their country of origin; 
Kurdish institutions play a significant role in the (re)production of Kurdish culture 
and identity.  
 
Many of the respondents admit that they met Kurds from other parts of 
Kurdistan during their escape, and while in diaspora. Kani discussed her routes 
to Plymouth as a female Kurd: 
 
“I was the first Kurdish woman that arrived in Plymouth and for 
about seven months it was very hard for me because there 
were no other Kurdish women to associate with. During my 
escape to Britain, and in Plymouth for the first time, I came 
across other Kurds from different parts of Kurdistan with 
different dialogues. Now I have friends from different parts of 
Kurdistan as well as English people. I become an advisory 
person at the Kurdish community to advise other Kurdish 
families about the life and we do lots of cultural activities. It is 
much easier to have women advising women, I know this from 
my own experience” (Kani 28:F). 
 
In diaspora, Kurdish people have the opportunity to meet other Kurdish people 
from different areas of Kurdistan of Iraq, allowing them to establish social and 
political networks. Kani feels her experiences have been shaped by being the 
only woman, learning from her experiences she wants to support other female 
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diaspora in her position by advocating. Her experience, she believes, supports 
many first generation married women in diaspora who remain reliant upon their 
husbands for support and networks. Kani considers the community organisation 
as social advocacy and belonging to all Kurds. According to Cohen the 
“community is that entity to which one belongs, greater than kinship but more 
immediately than the abstraction we call society” (1985:15). Therefore, their 
present migratory state certainly represents a distinct experience shared among 
these specific clusters of populace, which allows them to rebuild their 
community on the basis of that identity. Kurdish diaspora in Devon have been 
supported by the Plymouth Kurdish Community (PKC), a charitable organisation 
that facilitates the needs of the community and individuals. PKC was 
established by Kurds in diaspora to support integration in the new host 
community, but also to maintain Kurdish cultural heritage, maintaining and 
sustaining identity. Several cultural exhibitions are organised by the Kurdish 
community who wish to ensure that second and third generation Kurds cherish 
their rich cultural heritage. Many participants see cultural awareness as an 
important cultural connection to Kurdistan, enabling them to link with what they 
call real forms of Kurdish heritage/culture. The relationship between diaspora 
people and culture has been an important process; diaspora organisations are 
playing a significant cultural, and increasingly politicized, awareness both in the 
UK and globally. Many diaspora groups are often involved in activities to 
increase public awareness about the culture, history and homeland conflict.  
 
The Kurdish community in Devon, particularly Plymouth, mostly originate from 
South Kurdistan (North of Iraq). The first wave of eight Kurdish families arrived 
in Devon in the 1980s as students, and have increased after the War in Iraq, 
with significant numbers of Kurds arriving as asylum seekers to the UK. 
Plymouth has been a destination for many Kurds since the year 2000, the 
figures below from the annual PKC report show the increased number of 
Kurdish people living in Plymouth, this data has been collected and updated by 
PKC youth workers and volunteers every two years (see Figure 4.1). 
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    Figure 4.1: Populiation of Kurdish Diaspora in Plymouth 
 
The increase in the numbers of Kurdish people in Plymouth includes reunions of 
spouses and diasporas from other UK and European cities. Many Kurdish 
people come from double diaspora never visiting their homeland. Hersh 
explains about his double diaspora life: 
  
“…this is the second time I have escaped for safety, the first 
time my family fled to Iran and I was born in Iran and grew up 
there, but it was very hard to live somewhere like Iran without 
freedom. When I came to Plymouth it was a new life and it felt 
like I was born again, but I miss my family very much. It was 
very hard especially not speaking English to explain why I am 
here, when people ask me what is my story” (Hersh 30:M). 
 
For many Kurds, the ‘doubleness’ of diaspora life, experiencing different 
cultures and societies before arriving in a new host country, made the transition 
into a new culture less challenging. Hersh illustrated that living with double 
diaspora made him integrate with others in a much smoother way and with a 
greater understanding of different cultures. Many participants feel the language 
of the host country is important. Hersh, for example, wanted to explain his roots 
and Kurdish history, culture and geographic land of the Kurds to other people. It 
was difficult to define Kurdistan as a country and Kurdish nation to other people 
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in Devon without speaking the same language, communicating Kurdishness to 
others was a vital part of a participants’ identity in diaspora. There are many 
Kurds who are involved in activities which are closely linked to solidarity with the 
Kurdish movements and Kurdistan. Omar explained that: 
 
“…there are several ways we can support the Kurdish 
situations. Many Kurdish start working with English and other 
diaspora groups in Plymouth and they can tell people about the 
story of Kurds back in Kurdistan. After our arrival in Plymouth 
we feel protected and do lots of activities which we couldn’t do 
in Kurdistan” (Omar 48:M). 
 
The Kurdish diaspora is seen as advantageous to the Kurdish situation in 
Kurdistan. Many participants feel strongly about raising awareness of 
Kurdishness to a wider community. Omar feels it is important to explain 
Kurdishness to a wider community and enter into dialogue with questions such 
as ‘who are the Kurds’ and ‘where is Kurdistan’? Omar recounts the activities 
that they couldn’t do in their homeland that they can now carry out protected in 
diaspora. It was hard for many participants to discuss their memories before 
their departure from Kurdistan. Many participants feel that Kurdistan and 
national identity were born in exile. The Kurdish diaspora has played a part in 
supporting what many Kurds call the ‘Kurdish movement’ to an independent 
state. Political activity is very important to Kurdish people in diaspora. 
  
Omar and many other participants feel they were forced to Plymouth as a 
destination city, as they had no choice in their dispersal process by the UK 
government. Nick Gill, in his examination of Polish migrants in the UK, 
highlights the notion of choice, or not having a choice, as being an interplay 
between agency and power. In his example, the choice to integrate into 
mainstream society is situated within the context of opportunities and 
constraints. Thus, decision-making, even when confined by social mechanisms, 
is an indicator that power and agency in various forms have been activated 
(Gill, 2010). Many first generation Kurds in Devon felt they were disempowered, 
as choices and decisions were made on their behalf by people in power. 
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4.1.1. Positive and negative attitudes towards and within Kurdish diaspora 
In the previous section on the history of Kurds in Devon, the study has 
examined the route maps of the Kurdish diaspora to Devon. This section will 
look at the positive and negative experiences among the Kurdish members and 
wider community. In order to better understand the relationship between the 
diaspora and place of settlement and explore the attitudes and perceptions 
towards the diaspora engagement, the research has analysed the opinions of a 
number of relevant actors to the role of Kurdish diaspora. These key actors 
included MPs, police, councillors, and leaders in local organisations who were 
in contact with diaspora communities, as well as considering the positive and 
negative experiences of individuals from the Kurdish diaspora.  
 
A number of studies have questioned the failure of academic analysis to situate 
the experiences of new migrants and long-standing residents within the places 
they live and interact (White 2011; Glick et al 2009; Robinson et al 2007; Kesten 
et al 2011; IPPR 2007). These studies tend to be dynamic in nature, charting 
migrant/diaspora experiences through time or contrasting associated outcomes 
in different places. The negative perceptions associated with immigration and 
diaspora has increased in the last decade due to economic and political 
situations. Many first generation Kurdish diaspora experienced difficulties due to 
cultural differences, having arrived within the geographical place of an almost 
entirely white environment. As Mr Qader, the Secretary of the Plymouth Kurdish 
Community, said: 
 
“…when we arrived in Plymouth there were not many Asylum 
seekers and Refugees and there were not many BME 
communities living in this area, but Kurdish people stayed here 
and started to integrate within the English society [...] It was 
very difficult for the first couple of years due to cultural 
differences but Kurds have been fighting for almost all their life 
to get freedom for Kurdistan. So I think that’s why Kurdish 
people wouldn’t  move out because of racism or any cultural 
differences as we believe we can let people know more about 
the Kurds and Kurdistan” (Qader 39:M). 
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As the quote above shows, it can be argued that the first generation Kurds who 
arrived in this area are under pressure – due to cultural differences and 
language barriers – to communicate with the wider community. Integration is 
accepted following the culturalist paradigm as a developmental route, which 
minoritised groups could encounter and enter the area of modernity and get 
hold of equally subject positions. The involvement of the first generation, like the 
above interviewee, cannot be characterised as negative, as it depends very 
much on the circumstances in which the engagement occurs. Qader’s 
description illustrates the Kurds’ fight to secure their life after arriving in the UK. 
Even with cultural and racial differences, this is typically not enough to make 
them return to their homeland. Qader believes that it will be much easier to start 
educating the wider community about the Kurds as well as educating Kurdish 
people to integrate with a new society. Interviewers suggest that the negative 
attitude towards Kurds has increased as more Kurdish asylum seekers have 
arrived in the area. As Hewa explained: 
 
“…one Sunday me and two other Kurdish friends were sitting in 
the city centre talking about our arrival, we had only been in the 
city nearly a month, a group of English young men came up to 
as and told us ‘F**king P**ki, go back to your country’. I told 
them we are not from Pakistan and all of them laughed and 
went, so at that time it was very hard to understand why they 
were laughing at us but now after many years I understand why 
they laughed” (Hewa 32:M). 
 
Exile for Kurds has implied traumatic experiences; however at the same time it 
has given them a space and the possibilities to establish their movement and 
identity. Many Kurds have faced an otherness and alienation during the ethnic 
cleansing, violence, and other traumatic experiences inside their own land by 
different regimes (such as the Baath Party in Iraq), and many feel unwelcomed 
into a new society where they have encountered racism on a consistent basis. 
Hewa and his friends did not understand the racist comments towards them, 
and in response Hewa tried clarifying that they were Kurdish and not Pakistani, 
but it has taken a considerable amount of time to understand the racist 
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comments. Negative attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees as well as 
other BME groups in this area have increased within the last decade. The study 
has shown there exists within some Plymouth and Devon residents a belief that 
diaspora groups were prone to negative traits of being unfriendly, unlawful and 
violent. The residents’ experiences come into account through the media or 
direct engagement with one individual compared to many. As Safeen told me 
about his first English friend in Plymouth: 
 
“I was at college when I met group a of English students and 
after while one of them told me that his family said never trust 
asylum seekers and the our government shouldn’t support 
these people but after meeting you my opinions has changed 
toward migrants” (Safeen 23:M). 
 
There is a cultural misunderstanding with incorrect and misleading information 
about asylum seekers and migrants. The media misperception has increased 
negativity towards new diasporas from ethnic minorities that are settling into 
western society. Safeen’s friend’s negativity toward asylum seekers was 
informed by his family without any interaction with people from diaspora or 
migrants. Analysing the white elites role in the reproduction of ethnic and racial 
inequalities in Western countries in all sections of society, and particularly 
mass-media in their texts and speeches, often formulate stereotypical and 
prejudiced ideas about minorities, defining ethnic relations and legitimising 
ethnic discrimination. Van Dijk emphasizes the influential role of mass-media in 
the maintenance and legitimising of the white groups’ dominance in Western 
societies through the “production of everyday racism” (1993:83). Public opinion 
and policy making are often closely interrelated with the discursive construction 
of refugees or immigrants as a problem. Within the last general election in the 
UK in May 2015, there was a focus upon the migration policies of European 
countries, as well as the problematics of migrants. Immigration  has therefore 
been a central and contentious political issue within the UK, with a focus upon 
the social and political problems it is perceived to create. Negative attitudes 
towards immigrants have increased in recent years due to downturns in the 
economy, concerns over safety and security, and the rise of terrorist attacks 
globally. As Hoshyar explained: 
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“…we get negative comments or racism by English people 
every day sometimes, but what hurts me much more is when I 
get negative comments by other migrant refugees and other 
ethnic groups born here or who have been here longer” 
(Hoshyar 38:M). 
 
Hoshyar and other participants felt hurt when they received negative comments 
from other black and ethnic minority people. Diaspora individuals believe the 
various negative attitudes increase, rather than decrease, the problems of 
integration and engagement. The situation has deteriorated, and has been 
precipitated by acts of terrorism after the London bombings in 2005 and the act 
of terror on September 11, 2001 in the United States. Muslim communities in 
particular have experienced changing attitudes towards them. Hoshyar recounts 
his experience of exposure to discrimination and negative attitudes on a daily 
basis. Like Hoshyar, Yassien has experienced many negative interactions with 
people where discrimination occurs. Yassien said: 
 
“…at work many times I have been told by different people 
I am not English and what am doing here, but one day I 
was told by a black woman ‘where ever we go we see 
these people’ and I could see her two English friends were 
embarrassed and told her go and sit down we’ll bring the 
coffee for you, they apologised for what she said. I was so 
irritated and frustrated to hear negative comments from a 
black woman” (Yassien 23:M). 
 
Yassien pointed out that receiving negative comments from other black ethnic 
minorities is more hurtful than from English people. Many participants 
understood why some English people ask them about their country of origin due 
to the lack of cultural diversity in the local community. The ‘acculturation’ that 
Berry (1990) discusses, appears on both sides as very important requirements 
for life and living. The process of acculturation involves many changes in the 
abilities, attitudes and behaviours of the individual. A number of respondents 
stated the importance of respect and acceptance of all different cultures, 
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religions, and nationalities. Generally it could be argued that there are 
differences between cities and regions in the UK regarding cultural awareness, 
such as between the cities of Bristol and Plymouth, which are both in the 
southwest of England, where there is a significant cultural difference and the 
majority population of people living in Plymouth areas are white. The negative 
attitudes towards migrant/diaspora communities have risen in recent years. 
Shilan explained: 
 
“I think as women we get more negative comments because 
some of us wear the Hijab to cover over heads as part of our 
Muslim religion but when you visit anywhere in Plymouth people 
look at you very differently and some time you get bad 
comments […] I went to my GP with my friend [and] the 
receptionist told us to sit at the waiting area and another three 
English women were waiting there and one of them told the 
other to be careful in case they got bombed and said lets go to 
the other waiting area” (Shilan 29:F).  
 
 According to Shilan, women in her experience receive more negative 
comments than men due to cultural and religious dress, and the 
misunderstanding of Islam with the wearing of the Hijab. Many female 
participants have different experiences and negative attitudes from local people 
and sometimes these have become violent. One of the participants told me, for 
example, that she was slapped by an English man in a public car park. Two 
weeks after the incident the Plymouth Herald published the news on 20th March 
2015 in which the Police were appealing for witnesses. A Kurdish women was 
slapped in the face in a racially aggravated assault in Colin Campbell Court car 
park.    
The negative attitude toward migrants in many places around the UK has arisen 
due to social, economic and political situations. The southwest, particularly the 
counties of Devon and Cornwall, have small BME communities. This lack of 
diversity is a contributing cause of negative attitudes, because of the lack of a 
BME community. The political and social situation, as well as the requirement to 
conform to the joint European refugee policies by the UK government, and the 
securitisation of migration, have contributed to the further restriction to obtaining 
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asylum in the United Kingdom and other European states. When elites and 
politicians emphasise that migrants or asylum seekers and refugees are a 
threat, this subsequently has an effect on both policy making and public 
attitude. Ni Laoire (2000) argues that there exists a need to understand this 
phenomenon in contingent and contextual circumstances. The contradictory 
result is that, on the one hand, the state considers immigration as a problem 
and at the same time tries to prevent and oppose discrimination and racism 
against asylum seekers, refugees and all immigrants. The Kurdish people in 
Britain meet a contradictory mixture of everyday discrimination, racism and 
exclusion as immigrants, together with democracy and certain social and civil 
rights as residents of the country. The immigrants are particularly exposed to 
exclusion and discrimination in many western societies. Karen who works 
closely with the refugee and diaspora community in Devon said: 
 
“When the group first started there was a reluctance to take 
part, this was more than the usual shyness and awkwardness of 
a new group, some of the group had negative experiences 
within the local community which led to insecurity and a lack of 
confidence, people just wanted to fade into the background” 
(Karen, community worker). 
 
Karen explains that the negative attitudes of the local community impacted 
some members of the drama group (Reach Community Drama) so inhibiting 
them to take part. Feelings of low self-esteem and a lack of confidence are 
underpinned by detrimental attitudes towards the diaspora community, creating 
a divide between the diasporic and local communities. 
   
4.1.2  Positive experiences   
From a historical perspective, the UK has a long history of being a multicultural 
society, but it is only in the last two decades that Plymouth has come to view 
itself as being intercultural, with the arrival of many different ethnic groups. The 
following section provides an analysis of the positive attitudes of both Kurdish 
and local residents within Plymouth, Devon. These are couched in two ways: 
specifically in relation to geographical areas, and broadly in relation to the UK. 
Many participants highlighted the positive relationships between Kurds and local 
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residents at the time that are still evident in diasporic spaces. The key actors’ 
reflections of having a larger Kurdish/migrant population residing in their area, 
as Peter explained: 
 
“…it’s great to welcome many asylum seekers and 
migrants from all around the world to our city. These 
people or groups are bringing something new to our 
society such as different culture and food. It is also more 
important for community cohesion to evidence different 
communities and people coming together” (Peter 
community leader ). 
 
Peter viewed migrants as bringing benefits to society, and that by welcoming 
them to the city, and outlining the importance of the relationship to community 
cohesion, Community cohesion is a policy project that will play out for years to 
come, as there will be many issues that will bring influences to bear on the 
process and the levels of success achieved. These will include a strong desire 
for communities to retain their traditional values and cultures that were identified 
as bringing about segregated and parallel lives in local areas (Temple and 
Moran 2005), and extremist politicking will seek to influence agendas (McGhee 
2005). According to Temple and Moran (2005), community cohesion will rest 
upon the ability of people from different communities to come together to share 
the same spaces and the same facilities; it will also rest upon the ability of all 
communities being able to articulate and have their concerns and issues heard 
(Robinson and Reeve 2006). However, community cohesion has been criticised 
as an agenda that will serve to erase decades of separate cultural development 
in favour of a policy that will force ethnic minorities to develop a greater 
acceptance of core British values (Kundnani 2002). 
 
With regards to positive attitudes towards Kurdish people in Plymouth, Jonathon 
reflected his own personal experiences of migrants in Plymouth: 
 
“I work with many different groups in the city. The Kurds I 
come in contact with were lovely people and they always 
want people to know about the great Kurdistan and 
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culture. They always welcome you if you are attending any 
Kurdish activities or celebrations” (Jonathon, community 
worker ). 
 
Jonathon’s positive experiences were based upon the interaction of hospitality 
by the Kurdish community to local residents emerging out of banal, unplanned 
spaces of encounters. Awareness of the Kurds was important, and using 
hospitality as a tool of engagement towards local residents promoted and 
supported social inclusion. The Kurdish diaspora are using tools of engagement 
to show awareness of Kurdistan and the Kurdish nation. As Bahar Baser 
highlighted, “the diaspora is a result of, and also a part of, the Kurdish 
movement and it has managed to transform the nation-building efforts into a 
transnational issue” (Baser 2011:26). The Kurds and Kurdishness were little 
known by local residents, and so as a result of that, the members of the Kurdish 
community in Devon have raised the profile of Kurdish culture and people. 
Jacky told me that: 
 
“…when I was an outreach worker for the college I had 
many Kurds in my project. I learned something new about 
the Kurds every session they were so proud of  their 
Kurdish culture and wanted to share their experiences. 
They supported each other, their life experiences were 
played out in the team building exercises, I know the other 
learners admired the way they just got on with things. I am 
still in contact with some of them” (Jacky, community 
worker ). 
 
Jacky’s interaction with the Kurdish community, and their willingness to openly 
engage with her and the rest of the group, facilitated cultural experiences.  
These attributes are underpinned by the social, historical and geographical 
nature of many first generation Kurds growing up within mountain areas with a 
long, deep-rooted history of passing Kurdish cultural traditions on. Due to the 
Kurds’ transnational condition and their dispersion between Iraq, Turkey, Iran 
and Syria, their attachments to places are highly ambivalent, multiple and 
complex. The team building skills observed will have been important for the 
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Kurds before their Plymouth experience, working together towards a Kurdish 
national identity and keeping the notion of homeland alive. The majority of the 
participants admitted they met each other for the first time during their escape 
and in their diaspora host community in Plymouth. Team building activities, and 
any outreach challenges, bring the Kurds together to identify and establish an 
idea of a Kurdish nation as well as to build social networks.  
 
The Kurdish diaspora in Devon and the rest of the UK have been organised 
around political diaspora parties. Political involvement in diaspora parties may 
carry a different meaning for second and third generations than it does for first 
generations, who in contrast might be more interested in homeland politics. Van 
Bruinessen (2000) has found that a younger generation shows even more 
interest in Kurdish identity than the first generation, due to feelings of 
marginalisation and of the otherness in the UK (discussed further in Chapter 
Seven). 
 
Diaspora associations and other local agencies can be considered in providing 
platforms that enable Kurdish people to take part in cultural events and political 
endeavours, and to foster their sense of Kurdishness through participation in 
different projects. The positive experiences towards local community groups 
and people encountered were precipitated from support received when arriving 
or having access to services via projects. Rizgar explained that: 
 
“It is great to see some local people help us to integrate 
with English society and some organisations help the 
Kurds. Kurdish people become a new nation to many local 
people and when they listen about our stories, they 
provide support, which we found great, people were 
listening to our needs […] we help each other more, any 
new Kurds or in fact any nationality who come here, we 
help them to settle to a new life” (Rizgar 46:M). 
 
Rizgar explains that support from local people and organisations was abundant 
and appreciated, enabling them to ease their way into the UK life and society. 
An example of this is shown in Figure 4.2,  Wahlbeck (2005), who conducted 
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Figure 4.2 Community Integration Project 
 
 research on the Kurdish diaspora in the UK and Finland, has suggested that 
Kurdish in diaspora support each other into new western societies. It could be 
argued that the Kurdish diaspora has not just provided support to Kurdish 
people but also to other diaspora groups and communities. Such a notion of 
need was couched solely in relation to culturalisation and shortages of BME 
groups in Devon. Rizgar recounts that involvement in storytelling and local 
cultural events was considered a learning process for the local community as 
well as second and third generation Kurds. Identifying selfhood as Kurdish 
evidently meant having a diasporic past and being part of a transnational 
diaspora community. In this matter, feelings of diasporic consciousness were 
interpreted into concrete actions, mainly among those who were active in 
diaspora life. Diasporic consciousness was narrated in close connection with 
the historical background of the Kurdish diaspora movements and together with 
an awareness of the political implications of what it means to be Kurdish. 
Graeme, who has invited the local Kurdish community to provide awareness of 
the Kurds and Kurdistan to local schools each year, said: 
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“…at community cohesion week with schools, I always 
invite the Kurdish community to provide awareness of 
‘who are the Kurds?’ and other general issues regarding 
the Kurds and Kurdistan. I think it’s important for local 
school students to understand the differences between the 
Kurds and other nations in the Middle East. To be honest 
they are very lovely and hard working people. It’s great to 
know and hear the stories of being different” (Graeme: 
Police officer). 
 
Graeme feels it is important to educate and present awareness of the Kurds 
and Kurdish culture to local schools. His positive contribution towards the Kurds 
can be valued as an understanding of the partnership and connections with 
Kurds in the place of settlement. Almost all the key actors and participants in 
this study identify the Kurds as ‘hard working’ and ‘lovely people’, which helps 
support and build confidence among the Kurds to be involved and undertake 
more by taking key contributions to their place of settlement. In the south west 
of England particularly in Plymouth, where a large and visible Kurdish 
population exists, in terms of both numbers and service responses, positive 
impacts were also couched in terms of the Kurdish diaspora making the place of 
settlement more intercultural and multicultural. The process of awareness of 
‘who are the Kurds?’ presented to schools, was not just for the students to 
benefit from the multicultural or culturaliszation environment in which they are 
growing up but to be spread across the wider local communities. Many key 
actors reflected upon their encounters with Kurdish peoples noting an 
experience in which they had ‘learned something.’  
 
4.2.  Intercultural within the host society  
Cultural differences have been at the heart of people’s behaviour throughout the 
history of global politics and immigration. Intercultural contact does not always 
translate into progressive and long-term social relations, and can in certain 
circumstances reinforce prejudices and exacerbate tensions (Vertovec 2007; 
Clayton 2009; Amin 2002). For Berry (2006) the integration of migrants will be 
part of a much wider process of ‘acculturation’, a phenomenon that involves the 
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cultural changes that take place when individuals, groups, or communities from 
other cultures, have continued contact with a host culture.  
 
In general, the nation building process of the Kurds is related to the nation 
building processes in the Middle East: the countries governing the Kurds have 
given rise to different forms of exclusion of Kurds within them. One of the most 
important results of this exclusion has been the migratory movement of the 
Kurds which has formed the Kurdish diaspora. Almost all the participants in 
diaspora have experienced cultures within both societies. Acculturation toward 
a host culture is a reflexive process in that it occurs in synchronicity with a 
partial, temporary or incremental ‘deculturation’ away from a native culture. 
According to Eliot, modern migration has transplanted a mixture of social, 
religious, economic, or political determinations, and migrants have taken with 
them only one part of the their original culture and the new culture. Moreover, in 
such situations cultural sympathy, as well as cultural clashes, will likely emerge 
(Eliot 1949:63-4).  
 
Interculturalism and integration in the host country has many benefits in the 
Kurdish context, such as building and improving the relationship between the 
people of the host country and the Kurds. Integration in the immigration context 
takes the strategy of acculturation, which means that immigrants make regular 
contact with existing populations in the host country and maintain their original 
cultural identity. The Kurdish people in diaspora have found these opportunities 
of intercultural and educated the younger generations about the Kurdish culture 
and host. Intercultural and integration can be regarded as the connection of 
groups and individuals to a societal oneness through a recognition and 
acceptance of cultural differences. Nasreen explains how she had pride at 
sharing her Kurdish heritage at a cultural exhibition in Plymouth (figure 4.3): 
 
 “It was good to talk and show to people about our Kurdish 
heritage, lots of people came to the exhibition, they were 
really interested to find out more about Kurdish life and 
culture […] it is important for future generations to know 
about Kurdish culture and heritage so that it won’t be lost 
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because the future generation are engaged with both 
societies” (Nasreen 23:F). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3  Kurdish Heritage Exhibition in Plymouth 
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The above statement illustrates the importance of educating people about the 
Kurdish culture and interlinking both cultures, and Nasreen realises the 
importance of culturalization.  
 
As Sam and Barry (2010) have highlighted, there are three characteristics of 
acculturation that include the changes that take place in acculturation, how 
numbers of people acculturate, and how well they modify after acculturation. 
These characteristics mean that more people acculturate, and adapt in a better 
way (ibid). For the first generation of Kurds and new arrivals the culture of the 
homeland or the country of origin is real. Here I utilise an adaptation of Barry 
and Sam’s acculturation framework to assess the relationship between a 
majority and a minority in a culturally plural society (Barry and Sam 1997). The 
theory of acculturation was developed to outline the changes that take place in 
cultural patterns for either group when two differentiated cultural groups come 
into contact (Berry 2005). Nasreen mentions in the above statement that Kurds 
engage both in their own cultural heritage and the host society culture. It has 
normally been used to express the changes in diaspora culture following the 
diasporic way to a very different context. Sam and Barry (2010) establish that 
groups or individuals who acculturate are those groups or individuals who adapt 
themselves to one more cultures. Berry (1990) described acculturation as "the 
process by which individual change both by being influenced by contact with 
another culture and by being participants in the general acculturative changes 
underway in their own culture" (235). It means that ‘acculturation’ will be the 
connection that exists between communally held requirements for life and living. 
Berry’s work on acculturation has been of significant importance in many ways. 
It shows how we classify acculturation attitudes and orientations, categorise 
acculturating groups, and most importantly how we imagine acculturation 
process and outcomes. The three features Berry identifies are: 1) acculturation 
dimensions and orientations; 2) a framework for the study of acculturation 
processes; and 3) types of acculturating groups. The first one is the 
investigation of identity conflict to immigrants, showing an alternative approach 
to conceptualizing orientations to heritage and contact cultures. The second is 
about the motivation for ethno-cultural continuity between acculturating 
individuals and acculturating groups. The last one extends theories of 
acculturation and intercultural relations to an atypical domain (Ward, 2008). 
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Acculturation is the process of cultural change that occurs when individuals 
from different cultures come together (Gibson, 2001). The Kurdish people who 
live inside the country of origin (the land of Kurdistan) have been pushed by 
several regimes that have influenced the culture and rules. For many decades 
the Kurdish people have been living with a different culture. Some cultural 
differences that exist between people are easy to see, such as language, dress, 
and traditions, but there are also significant variations in the way societies 
organize themselves, in the ways they interact with their environment, and also 
in their conception of morality.  
 
In the UK, the second and third generation of diaspora have moved into an 
acculturation process, and the Home Office immigration and asylum policy 
around community cohesion has been criticised. Separate cultural 
developments in favour of the policy will force ethnic minorities to develop a 
greater acceptance of core British values and migrants. Further, diaspora 
people are expected not to live lives that are fragmented away from mainstream 
British culture, but to integrate themselves to the core values of the state by 
understanding the British way of life (McGhee 2006). Cultural diversity is the 
variety of human societies or cultures in a specific region, or in the world as a 
whole (UNESCO, 2001). In contradiction to the concept of assimilation, 
acculturation consists of the overtaking of some elements of the other culture. 
The process of acculturation also involves many changes in the values, 
attitudes, abilities and behaviours of the individual. This overtaking of cultural 
aspects can appear on both sides on the existing group as well as the migrant. 
After arriving here in Devon, Renas explained:  
 
“…before arriving here, I didn’t want to mix with other 
people from other cultures or religions because back 
home in Kurdistan, Iraqi or Turks or Iranian attitudes 
toward us as Kurds was not good. They did not respect 
our culture and history, but here in Britain you can see 
they do lots of cultural activities and sometimes you learn 
about other community groups culture not only British. So I 
attended many other cultural venues and I think it’s 
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important to be part of a city cultural project and bring us 
all together as one culture” (Renas 37:M). 
     
Cultural affiliations could provide a way to be connected and construct feelings 
of belonging in relation to a transnational cultural community. Renas’ attitudes 
altered after living in the UK, and he valued the link with other cultures. 
However, diaspora and immigration has affected modern Britain in a number of 
ways. According to the report on the impacts of migration on social cohesion 
and integration:  
 
“…the impacts of immigration have been felt in areas ranging from 
jobs, education and housing through to language, diet and the arts. 
The combined social, economic, political and cultural implication of 
immigration has frequently been assessed as a whole and also in 
their discrete parts” (2012:11).  
 
Psychological research on acculturation has focused on ways in which majority 
attitudes towards multiculturalism impact on the acculturation strategies of 
migrants. The most widely cited model of acculturation has been developed by 
Berry (1997, 2005, 2008, 2011). According to Berry’s model, when migrants 
enter a new cultural environment they are faced with two questions: a) whether 
they wish to maintain their affiliation with the culture of their country of origin, 
and b) whether they wish to forge relations with the dominant culture of the 
society they are entering. 
 
According to Berry (1997), depending on how migrants respond to these two 
issues, they are said to employ one of four acculturation strategies: 
‘assimilation’ referred to a situation which involved the loss of a minority culture 
with the adoption of a majority culture; ‘separation’ refers to maintaining one’s 
heritage culture without adopting elements from the dominant culture; 
‘marginalisation’ referred to the situation where there was a loss of a minority 
culture but with no compensating gain or investment in the majority culture; 
finally, ‘integration’, which is for Berry the most efficient strategy in terms of 
adaptation outcomes, refers to forging or maintaining relations with both one’s 
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country of origin and with the dominant culture (ibid). Aree explains his feelings 
about leaving his Kurdish culture and moving to Devon: 
 
“I felt really alone it took me a long time to fit in, I made a 
decision that I had to be part of my local community, what 
really helped was volunteering and getting a job mixing 
with the local community not just the Kurdish one” (Aree 
29:M).  
 
Aree made a conscious effort to change things and tried to assimilate into the 
local community, however this was not the case for all of the respondents. 
Bewar tells of his resistance to integrate into the host community, preferring to 
remain with his peers in the Kurdish community in efforts to keep his culture 
alive, Bewar made the decision to adopt separation: 
 
“I don’t want to mix with people who are not from my 
culture, they do not understand our ways and values, and 
the Kurdish community is good here, we all know each 
other and trust each other, I know where to go for help, I 
know where I belong. Some of my friends have mixed, but 
I think they have changed, become too westernised and 
don’t participate with Kurdish culture, which I don’t want to 
happen to me” (Bewar 25:M). 
 
Bewar mentions that he wanted to be more attached to Kurdish culture and 
society. He understands some people formed a “multifaced sense of belonging” 
(Elissi 2013:52).  In contrast being in-contact with only one culture is dependent 
on the individual’s self-esteem and confidence. It is worth mentioning that from 
my own experiences many Kurdish people have an interconnection to both or 
more societies and cultures. 
     
Assimilation and integration are the two orientation processes of acceptance 
that immigrants or diaspora groups may choose. To assimilate with the 
dominant group, sometimes the minority tries to change the characteristics of 
their culture completely (Tajfel, 1985). The people who feel more similar 
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culturally to the host society preferred assimilation due to the orientation which 
has a correlation with high self-esteem. Acculturation, assimilation and 
integration from the informants’ point of view have different dimensions. Kurds’ 
successful integration into British society has made them at certain periods 
assimilate into the new culture. If the cultural distance is greater, Kurds prefer 
integration, another strategy that allows Kurds to feel accepted and still keep 
their original culture. When Kurds prefer to maintain only their original culture, 
they endorse the separation strategy. According to Berry (et al., 1987; 1989) 
separation is positively related to acculturative stress. The immigrants who 
choose marginalization may experience a feeling of loss of identity, high levels 
of alienation and anxiety. It is argued that the integration of the people will be 
part of a much wider process of ‘acculturation’, a phenomenon that involves the 
cultural changes that take place when groups, individuals or even communities 
from other cultures come into first hand and continuous contact with a host 
culture. Consequently the relocation in British society and the dislocation from 
the place of origin has established a cultural mix. 
 
4.2.1 Cultural awareness  
The involvement in cultural and social activities has significantly contributed to 
the preponderance of Kurds in diaspora networks. The meaning that the Kurds 
associate with diaspora agrees with Vertovec’s argument of diaspora as a 
social form, as a type of consciousness, and as a way of producing cultural 
awareness. Delivering training to other agencies and groups in Devon, 
specifically within Plymouth, the majority of the participants believe that the 
demographic of the city has changed since 2000, and it now has a more diverse 
population, while more broadly Britain has become a multicultural society. It is 
important with the challenges that communities all work together and support 
one another to be and do the best that Kurds are able. The growing interest in 
cultural differences has been raised within organisations and schools in 
Plymouth and Devon. Omar explained: 
 
“…we provide cultural awareness training to some schools 
every year as part of international week. It is very 
important to teach children in our area to understand 
about differences and sometime I think our children need 
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cultural education as well […] Staff from organisations that 
work with immigrants need cultural differences training so 
they can deal with their issues in a much better way” 
(Omar M:48). 
  
Omar highlights the important merging of cultural and political differences in the 
education system and wider communities; he sees it as a crucial aspect in the 
educating of the Kurdish cause, but also a two way learning process with 
diaspora communities learning from the local host (Figure 4.4  ). 
 
Figure 4.4  Kurdish Supplementary School 
  
The cultural awareness events may serve to solidify connections to BME or 
Diaspora groups, particular notions of what it means to be different, and the 
need for the continuing existence and cultural awareness of Kurdish principles. 
Nevertheless, they may be present to strengthen constructions of 
consciousness and affiliations with fellow Kurds in Plymouth. The above 
statement highlights the significance of teaching children to be aware of 
different cultures whilst living in the host society. In addition it is important to 
educate Kurdish children from the diaspora about their parent’s cultural 
background. In recent years geographers and other scholars have 
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acknowledged the importance of teaching children in diaspora about their 
culture, homeland and national identity. Elizabeth Mavroudi (2007) 
acknowledges the importance of teaching Palestinian children in diaspora on 
how to be Palestinians, for practical purposes of identity continuation and 
survival. 
 
Many participants see Kurdish cultural events such as ‘Newroz’ (the Kurdish 
New Year celebrated on March the 21st) as an important cultural connection to 
the Kurdish diaspora, enabling the host society to engage with genuine forms of 
Kurdishness. Every year on 21 March, Kurdish people in all parts of Kurdistan 
as well as those who live in diaspora, gather together to show their solidarity 
and joy, as well as their patriotism, and in highlighting their need for freedom 
and democracy. Hoshyar points out the importance of Newroz events (see 
Figure 4.5): 
“Newroz is not only a celebration; it is part of our life. It is 
important for us to celebrate as part of our history and 
culture, at the same time we want to educate our younger 
generation and host communities about our rich culture. 
More than 2000 people attend the Newroz celebrations in 
Plymouth every year, it’s not all Kurds but other people 
from different local groups attend. Cultural activity is part 
of our integration programme” (Hoshyar M:38). 
 
Figure 4.5  Kurdish Cultural Event  
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Cultural integration in the diaspora context takes the strategy of acculturation, 
which means that individuals from diaspora makes regular contact with the 
members of diaspora in the host society and maintain their original cultural 
identity as well. The above statement by Hoshyar highlights that the cultural 
event is a road map to integration within the host society. Hoshyar also 
mentioned that it is important to educate the younger generation of Kurds to 
follow and understand their cultural heritage. Rubin (2011) has argued that 
“social integration refers to the social connection and interactions with other 
people in terms of quantity and quality (498). The integration projects in 
Plymouth have many benefits such as developing and improving the 
relationship between diaspora groups and people from the host country. How 
individuals acculturate and how well they adapt in the acculturation process, 
following Sam and Berry’s (2010) features that the more people acculturate, the 
better they adapt. Cultural awareness is one of the integration concepts that are 
obvious in the narratives of some informants as a first step in the host society.  
 
4.2.2  Land of Opportunity 
 
Every Kurdish participant who was interviewed couched Britain as a land of possibility. 
Britain has been the home to many other diaspora groups. Many studies conducted on 
immigrants, diasporas, and Kurds have outlined western states as places of 
opportunity (McDowall 1992, Sheffer 1995, Hassanpour 1995, Ahmedzadeh 2003, 
Eliassi 2013, Alinia and Eliassi 2014). The first generations and new arrivals of Kurds 
can be seen as “individuals with limited choices deciding to enter into something larger 
than their immediate cultures” through migration (Malcomsom 1998  :235).   
Many respondents interviewed said that they saw Europe and particularly the 
UK as a land of opportunity, a place of safety and security, that offered a good 
standard of living, employment opportunities, and an education system that was 
enviable. The civil unrest caused by the Saddam regime impacted on many 
Kurdish people; they felt their independence was denied to them in their 
homeland. The first generation of respondents fled Kurdistan to escape 
Saddam’s oppressive regime, where homes were destroyed and land and 
property taken away.  Some respondents left Iraq quickly and entered Europe 
seeking asylum (Figure 4.6). Rezan explains why he left Iraq and wanted to live 
in Europe: 
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 “Everything was taken away from me in Kurdistan, I saw 
my house burnt, I had to go to Iran with nothing, I was a 
refugee there. I knew that if I wanted to have a better life I 
would have to go to Europe, I know it meant leaving my 
family and friends but I had to do it my parents were very 
supportive of me even though my mother was so upset, 
but they said I had a better chance there with more 
opportunities” (Rezan 36:M). 
 
Figure 4.6 Europe’s Refugee Crisis 
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This was a recurring theme with many of the respondents, having a desire to 
have a better life, a life somewhere which would empower Kurdish people to be 
Kurdish and to have a positive identity in safety. 
 
There was a dichotomy of diaspora experience in Plymouth with both positive 
and negative outcomes. Some respondents viewed their experience as a 
catalyst for change to a better life with opportunities that were denied to them in 
their host land. Social media was influential in enabling many to view western 
counties as places to go temporarily until an independent Kurdistan was 
established a “promised land”. Paree tells of the hard decision she had to make 
to leave Kurdistan: 
 
“I did not want to leave my village but it was not safe for 
us, my father went to prison, Saddam’s army was cruel we 
had no life, we could not breath. I would watch TV 
programmes on satellite and Europe looked safe, people 
had no wars, no troubles likes us. I did what my family 
wanted, it was only for a short time until I could go back, 
and life is good here I am happy and safe, but I am still 
waiting to go back to my motherland” (Paree 29:F).  
 
Paree’s experience is common among the respondents, torn between a 
diasporic place of residence and homeland, the pull to return home is 
overridden by safety and the opportunity to be Kurdish without reprisal. For the 
majority interviewed most did not want to leave their homeland where the 
community was close knit, and people were employed. 
  
How respondents were received in Britain and their experience did not 
necessarily affect their attitudes about returning to their homeland. 85% of the 
respondents said that they would eventually return to their homeland (South 
Kurdistan) when Kurdistan was a recognised state (see Chapter Seven.  
Despite being settled in Plymouth with job security and children in the education 
system, Mustafa explains why he wants to go back to Kurdistan when it is 
independent: 
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“It is every Kurds dream to go back to the land of their 
blood, the blood in the land and in our veins is the same. 
The UK has given me and my family an opportunity to 
understand and develop living as a Kurd but I always feel I 
am missing something with our life. I am very proud to be 
here too, they always let us as Kurds celebrate and do our 
cultural activities which were banned in Kurdistan” 
(Mustafa 35:M). 
 
Mustafa admitted that the host society of the UK has established the opportunity 
for the Kurdish diaspora to play an important role of the Kurds and Kurdistan.  
Opportunities would be given for Kurds to be able to begin a series of new 
histories and experiences upon which to build lives together with the host 
society. During the great wave of Kurdish immigration to western countries, 
thousands of Kurdish people left their homeland to come and find a safe place. 
The society of settlement for Kurds, becomes the land of opportunities to 
develop the idea of Kurdishness or Kurdayati. 
 
In the following section I show how the economic situation affects the Kurdish 
diaspora arriving in the area with few or no choice, and how members of the 
Kurdish diaspora  have become involved in a variety of experiences from the 
place of origin to the place of settlement.    
  
4.2.3  Plymouth: “the Kurdistan I never knew” 
Some second and third generation respondents made reference that Plymouth 
had become a Kurdistan that they had physically not been to.  This was 
facilitated by the democratic open environment in which they are growing up in. 
The city of Plymouth (Figure 4.7) with its large Kurdish population, is also a 
place where the respondents expressed that they had the freedom to affiliate 
themselves to a particular political party, to wear Kurdish traditional dress, 
socialise in Kurdish restaurants, and learn more about their Kurdish heritage 
and language with extra-curricular Kurdish schools. Kamyar, a second 
generation diasporic Kurd, explains how he has listened to many stories 
recounted from his parents about Kurdistan, and how he feels that Plymouth is 
his Kurdistan: 
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“My mom talks about the motherland (Kurdistan) all the 
time. She tells the stories of her village, the family, and 
people left there. I know life was hard especially under 
Saddam’s regime, and one day I hope to visit, but here in 
Plymouth this is my homeland, this is where I belong, 
where I can live out being Kurdish, where I am proud to be 
Kurdish British. This is my home, although sometimes I 
feel guilty because I don’t feel like my friends who say that 
Kurdistan is in their blood, Plymouth is in my blood” 
(Kamyar 20:M). 
 
Figure 4.7 Plymouth City 
 
Kamyar regards Plymouth as his home and has divided loyalties between his 
mother’s emotions towards Kurdistan and his recognition that his home is in fact 
not directly linked to his generational past. Perceived ideals of sentimentality 
towards homeland, visited or imagined, can cause internal conflict. Roken 
explains that though she was born in diaspora her father has kept the memory 
of homeland alive and that while she has never been to his family’s city of Erbil 
she does not feel homesick, as Plymouth is the Kurdistan she never knew: 
 
“In my head I have been to Erbil but I don’t miss it, as here 
in Plymouth I am Kurdish. I know some people in 
Plymouth here are not nice, but most are ok. My father 
has told me the stories of the suffering at the hands of the 
Baath party for being Kurdish, there is none of that here, I 
live my Kurdish life here in peace and safety, there is so 
much help and support in Plymouth. Being Kurdish is 
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recognised even in hospital, they have leaflets with the 
Kurdish language” (Roken 19:F) 
 
Roken finds the support in Plymouth instrumental in underpinning her feeling 
that Plymouth is her home, her Kurdistan. Plymouth city’s largest ethnic minority 
is Kurdish, there are many voluntary and statutory agencies that support the 
Kurdish community, and this interaction supports integration with the local and 
wider community. Some respondents said that they felt part of their community, 
some volunteered in local projects, others were being trained to be champions 
with local health organisations that signposted others to the right support. Some 
of the diaspora community had businesses in Plymouth and felt that they were 
well-respected members of the area. Bashir tells of the pride he felt when he 
was asked to speak at a Christian event describing what the asylum process 
was about: 
 
“The local church asked if I would do a talk at the men’s 
breakfast club, they wanted me to explain the asylum 
process and what it was like being in a different country. I 
felt proud to do this; everyone was so polite and nice and 
seemed really interested in what I was talking about. They 
asked me lots of questions. I know when I first came to 
Plymouth there was some racism towards me and 
sometimes there is still, but now I can talk to people about 
being Kurdish and the persecution, people are really 
interested they want to find out more” (Bashir 24:M). 
 
The feeling of belonging was important to Bashir; assimilation into the 
community had become a substitute for the missed extended family back in 
Kurdistan. Belonging, whether to a particular political party or group, helped with 
retaining a sense of identity of being Kurdish. As Bashir goes on to explain, so 
much has been taken away or denied to him that Plymouth has given him the 
opportunity to reclaim his life, and Plymouth is his Kurdistan: 
 
“What I love most about here (Plymouth) is that I have got 
back some of what I have lost, I mean I am free to say 
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what I think and feel, I can meet up with my friends and we 
have long talks about our culture and what is going on in 
the world, I play football for Azadi the Kurdish football 
team and we play against local teams, I am feeling better 
about myself and living here has helped, it is now my 
home [...] yes I am proud to say my home” (Bashir 24:M). 
 
The value of community involvement in giving as well as receiving support was 
of fundamental value. Karen, a local community drama facilitator, noticed that 
the more individuals gave of themselves in terms of practical and emotional 
support, the more they made reference that they “did not miss their country,” 
they no longer felt isolated but valued. This sense of being valued was also 
recognised by the local host community. Martin, a local shopkeeper, explains 
why he enjoys his Kurdish customers: 
 
“There is a large Kurdish population here in Plymouth, I 
have many customers who are Kurdish, I like the way they 
are so family orientated and value the time spent with their 
family. I have been invited to customers’ houses to eat, 
there is one man whose wife cooks me dolmas. I always 
have a laugh and a joke, they are polite and respectful and 
look out for each other, the way it used to be here 30 
years ago” (Martin: shopkeeper). 
 
Martin’s positive interaction with his customers evidenced what I have observed 
during this study, that involvement and a sense of value by the host community 
aided community integration. New migrants are typically living in disadvantaged 
and deprived neighbourhoods, often characterised by poor housing, high levels 
of unemployment, limited service provision and poor local amenities (Robinson 
2010). These places can represent an unfavourable context of reception and 
induce what has been referred to as acculturative stress: adverse effects, 
including anxiety, depression and other forms of mental health and physical 
problems, associated with adapting to a new cultural context (Schwartz et al., 
2008). Living in close proximity to people from the same country of origin or 
from a shared ethnic or religious background can help limit such challenges. 
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Benefits are most apparent in situations where the migrant community is well 
established and has a good knowledge of local bureaucratic systems, resource 
availability and has established its own community based services and facilities 
(White 2011; Spicer 2008; Glick Schiller et al 2006; Williams 2006; Kesten et al 
2011). 
 
4.3 “No money in my pocket”  
The majority of first generation Kurds will have experienced and witnessed 
harrowing and distressing situations both in their country of origin and on route 
to the UK. For families and children these experiences may have been 
particularly traumatic and shocking because of the trauma they have suffered in 
the homeland and during the journey to the host country. Many arrive in the UK 
and other European countries with limited cultural and legal knowledge and 
understanding, and with little or no money or financial security. It is 
predominantly men who arrive in diaspora first, and once settled are followed by 
their wives and children. Many Kurds in Plymouth and surrounding areas 
decided to settle here after their claim for an Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) 
visa was granted or British citizenship awarded. Kader, a Kurdish business man 
recounts how he arrived penniless. The picture below shows the first Kurdish 
dispersal arrivals in 2000 to Plymouth City (Figure 4.8).:  
 
Figure 4.8  Group of First Kurdish people arrived in the Plymouth 
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“I came to Britain with no money as a victim of war and I 
am sure the majority of Kurdish people coming from 
Kurdistan didn’t have any money in their pockets, but after 
settling here we all started a new life working in factories 
or food industries, and also started small businesses 
together with inter-partnership of two or three people at 
the beginning” (Kader 47:M). 
  
Kader believes the majority of first generation diaspora Kurds arrived here with 
little or no financial support when they arrived. It is important to look at the 
Kurdish experiences and life after settlement, as there is little research in this 
area. The above statement demonstrates that hard work and contribution to a 
new place of settlement can have an experiential background that can be 
traced. Kader states the terms of ‘inter-partnership’ initially to set up 
businesses, there are many small Kurdish businesses, which include 
restaurants, takeaways, car washes, mini-markets, hairdressers and taxi 
driving; the first Kurdish restaurant, café and mini-market opened in 2001 in 
Plymouth. Kurdish enterprises can become focal points connecting the country 
of settlement and Kurdistan, providing a space of multi-ethnic interaction in the 
everyday lives of Kurds. It is this interaction, which the proprietor of the Kurdish 
enterprise in Plymouth, believed he could support with the demand and 
increase of availability of Kurdish products. Before opening the Kurdish 
businesses in Plymouth the nearest sources of dedicated Kurdish products 
were in Bristol, Birmingham or London. Another participant told me that:  
 
“…we are very proud of the Kurdish community here, 
within a very short time many Kurdish people have created 
successful small business and integrated within new 
communities. It was very hard when we first arrived here 
as we had no money and the majority of us couldn’t speak 
English, but we have developed a society within a big 
society, and you can access lots of Kurdish businesses 
which has helped to create lots of jobs for local and 
Kurdish people” (Omar 48:M). 
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Omar like Kader experienced the culturalisation of differences and struggled 
during the time he arrived in Plymouth. The integration of migrants to a new 
society commenced after learning the language of the host country, starting 
employment, and developing new businesses. What Omar tries to show is that 
to successfully integrate a small society within a wider community, an  
exchange of labour and skills is needed, as the diaspora community increases 
so does the demand for Kurdish products, which benefits the whole community, 
not just the diaspora. Many participants feel that after receiving work permits or 
ILR visas in the UK they have greater opportunities to build a business or work 
with other local companies.   
 
The initial settlement of the first generation of the Kurdish diaspora is a key part 
of the Kurdish history, building and intergrating into the local host community. 
The history and story of the fist generation and more recent Kurdish migrant 
settelment in the country needs to be told, as has their contribution to the place 
of residence. Amir admits that: 
  
“…first generation and recent migrants bring a new culture 
as well as new experiences to the UK, I think its important 
for our children and other people to know about our story 
and how we have been adopted here and started our new 
life. When I arrived here in the UK I was supported by 
NASS with a small room to share with other people in a 
house, but some times you need other help and I had no 
money, so it was only waiting to get £26 vouchers a week 
from NASS, but now after settelment I set up my own 
business and now eleven people work for me” (Amir 
39:M). 
 
For Amir the historical importance of the first generation of diaspora to Britain is 
important. He argues that the first generation and recent migrants bring new 
contibutions and experinces such as food to the place of settlement. However, 
Amir illustrates that it is important to have extra support not just for 
accommodation and weekly food vouchers. As Perry states, “It’s not just about 
providing physical accommodation, sometimes there has been little attention to 
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the wider support needed” (2005:124). This could include, for example, isolation 
from key services, social networks, issues of racial tension, and high transport 
costs (Wilson, 2001).   
 
The Kurdish diaspora in Devon and the UK, particularly the first generations and 
recent Kurdish migrants, are working in low-paid, unskilled sectors such as 
hand carwashes, takeaways, barbershops, and on factory floors. One of the 
reasons for a lack of aspiration is an educational background where a directed 
and guided approach is the norm, rather than empowerment to think 
independently. A large number of the Kurdish diaspora in Devon are 
predominantly male, and a small number of Kurdish women stay in the home 
looking after children as their husbands search for employment to improve their 
standard of living. Some participants felt that women in Kurdish society should 
take on stereotypical gender related roles, staying at home while males worked 
outside and brought financial support to the family. The women’s role, 
particularly that of married women in the Kurdish society, is often seen as the 
person who looks after the families finances. A large number of Kurdish women 
arrived in the UK as a spouse, to join their partners. Under Home Office policy 
these women are not entitled to any public funds. On arrival the women are 
faced with language barriers and cultural challenges, while the enormity of 
responsibility for their husbands is too much to manage. Karwan suggests that 
the majority of single Kurds in the diaspora work very hard to save money and 
bring their partners to join them:  
 
“I work 6 days, 12 hours shifts in the factory to save 
money so my wife can join me here, because the role has 
changed […] I was a teacher back home but because of 
the language and cultural differences I couldn’t continue to 
be a teacher and obtain the financial support I needed. I 
still think it is difficult for my wife to come here with the 
cultural differences and the amount of time it will take to 
learn English” (Karwan 38:M). 
 
Karwan’s account describes working hard to save money to bring his partner to 
reunite with him. Karwan is aware of the difficulty his partner would face after 
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arriving in a new society. Many migrants like Karwan arrive to the host country 
with academic educational backgrounds or have worked in white collar or highly 
skilled jobs in the country of origin, however due to the lack of language 
competency and confidence they work in the low skilled sector. Kurds arriving in 
western countries within the last two decades are typically characterised as a 
less educated and a more heterogeneous group than those who came to the 
west before the last two decades (Wahlbeck 2001). The reason behind this was 
the lack of security and the economic situation of that period. 
  
Kurdish women’s experiences of exile and diaspora have been counted in the 
role of these processes. Ala pointed out that the role of women is to support 
their partners, she explained after her arrival: 
 
“…before I married my husband he did not have lots of 
savings due to his spending but when I arrived here we 
started saving  more as well as going on holiday every 
year. I think in general women play a great role in Kurdish 
society to support men” (Ala 28:F). 
 
Ala refers to the role of women in Kurdish society as a backbone. Whilst many 
women primarily focus on the needs of their children and partners, new 
opportunities and rights have opened up for them in western countries, and to 
some extent they feel more at home in the UK than their partners. This 
dichotomy has been identified by scholars regarding the position of Kurdish 
women abroad and in Kurdistan (Alinia 2004). Kurdish women in diaspora in the 
UK are adopting the stereotypical gender role, staying within their home, and 
looking after their children without paid employment. However, the Kurdish 
women in other countries such as the USA, Germany and Sweden often work 
among the men to support the family (Alinia 2004).  
With regards to the Kurdish diaspora in Devon particularly within the first 
generation arriving with limited or no money, many of them waited more than a 
decade to get a positive decision of ILR in the country and commence 
employment. Many Kurds feel a sense of belonging towards the place of 
residence, and with the increase of the Kurdish community there is also 
recognition of small businesses. As Kader illustrates: 
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“…the night food economy of Plymouth city is run by 
Kurdish people, we have nearly 43 Kurdish takeaways in 
Plymouth and I believe there are more than 100 delivery 
drivers working each night to deliver the food this will 
include Chinese, Indian and other restaurants that deliver 
the food to the public” (Kader 47:M). 
The night-time economy that Kader identifies is the most important income for 
the Kurdish community and working with other diaspora groups such as 
Chinese and Indian helps to build relationships as well as understanding the 
needs of both communities. This demonstrates that the diaspora groups in 
Plymouth not only work with other cultures and organisations, but also work 
together to provide and build a better economic situation among them. Several 
studies have highlighted the connection among the diaspora groups that are 
strong and they understand the needs and development of each other (Alinia 
2004, Wahlbeck 2001, Robinson 2002). Robinson highlights the connection 
between the diasporas and developments as being three pronged: first, 
development in the diaspora, second, development through the diaspora,  and 
third, development by the  diaspora. The first refers to the use of networks in the 
place of residence, which includes the formation of cultural ties, mobilisation, 
and ethnic businesses. The second as development through the diaspora, but 
refering instead to “how diasporic communities utilise their diffuse global 
connections beyond the locality to facilitate economic and social wellbeing.” The 
third applies to the ramifications of “the flows of ideas, money, and political 
support to the migrant’s home country” (Robinson 2002:113, 123). 
  
Many members of the Kurdish diaspora in the UK benefit the south Kurdistan 
economic situation. South Kurdistan has recently undergone an economic 
boom, particularly between the years 2004 and 2014, with a large percentage of 
the population having more disposable income; this is seen through the 
numerous shopping malls that have sprung up all over the region selling well-
known international brands. As individuals’ lifestyles are changing, so are their 
tastes and ideas, and there is an increased desire to try new things from the 
west. Some members of the diaspora have a chance to benefit by the sale of 
goods (particularly land, property, and business) in Kurdistan and then bringing 
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money to the country of settlement to develop businesses and employ local and 
diaspora members. However, the interview data presented in this study has 
indicated that most of the respondents arrived in the host country without any 
financial or cultural understanding. Migrations increase from complex 
connections between different societies, establish new connections. The 
mobility of people will remain a key issue in development.  
 
4.4  The grass is always greener: difficulties of settlement in the host 
country 
The idea of living in a different country is often different to the reality; life in 
Plymouth for some diasporas appeared more desirable than the life that was left 
behind in Kurdistan, but did not match the reality of the situation. Many 
participants interviewed believed that Britain was the land of hope and 
opportunity and did not expect some of the challenges that they encountered. 
Alan explains why he was excited about leaving Kurdistan and how he first 
found Plymouth: 
 
“I had to leave my town, there was no other way, it was 
not safe for me to stay. I was sad to go but excited about 
going to Britain, I had seen on the TV how good things 
were there, it was a good place to live, there were jobs, 
and it was a safe place, the sort of place that was good to 
live in. When I first arrived in Plymouth I thought all my 
troubles had gone” (Alan 29:M). 
 
Alan continues:  
“I did not know that some people did not like us coming to 
their city, they were racist and said bad things to me, I did 
not think Britain would be like that it was a surprise.” 
 
For many the idea of living in a country that is a democracy, safe from 
persecution, and with a secure economic environment, is an attractive prospect. 
Some members of the diaspora leave secure jobs and have good qualifications, 
but their dreams are not realised when settling in the West Country, where there 
is high unemployment and social and economic deprivation. This is particularly 
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the case in Plymouth, which is also a rural city with low populations of BME 
groups.  
 
Amin explains his disappointment that despite having a degree he is working in 
an ice cream factory: 
 
“I worked hard for my degree, my family was so proud of 
me for getting it, I have to lie to them, I don’t tell them that 
I work in an ice-cream factory, they think I am a teacher. It 
makes me sad, I thought things would be easier here but 
they are not, most of my friends work in factories or take 
away. I hear people say we take jobs away. I want to be a 
teacher not an ice cream worker. In Kurdish we have a 
saying, ‘Dang deholeh Dire khosha’ [‘the grass is always 
greener on the other side’]” (Amin 31:M). 
 
There is a reoccurring theme of diasporas that they believe opportunities will be 
greatly improved in the UK, however when they settle they feel that they don’t 
have the same opportunities as the host country because they are immigrants; 
indeed the number of available white collar jobs in Plymouth is lower than in the 
manufacturing industry, agricultural, and hospitality sectors, this gives rise to 
over-qualified people doing jobs that are low-skilled. As Adel stated, “I was an 
engineer in Kurdistan, but in Plymouth I work in a take away, I know work is 
work but sometimes it makes me cross that I am not using my skills that I 
trained in”(Adel 39:M). The frustration of not working in meaningful employment, 
earning low wages and being unable to improve standards of living due to 
increasing costs of living in the West Country leave many participants feeling 
disillusioned. Sami wondered whether he had done the right thing in coming to 
Britain. He pointed out: 
 
“Most of Kurdistan is safe now, I think I could go back but I 
have no money, I cannot save money here, life is very 
expensive in Plymouth and the bills keep on going up. I 
know I am safe here but I can’t improve my situation, my 
friends back home have land, jobs and are doing well, I 
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feel that I have gone backwards, I think I thought life would 
be a lot different, better” (Sami 27:M). 
 
The disappointment that Sami expressed is also the experienced of other first 
generation and new arrivals. Unskilled members within the diaspora who have 
literacy and language problems find it particularly difficult to secure employment 
as their skill base is very limited compared with other diasporas who are 
qualified and literate. The experiences of some individuals in diaspora are 
conflicting, wanting a change of circumstance, and then when it happens, 
wanting it to revert, as Omar illustrates:      
 
“I miss Kurdistan my family and village, when I was there I 
thought the West had it all, people said that Europe was 
the place to live a land of opportunity. Now I am here I 
wish I was back home, with my family and village with my 
land, there is a saying here the grass is always greener 
[...] yes that’s right you wish for something and when you 
have it is not what you thought” (Omar 48:M). 
 
Omar shared his feelings of missing his family and friends in Kurdistan, and that 
life in the UK is not what he expected. Omar went on to explain that new arrivals 
would be better knowing the facts and using their energy and skills in building 
Kurdistan: 
“I tell my friends not to come here, life is not what it 
seems, they should stay at home and build Kurdistan, 
that’s what they should do” (Omar 48:M). 
 
New diaspora arrivals In the UK are faced with high levels of homelessness, 
reliance on food banks, and unemployment; the UK for some of the 
respondents like Omar is not the utopia they believed it would be. 
 
4.5 The 450: Supporting each other 
In this section the study explores how the Kurdish diaspora supports each 
other. The figure of  450 was identified by participants during the research as an 
element of cultural rules and norms of the Kurdish community. Between 2001 
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and 2003 the Home Office refused many asylum seekers in the UK, due to 
political turmoil that occurred after the attacks in New York and Washington on 
11 September 2001, as well as the War on Terror. 450 Kurdish people from 
Plymouth were refused asylum by the Home Office, and support was terminated 
from the government, resulting in homelessness for many and the inability to 
return to their homeland. The immigration debate in the UK cannot be 
understood without considering the wider global context. The invasion of Iraq in 
2003 by coalition partners left the life of many refused asylum seekers in the UK 
on hold, without receiving any support from the government, leading many to 
become destitute. Usually within the Kurdish society there is a cultural respect 
which Kurds show supporting each other in a variety of ways. The Kurds in 
Plymouth have remained true to many of their traditional norms and values. 
Members of the Kurdish diaspora have seen an increasingly important 
dimension of Kurdish history, culture and solidarity to Kurds. The story of the 
450 Kurds in Plymouth has been chosen as a focus for this section, as a key 
example of the solidarity and support of diaspora in a host country. Rizgar 
points out that: 
 
“…we couldn’t believe while the war was happening in 
Iraq, the Home Office stopped giving support to failed 
Kurdish asylum seekers. Myself and other individuals from 
the Kurdish community gave support to those who had 
been refused. I took seven people to stay with me at my 
small flat whatever I earned we shared at that time, it is 
part of our culture to support each other and not let them 
do anything bad” (Rizgar M:46). 
 
The Kurdish diaspora practise their own cultural rules. Rizgar supported the 
other members of his community as part of his cultural norms and values. His 
support was pivotal to failed Kurdish asylum seekers. The cultural aspirations of 
Kurdishness bring pride to many Kurds in diaspora. When interviewed, some 
key actors recognised and acknowledged respect towards the Kurdish 
community for the support network offered to each other; Keith explains that: 
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“There were so many Kurdish people inside Plymouth city 
without any financial support as they had been refused by 
UKBA and in that period of time we never had any 
incidents of petty crime such as shoplifting that involved 
the Kurdish community, it is a privilege to have worked 
alongside the Kurdish community” (Keith Police officer). 
 
Keith emphasizes the powerful influence of the Kurdish culture to prevent 
crimes and petty theft from the town centre. The cultural tradition of Kurds has 
been one of the strong routes for Kurds to support each other. This culture of 
respect is highlighted by Baroj: 
 
“I was one of the 450 Kurdish asylum seekers that 
received a refusal letter from the Home Office. It was a 
hard time because on one hand there was the war in Iraq, 
we were all worried about our family and friends, and on 
the other hand the UK government had refused us, and 
many of us become homeless. We relied on other Kurdish 
friends as they had been granted indefinite leave to 
remain or had been here for many years […] If we die we 
will never put our culture or people down, and I [am] so 
proud to be a Kurd” (Baroj 33:M). 
 
Many participants had multiple worries due to the lack of information regarding 
their families back home and the war in Iraq. Despite these significant worries, 
support networks by the other Kurds provided hope for all of 450 people not to 
be homeless. Members of the Kurdish community who have been settled are 
marked differently even from other failed asylum seekers. The above statement 
identified the respect towards the Kurdish people and culture. To be a 
participant in supporting other Kurds with food and providing a safe place in a 
time of need is likely to lead to a greater identification. A certain degree of 
personal investment is made and an increased concern in the fate of those 
supported is likely to be engendered. Involvement of this kind can also lead to a 
greater awareness or inquisitiveness about the causes in the first place, it could 
be argued that the significance of the Kurdish cultural norms and humanitarian 
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efforts within the Kurdish Diaspora and Plymouth communities. A number of 
Kurds campaigned and embarked on a hunger strike to highlight their 
humanitarian rights in obtaining a hearing. Zakria explains:  
           
“In 2002, myself and eight other Kurds in Plymouth went 
on a hunger strike outside the Plymouth Immigration 
Office, to obtain a hearing and acknowledgement of 
asylum rights. We were there for two weeks, it was 
important for people and the media to get our story and we 
tried to get people in power to listen to our situation” 
(Zakria 38:M). 
 
The Kurds in diaspora and in homeland fight for their rights. Zakria explains the 
importance of going on a hunger strike for two weeks, to obtain a hearing and 
acknowledgement of asylum seekers rights, In the Kurdish context in Plymouth, 
supporting one’s fellow Kurd is a politicised one, which cannot be separated 
from other cultural and social aspects of Kurdayati.    
 
Local agencies that work with refugees and asylum seekers from Kurdistan 
have identified that young people who arrive in Plymouth face challenges and 
require more support due to the fact they are minors. Harem arrived in 
Plymouth at the age of 16 years and he told me: 
 
“I arrived in Plymouth as a young person and after four 
months I got the decision ‘leave to remain’. I was very 
happy as I can access many things which I couldn’t 
before. I did start part time work at the local restaurant in 
the town centre and attended college to develop my 
personal skills. But all that changed when I become 18 
years old, the Home Office took away my ‘leave to remain’ 
and all my hopes have been turned down. It’s nearly five 
years that I have been supported by other Kurdish people 
in Plymouth and I am applying for Section Four again but 
don’t know whether they will accept it or not” (Harem 
26:M) . 
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Many young Kurdish individuals arrived in the UK, like Harem, with the short-
term decision of ‘Leave to Remain’. During that time Harem had access to 
employment and education enabling him to plan for his future.  His hopes for 
the future have been stopped by the Home Office and his life now depends on 
the support of other Kurdish people in Plymouth. Participants also identified 
many strengths exhibited by Kurdish people. These strengths include personal 
qualities such as being hardworking, building strong relationships, resilience, 
and standing up to fight for their rights. Attributes common to Kurdish cultures 
were also significant strengths that young people could draw on, including the 
value of respect, supporting each other, love and care. The ways which teen 
migrants from Kurdistan navigate the multiple and complex transitions 
encountered as part of settling in Plymouth require a support network from the 
Kurdish diaspora community. Immigrants all have different skills and 
characteristics, so any claim about them is by definition a generalisation. 
 
4.6   Experiences of racism in Plymouth 
The relevance of global migration to Plymouth has noticeably increased since 
the late 1990s, as asylum seekers began to be dispersed to the city under the 
1999 Asylum and Immigration Act (Refugees’ Needs Analysis; 2005). Burnett’s 
(2011) study investigated how geographies of racism throughout the UK have 
changed in a wider climate of economic challenges, finding that changing 
patterns of migration and settlement form increasingly varied racist responses, 
exacerbating national policies. Although historically Plymouth has had a 
comparatively small BME population, the demography of the city has changed 
significantly over the past ten years, leaving particular communities isolated and 
vulnerable to racist attacks. Drawing on Burnett’s findings, the IRR (IRR News 
Team, 2011) has argued that the lack of a local and national political will to 
challenge the causes of racist attacks, and to state the official response to 
racism, has historically been one of denial and that of downplaying the severity 
of racial violence. Unfortunately the current economic climate has forced certain 
key support agencies, with a commitment to projects aimed at fostering 
community cohesion and diverting the focus away from racial violence and 
racism, to close down (ibid). The IRR has reported that in relation to the 
increase of BME’s in Plymouth specifically: “There have been vicious attacks 
139 
 
against asylum seekers, students from BME communities, Gypsies and 
Travellers and workers within particular sectors such as catering and mini-
cabbing” (ibid). 
 
Valeria Ottonelli (1999, in Dower and Williams, 2002) believes the responsibility 
to initiate changing attitudes towards those less fortunate lies with those who 
are global citizens, and states that although people have varied reasons to 
emigrate, the main reasons are economic imbalances and disparities. Global 
citizens ought to give support to redistributive activities, cooperating 
internationally to improve living conditions for the poorest countries in the world, 
whilst contributing to removal of political and economic causes of immigration, 
by taking actions to bring their countries to adopt a more liberal immigration 
policy (ibid). 
 
In terms of the research conducted on the Kurdish diaspora in Devon UK, 
studies have found that the first generation and recent Kurdish migrants are at 
risk of experiencing discrimination and prejudice similar to the wider BME 
population, causing difficulties in establishing new lives in the UK. Yet, typically 
little research has investigated Kurds in the UK, significantly less than in other 
countries such as Sweden and Germany with more established diaspora 
groups.  
 
Experience has always held a central position within the diaspora discourse. 
Mohanty illustrates that experience can be understood in terms of fragmentation 
and discontinuity, and that it should be situated within historical contexts in 
order to enable generalizing claims on part of collectivity regarding shared 
experiences (1992:88). This day-to-day experience of racism has been 
experienced by many participants in Devon. Since the EU referendum on 23 
June 2016, incidents of hate crime in the UK have increased by 57 percent 
(Yeung, 2016). Figure 4.9 shows that Plymouth City has a higher percentage of 
reported hate crime than other areas in the South West. The following quote 
illustrates the racism faced living in a Devon environment: 
 
“…of course we face racism and I think it’s important to 
understand the geographic area because we live in Devon 
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as there is no large diverse populations. My cousin and his 
wife visited me here, we went to the town centre and a 
group of young girls said to his wife ‘look Muslims and 
terrorists are here’ but we didn’t report it because the 
police don’t do anything and we get used to day to day 
abuse from local people” (Saman 23:M).     
 
Figure 4.9  (Post-Brexit) The incidents of hate crime in the UK 
 
The daily experience of racism voiced by Kurdish participants in Devon left 
some participants feeling demoralised, and was heightened by the belief that 
the support networks in place to prevent such incidents were of no use. Saman 
felt that reporting to the police was pointless because they would not intervene. 
He identified Devon as a place where one is more likely to experience racism 
than in other areas, due to current immigration. The racial geography and 
division of populations, created through international borders and migration 
controls has resulted in a political geography of race, ethnicity, colour and 
culture. To Marxists racism was a capitalist creation to dominate the poor 
powerless and make one race more superior to others; “The tenacity of racist 
ideas and movements, in a variety of specific historical contexts, points to the 
need to see racism as an ever-changing social phenomenon which recreates 
itself in new forms all the time” (Solomos & Back 1996:131). 
   
While a minority of Kurds have experienced direct racist attacks or 
discrimination, all Kurds in Devon have been affected by the racist attitudes 
which many local people in the host country display. Females and older males 
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in particular have experienced racism. This has a profound effect on the 
integration and relations of the Kurds with the host community. Sheelan 
explained her recent experiences of racism: 
 
“I was waiting for my friend to arrive in the bus stop. An 
English man just came behind me and hit me on the face, 
I didn’t see anything. Awhile after that the police arrived 
and took a statement, but I didn’t know who was the 
English man and the police did nothing and I was very 
afraid and until now I always go out with someone” 
(Sheelan 24:F). 
 
The misgivings of some members of the Kurdish diaspora in Devon have also 
led to living a more isolated life than they would otherwise wish. Many Kurdish 
women in Devon avoid places where it is possible that problems might occur. 
Unfortunately, it is not only the Kurdish community that have received racist 
attacks in Devon, as other diaspora groups have faced similar experiences. 
This has been illustrated and widely publicised by the racist attack of a 17 year 
old man from the BME community in Devon who was playing football for the 
local Plymouth Argyle club. The racist attack resulted in the murder of the young 
man and sparked fear amongst the diaspora groups.  
 
Figure 4.10 Plymouth Hate Crime                                            Source: Devon & Cornwall Police 
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Such racialised discourse has been supported by a variety of methods, and is 
used to exculpate great injustices, to oppress other races, and to further 
strengthen Britain’s self-image, economics, and power as a nation. So was born 
the Manichean ethos, and Dubois’ definition of the ‘colour line’ which has 
become the chief way of understanding and dividing the world (Malik 1996:118). 
Colour became important politically and socially, whereas before it had been 
largely irrelevant. Using black and white created an antithesis and bipolar 
antagonism, and racism was born. Feagin (et al., 2001) offer that, “In its fullest 
definition, racism is a system of oppression” (3). The underlying structural reality 
which is much more than an ‘abstracted scholarly paradigm’ (ibid:5) is the 
oldest system of racist oppression which was central to the internal operations 
of the new society.  
 
Through an imperial and colonial past, white people have created a self-image 
based on a face of imperial arrogance, referred to as ‘sincere fictions of the 
white-self’. This superiority continues today, and although forms of racism have 
changed a sense of elitism has not. New and developing forms of racism are 
emerging both in Britain and globally, articulating and deploying their ideologies 
through different terminologies, in an attempt to disguise them. ‘Culture’ and 
‘ethnicity’ are now used as acceptable instead of ‘race’, although I argue that it 
is equally as divisive and detrimental, as it still categorises and highlights 
difference, creating a situation of ‘them’ and ‘us’. Further, there is a general 
acceptance that like race, culture and ethnicity are invariant. Gilroy posits that, 
“in the bloody penumbra of the Third Reich, that innocent culture took over from 
raw natural hierarchy as the favoured medium through which racial differences 
would become apparent as common sense” (Gilroy 2004:44).  
 
Contemporary expressions of racist ideas and practices, such as ethnic 
cleansing, are based on outdated racist politics. They are apparent through the 
rise of the extreme right and neo-fascist movements, but more subtly through 
mainstream politics, for example in regards to migrant communities and 
refugees where the issue has moved to the core of public debate. Asylum 
seekers are being demonised daily by the media, and some believe that 
politicians fixation with immigration, coupled with images of the UK being 
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“swamped”, has sparked a rise in racism. Sardar, writing for the Independent 
agrees:  
 
“I think there is a rise in the awareness of racism and a rise in 
Islamophobia. Ten or fifteen years ago, society did not regard 
Islamophobia as racism. Every time there is an event in the world 
such as September 11th or the Beslan massacre, Muslims come 
under attack. I also think anti-immigration attitudes have led 
refugees to be demonised” (2005, online). 
   
People suffer from both colour and cultural racism, and there are intrinsic values 
and notions that run through both discourses. They can also be in operation 
simultaneously, although it is easier to hide aspects of ones culture than it is 
skin colour. Following the Stephen Lawrence murder enquiry in 1993 in the UK, 
race, racism, colour and culture rose to the top of the British government’s 
agenda, but gradually lost importance. Social inclusion, community cohesion, 
diversity, and multiculturalism training was given to different agencies. The 
means by which the government dealt with the matter and outcomes was seen 
as a failed exercise Lord Ouseley later commented, the government’s response 
to the social uprisings in the northern towns was to introduce the concept of 
“community cohesion” aimed at bringing people from different backgrounds 
together. This is where the debate started to develop about segregation being 
created by Muslims choosing not to mix (Bourne 2007).  
 
The environment in which individuals grow up in, can determine whether an 
individual becomes racist or not. You can also be under pressure to become 
racist. Increasing racism can be attributed in part to the role of the media, due to 
the use of stereotypical opinions about immigration, asylum seekers, 
immigrants, and ethnic minorities. The Western Morning News (July 2011) 
reported “Plymouth has seen an increase of 60 percent in ‘hate crime’ in the 
past five years and now suffers an estimated 50 racist or religiously aggravated 
incidents every day.” Burnett’s research on the new geographies of racism 
identified Plymouth as one of three areas in the UK experiencing high levels of 
racism (Burnett 2001). Racist attacks reported to police show the number of 
incidents increased from 224 to 359 per year between 2005 and 2010. A 
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number of attacks have left individuals seriously injured, and in some instances, 
have resulted in deaths. However the true level of racist attacks is unknown, as 
such attacks often go unreported. Rizgar illustrated that: 
 
“..the number of under reporting among the BME 
communities and particularly the Kurds is much higher 
than what we hear from the authorities or Police. The 
Kurds received daily racist abuse by some English people 
and it’s complex as well as difficult to report every incident. 
We encourage our members to report but the Council and 
Police didn’t work seriously to solve the problems. 
Sometimes we get racism from members of authorities 
and police but after reporting to them they didn’t do much 
work and we never get any feedback. So I think people 
from BME communities have been ignored after reporting” 
(Rizag 46:M). 
 
Many interviewees admitted that there is still a high population of diaspora in 
Devon that don’t want to report racism. Underreporting has been identified 
through this study as a complex matter; for Rizgar and other members of BME 
groups this is related to the theory of trust and a lack of awareness within the 
police and council staff. Surprisingly the first generation and many new arrivals 
to the area did not regard vocal racism as a major problem in their lives, 
compared to the experiences of discrimination and war in the places they 
originated from. Reporting racism was seen by some of the participants as 
negative, as they felt their situation was not handled with understanding, and for 
some this encounter was the first point of contact with the police or council. 
Another factor in underreporting among the new diaspora is a preference for 
non-contact with police or authorities due to concerns over personal situations, 
such as claims for asylum or spousal visas, or obtaining British citizenship. 
However, some participants find hidden racism and discrimination experienced 
even worse, as explained by Delshad: 
 
“I think people who make the differences between us and 
them or cultures could be the real racists. Sometimes 
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people work with you as workers of interlinking but she/he 
have got their own agendas and put individuals in different 
classes […] because of what happens in the Middle East, 
the racist person blames everything on your culture 
without understanding you as a person. Also sometimes 
people look at you very differently” (Delshad 29:M). 
 
Figure 4.11 Plymouth Hate Crime                                      Source: Devon & Cornwall Police 
 
The idea of hidden racism was identified by several participants. As Delshad 
experienced, cultural difference arose because the demographic of the city has 
been changed and because refugees are seen to come from war zones or poor 
countries and cultures. I have found that racism in Devon is more hidden and 
structural, rather than publically visible and involving direct or physical personal 
attacks. Though often hidden or subtle, such acts of racism are still a serious 
problem. Devon diaspora groups have experienced racism more than other 
diasporic groups in big cities such as London, due to the relatively small existing 
BME communities in this region. The experiences and problems that the 
Kurdish diaspora faces in Devon are not the same as other Kurdish diaspora as 
the result of the demographic makeup. There is a feeling of alienation among 
the Kurdish diaspora and “they believe they are not – and perhaps cannot be – 
fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly alienated and 
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insulated from it” (Safran 1991:83). This impression of alienation has to do both 
with the Kurdish diaspora’s feelings of their experiences of discrimination and 
racism. The hidden coherence of this cultural racism is the thought of a fixed 
cultural essence. 
 
Alienation begins at an early stage of an asylum seeker’s life in the UK. It can 
begin for some within an educational setting; for children attending school it can 
be extremely important for them to be able to fit in and be accepted by their 
peers. In order for them to be accepted they often adopt Western clothes and 
mannerisms, along with the ability to be able to speak English, often 
colloquially. Growing up in a Western society it is possible to become 
completely Westernised, therefore it is necessary for younger generations to 
retain a sense of identity within the diaspora, and to be educated as to their 
history and cultural traditions. The parents of children in diaspora have an 
important and sometimes difficult task in ensuring that children do not forget 
their origins, whilst they are learning to integrate into Western society. Failure to 
do so could mean that children would grow up with increasing feeling of 
confusion and alienation. Their ability to feel comfortable within either society 
could be severely curtailed leading to a feeling of alienation from both societies. 
Adults are more able to adapt to new cultures (once the asylum process is 
complete), often being able to speak another language and seeking 
employment and housing. However, this is not always the case. Some 
participants suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, which caused an 
increased feeling of alienation and isolation within the host community. 
Therefore it is necessary for asylum seekers to retain a sense of who they are 
and where they come from in order to integrate into a new society and make 
valuable contributions to their new communities. In August 2005, Ipsos-MORI 
conducted a multiculturalism poll for the BBC suggests that, “people who come 
to live in Britain should adopt the values and traditions of British culture” (BBC, 
August 2005). 
  
4.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has explored the positive and negative experiences of Kurdish 
diaspora in Devon, a rural county with significantly different demographics to 
other cities such as London, Bristol and Birmingham. It has discussed the 
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challenges that are faced within the diaspora, especially regarding integration, 
cohesion, and racism, and has identified that there is a feeling of alienation 
among the Kurdish diaspora and  “they believe they are not – and perhaps 
cannot be – fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly 
alienated and insulated from it” (Safran 1991:83). The experiences that 
respondents encountered particularly around racism and discrimination 
contributed to the feeling of alienation within the host community. However, 
many respondents underreported incidents of racism and discrimination, due 
primarily to the lack of trust of authorities within the local environment. 
 
The contribution of the Kurdish diaspora, especially by the first generation, to 
the local host community, and to new arrivals, is seen by some respondents as 
a significant factor in successful integration. This is played out in numerous 
ways, impacting the local economy, and intercultural what? within the host 
society. Respondents acknowledged that without the foundations established by 
the first generation of diaspora it would have presented more challenges for 
cohesion and inclusion. Intercultural and integration in the host country has 
many benefits, such as building and improving the relationship between the 
people of the host and the Kurds. Integration in the immigration context takes 
the strategy of acculturation, which means that immigrants make regular contact 
with the native people in the host country and maintain their original cultural 
identity. 
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Chapter Five: Identity and Belonging of the Kurdish Diaspora in 
Devon 
 
5.1 Introduction  
With large-scale human movement around the world from one place to another, 
questions of identity have become essential in daily life. Identity is often 
introduced as a result of physical and social features such as nationality, race, 
gender, and class (Drzewiecka & Nakayama, 1998). Ethnic identity among 
diaspora groups can play an important rule  structure their ideas about who they 
are, to take account of their behaviours and experiences, and their  awareness 
of the world surrounding them. The difficulty around ethnic identity is also 
exacerbated by the fact that “ethnicity is not equally important to all people and 
the degree of ethnic identity and attachment differ strongly between individuals 
and within societies” (Hiebert, 2000:235).  
 
Terms such as ‘dual citizenship’ and ‘hybridity’ have been used among 
researchers in the field of diaspora studies. Hall highlights that hybridity is 
particularly linked to the idea of ‘new ethnicities’, and he adds, identity should 
be thought of as a “production” because it is an ongoing process (Hall 1992), 
whilst Gilroy uses the notion of ‘double consciousness’ to denote the hybrid and 
diasporic condition (Gilroy 1993). Palmer has suggested that “a national identity 
is thus a very personal concept as individuals draw upon the differing identities 
available to them in order to construct their own sense of who they are and how 
they fit in” (Palmer 1999: 314).  
 
The concept of home is one that is central to many people identities and lives. 
Ang and Symonds underline that:  
 
“there can be few terms so densely laden with passionately conflicting 
meanings than home […] the problematic of home, displacement and 
belonging has acquired a new historical acuteness in the current age of 
massive social and economic transformations, as processes of 
globalisation migration and postcolonial dislocation are foregrounding the 
precariousness of established and seemingly anchored definitions of 
home, identity and security” (1997:v).  
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The importance of the home as space and physical symbol of connection is 
more significant to those living in diaspora such as the Kurds who have been 
displaced, often as refugees. The home can become both a comforting and 
challenging aspect in peoples lives. In the case of those in diaspora, one has to 
challenge and be aware of the home as insecure or secure space:  
 
“It may constitute a conceptual shift from debilitation to control but at the 
same time become a space of unpredictability and fragile connections to 
the homeland, where experiences of ambivalence and confusion occur 
that are marked by feelings of “transience, impermanence and 
separation from family” (Thomas, 1997: 97).     
 
In the process, the “home as sanctuary” may become a reality and belief that is 
more “ephemeral or continuously deferred” (ibid). 
   
In this chapter I analyse the identity, belonging, and positions which first and 
second generation Kurds speak from regarding their experiences in relation to 
the home and the nation states within the diaspora. I also analyse how they are 
related to notions of home, belonging and hybridity. This chapter also discusses 
the literature on identity, ethnic identity, identity formation, homeland, and 
citizenship, within the framework of the national ideology and cross-border 
connections to Kurds in diaspora, and home as a material and domestic space 
in which Kurdishness is negotiated. The participants discuss the UK and 
Kurdistan as places and homelands, but also describe the obstacles that ethnic 
discrimination engenders from claiming the UK as a homeland, and the role that 
those obstacles play in stimulating the respondents to seek other places that 
are believed to be their essential site of belonging.   
 
5.2 Identity, homeland, place and diaspora 
The concepts of identity, homeland and diaspora are crucial to this research 
inasmuch as, scholars believe that  Kurds in diaspora have discovered a sense 
of  Kurdishness or Kurdayati through diasporic life; there ideas are  central 
within this research (Hassanpour 1995; Ahmadzadeh 2003; Khayati 2008; Alinia 
2004; Wahlbeck 1998). The Kurdish diasporic experience has allowed the 
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Kurdish people in diaspora to have multiple identities. The range of theories 
regarding the notion of place, which plays an important part in both the symbolic 
and physical dimensions of an identity, argue that the experience and the idea 
of place are socially constructed and that the perception of it changes according 
to time and place. Consequently, the notions of homeland and home are 
formulated and illustrated here through interconnecting discourses concerned 
with notions of place and space.  
 
The Kurdish identity has been unfixed and shifting throughout history as a result 
of internal and external change. Such modifications in the political and historical 
framework of Kurdistan have been the major factor in this fluidity, with Kurdish 
identity constantly readjusting itself to the requirements of a changing context. 
Kedourie (1996) has highlighted that “the politics of Islam, the autonomous 
political structures of tradition, and the resistance of the periphery to an 
integrated national economy were all the components of the constitution of 
Kurdishness”(226). It has been argued that the exclusion and denial of a 
Kurdish identity is directly related to the regions of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, 
and is a political project of a modern and secular nation state, which has 
increased the politicization of Kurdish identity (Hassanpour 1995; Alinia 2004; 
Khayati 2008).  
 
It is broadly acknowledged that language occupies a prominent place in 
discourses of national identity (Fishman, 2004; Edwards, 2009). According to 
Sheyholislami (2010), “national identity is a social construct, but it has historical 
and ethnic roots […] even if such roots often are invented […] But differently, 
those involved in a great number of cultural and political symbols and myths as 
ways of strengthening national ties” (291). To have national identity is to 
possess ways of discussing the homeland and nationhood. Having recognised 
that discourse is a means of articulating nation and theory, and is a socially 
constructed political unit, discourse can be seen as directly related to the 
concept of identity. The connotations attached to the term ‘nasnamah’ in the 
Kurdish language will first be considered, followed by how identity is to be 
understood in this study.  
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The term nasnamah-i natavi is used in the Kurdish language regarding national 
identity. Natavi and nataviat are not directly equivalent with nationality in 
English, neither, truly speaking, is nasnamah equivalent to identity. Hall clearly 
describes three main concepts in relation to his discourse on cultural identity. 
First, the ‘Enlightenment’ theme, second, the ‘sociological’ theme, and third, the 
‘post-modern’ theme (Hall, 1996: 597). The enlightenment concept of the theme 
was an ‘individualist’ concept of identity that explained that the self remained 
the same throughout it is existence. The ‘sociological’ concept, however, was 
an ‘interactive’ concept that saw that the self was “formed in relation to 
significant others” (ibid). As a final point, the ‘post-modern’ concept of the theme 
saw the self as “having no fixed, essential, or permanent identity” (Ibid. 597-8). 
The following discussion stated by Hall in his discourses on cultural identity and 
the Afro Caribbean diaspora adds to the debate “identity is not as transparent or 
unproblematic as we think. Perhaps instead of thinking of identity as an already 
accomplished fact […] we should think, instead of identity as a production, 
which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not 
outside representation” (Hall, 1990:222). 
   
Almost all of the participants indicated that their Kurdish identity was either 
important or very important. The importance was placed on Kurdish identity for 
several reasons. For many their Kurdish identity provided a sense of rootedness 
and symbolically connected participants to their heritage, history, culture and 
ancestors. Hiresh (M. 19) highlighted that “I feel I am linked to my roots by my 
parents, due to experiencing the strong traditions and culture values passed 
down for generations”. Meanwhile, Aveen (F. 18) who considered her Kurdish 
identity as highly important, felt a powerful sense of responsibility to carry on 
her Kurdish culture, “…by letting go, she would not only be letting go of her 
Kurdish culture and history but also her father and mother”.  Kurdish identity is 
however not only viewed as important as a result of its connection to the past 
but also the present. It is conceived as significant because it determines “who 
people are in their own eyes” (Breton et al. 1990:5), and provides a sense of 
identity. It also serves as a homogeneousness tool through which one 
understands and discovers oneself. The significance of roots for those in 
diaspora is described by Thomas as “the often profound desire of those who 
have left a homeland behind to be in place and to be connected and rooted to 
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the landscape and has for most part been ignored by social analysts” (Thomas 
1997:95). As pointed out by Said (M.37) “…it is important to not forget the roots 
we come from and what land we originally came from as well, as I think 
everyone needs roots and it is very important to understand where you belong”. 
The concept of being rooted to the land from which they originated from has 
become important in many discussions of Kurdishness or ‘Kurdayati’ and 
perceptions of identity, home and homeland. The majority of Kurdish 
respondents said they have visited homeland (south Kurdistan or Kurdistan of 
Iraq) and keep themselves aware of what is going on, and also have an idea of 
historical issues that led to the present state of affairs. Despite their exile, 
Kurdistan as a homeland and space in which to belong appears to remain an 
important part of their minds and hearts. 
  
In light of the participants’ responses, it is apparent that on the whole the 
formation of a Kurdish identity in Plymouth corresponds with a constructionist 
theory. The Kurdish diaspora is dispersed around the globe in many places 
(such as the UK) and there are beliefs that transnational Kurdish identities will 
emerge with convergent and divergent experiences as a result of different 
political arrangements that they are embedded within (Alinia 2014). The political 
development and dynamics of the countries of origin impinge on the narratives 
of belonging, continuity, transformation and weakening of the Kurdish diaspora. 
Schireup (2006) has highlighted that:  
 
“…radicalised minority cultures, networks and community building must 
be seen as a product of societies ongoing general transformation related 
to exclusion, discrimination and everyday racism directed at these 
groups, rather than as an expression of imported immigrant culture. 
Nationalism and the imagination of a national community constitute one 
of the powerful ideologies that appeal to exiles and diasporas, and it is 
also the one that has the most favourable conditions for spreading in 
these surroundings” (246). 
 
While participants emphasize a strong sense of identification with the western 
lifestyle, some Kurds consider themselves British-Kurdish. For many 
interviewees this is due to their strong sense of belonging at the level of 
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emotional attachment, which they maintain with their homeland and place of 
birth.     
 
5.3  Hybridity, belonging and home 
It is necessary to point out that there is a clear translation of ‘home’ and 
‘homeland’ in Kurdish. In Kurdish home is ‘mal’, or ‘khano’, a dwelling that you 
inhabit, and ‘neshtiman’ or ‘welat’ refers to homeland, a country of belonging, 
and identity. The construction and dynamic of the home and homeland is 
imagined differently by Kurds within different situations. Several research 
participants revealed that there are a number of ways in which Kurds are 
described, and that this is largely related to the geographical area they originate 
from and the links they visualize to their homeland. Kurdistan for many Kurds 
who lived there is homeland, though it is not a recognised state, more an 
ideology this is reinforced by traditional Kurdish dress, national song, and the 
Kurdish flag, along with stories of a Kurdish homeland. Many first generation 
Kurds who have lived in Kurdistan pass on to second and third generations in 
diaspora stories of Kurdistan and Kurdishness. As Omar describes, “I have 
written a little story about my home and where I belong in Kurdistan and this will 
remind my children who am I and to not forget the real home” (Omar M.48). 
Omar’s book is a story in which he is trying to bring up his children with Kurdish 
ideals, and is an interesting symbolic and important aspect in writing about the 
Kurds and Kurdishness. This is seen as an important vehicle to educate and 
pass on to further generations the Kurdayati, not just in Plymouth, but globally 
to keep alive the traditions, identity, and the way of life as a Kurd. Appadurai 
and Breckenridge (1989), for example, state that whatever their form or 
trajectory, “diasporas always leave a trail of collective memory about another 
place and time and create new maps of desire and of attachment” (i). 
 
The Kurdish diaspora is seen as historically important, and as a pivotal 
contribution in the development of National consciousness, both within the 
diaspora, as well as the Kurdistan region. As Candan (2008) has pointed out: 
 
“...the Kurdish diaspora […] in Europe plays an important cultural and 
political role for Kurds worldwide. Historically the Kurdish diaspora 
contributed pivotally to the development of a Kurdish national 
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consciousness, both within the diaspora as well as in the home regions” 
(130).  
 
The Kurds in Plymouth use the Kurdish flag and map to symbolise and illustrate 
the Kurdistan they feel they belong to. Home(land), and the concept of home 
are fundamentally central for many people and their identity. Yassien describes 
home as:  
 
“Home is where I belong and all my family are growing up 
and live there so it’s the land of belonging to my people. 
So for example, Kurdistan does not exist as country but it 
is the land of Kurdish people and I think it doesn’t matter 
where Kurdish people live in the world but they still focus 
on Kurdistan as homeland” (Yassien M:23).  
 
A sense of belonging to Yassien is a place where he and his family grew up, 
with a strong historical tradition of land and culture that shapes belonging and 
identity. Yassien acknowledges that Kurdistan does not exist as a country, but 
the ideology of the land of his people does. This ideology is a common factor 
with all the interviewees, a pride in being Kurdish. In Anderson’s (1991) work, 
he says of community: “It is imagined because the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or 
even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” 
(49). For the first generation diasporas this is reinforced by a displacement from 
family and friends. A familiar environment to a society which at first appears 
alien, that sense of belonging is heightened by a separation from the country of 
origin, from being displaced from family and friends and a familiar environment 
with a common culture, traditions and language. Bayan also describes her 
strong feelings towards home: 
 
 “Home means everything to me, home is where I belong 
and all my family, friends live there so I can’t forget my 
homeland” (Bayan 26:F). 
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Bayan like Yassien puts the emphasis on family and friends, a place where they 
collectively live, with a shared experience of memories. This is the most 
overriding emotion: connectivity to a people, culture, values and a belief system 
that they all share. The feelings for the homeland, and loss of it, are 
exacerbated by the lack of connections to the host country. As Bayan 
continued: 
 
“I did not choose where to live in Plymouth, I do not know 
my neighbours, at home in my village we were always in 
each other’s houses, I was never lonely, I felt I belonged 
to one big family. Here people don’t talk to you, or 
sometimes they just stare and still don’t talk [...] I don’t 
belong here.”(Bayan 26:F) 
 
Bayan pointed out her family and friends live in Kurdistan where there are close 
social connections, often where several generations live together, and certainly 
neighbours are known, but that this is not the case in Britain, and therefore 
some Kurdish diasporas do not have that feeling of closeness of belonging to 
their host country. This alienation from a cherished community and homeland is 
a common denominator with many of the participants. 
  
Various factors impact on diasporas and their relationship with their homeland, 
both with positive and negative responses – such as racism and exclusion – 
whether diasporas were forced or coerced into leaving or their decision to leave 
was voluntary. Diasporas living in Devon have mixed experiences of exclusion 
and racism and these impact and form opinions and experiences of belonging, 
identity and worthiness which often underpins existing labels and feelings of 
alienation from their homeland. Participants who were victims of racism in 
Kurdistan and experienced the same in Britain had an evangelist zeal for 
nationalism because of their history. Their perception of a utopian homeland, or 
a motherland that was distinctly Kurdish as an independent state that was 
home. Hemen illustrates his feelings and explained:  
 
“I have suffered so much both at home in Kurdistan by 
Sadam and with cruel words in Devon. I don’t have 
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physical violence but I suffer much in my mind, but what 
makes me go on is the belief that one day I will go back to 
Kurdistan and see my family and friends, back to my 
homeland where I belong” (Hemen 33:M). 
 
Hemen claims that the memories of a double environment play a big part in the 
hope to return towards home or homeland. Malkki (1992) has highlighted that 
“people are chronically mobile and routinely displaced and invent homes and 
homelands in the absence of a territorial national base” (24). As these homes 
and homelands are invented through memories, one has to investigate the root 
metaphors in order to get an understanding of what these terms actually mean 
to the people who connect themselves to these thoughts. More precisely, 
metaphors of kinship and home tell something about the relationship between 
the rooted people and what they call home (ibid). This is also important to 
understand as these terms act as symbolic anchors for dispossessed people, 
regardless of where they are from. Each of these metaphors are only as 
powerful as the people make them, or as meaningful as they make them. As 
Ben Jelloun reflected (1993):  
 
“I climbed into the bus and closed my eyes to avoid seeing the country 
which was no longer mine. Starting that morning, I had gradually come to 
realize that a country is more than earth and houses. A country is faces, 
feet anchored in the earth, memories, childhood fragrances, a field of 
dreams, a destiny leading to a treasure buried at the foot of the 
mountain. Where will I find this country?”(255).  
 
Strath (2008) describes the above idealistic statement of Ben Jelloun as the 
“poetic and imaginative force” (26) of the contested and loaded concept of 
homeland, which is often used as synonym for belonging and identity. Within 
the nationalist discourses, when this poetic imagination is translated into 
political projects, a sharp demarcation of “Us” and “Them” is at a convenient 
distance (ibid). Any question about home and homeland can be understood 
within the framework of various ideologies that are concerned with social 
exclusion and inclusion. Home and homeland hold a central place within 
diaspora fields, and these issues are intimately related to the question of 
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belonging and citizenship (Brah 1996; Alinia 2004; Demir 2012; Hall 1993; 
Collyer 2013; Carter 2005). Many participants considered this as an important 
marker of belonging, and functions as a device to include and exclude people. 
Experiences of Kurds often make it difficult to feel at home in one single place, 
due to people developing a sense of belonging in multiple ways in which 
numerous places can be called home.  
 
5.4  The lost identify with both sides 
The loss of identity can have a dual dimension. The Kurds in diaspora have two 
losses: the first loss is of an independent country, a territory which has never 
been recognised, a land which has been colonised by different states. This 
colonisation has tried to erode the identity of Kurds, however the effect of 
imposed states created an environment where nationalism flourished. 
 
Kurdish diasporas are viewed from their homeland with mixed and complex 
emotions, often with suspicion and contradictory, misplaced beliefs. “I went to 
Kurdistan in 2008, everybody mentioned to us ‘ohh you are coming from 
Europe’, it means they don’t think we belong there” (Omar 48:M). For many 
participants feelings of confusion over belonging and identity were prevalent 
and this caused both internal and external conflicts, torn between two places of 
home and homeland. As Brah (1996) stated, “The concept of diaspora places 
the discourses of home and dispersion in creative tension, inscribing a homing 
desire while simultaneously critiquing discourses of fixed origins” (193). The 
experience of the participants clearly showed a sense of lost identity or an 
uncertainty of belonging anywhere, as Ahmed explains: 
  
“It is hard to describe my identity so I just say I am as I 
am, it could be British or Kurdish but I think I lost my 
identity in between so I could not say who I am anymore” 
(Ahmed 39:M). 
 
Ahmed’s loss of identity is far from a singular one, many Diaspora Kurds spent 
time displaced in the Kurdish land, having spent years in exile from the Iraqi 
regime and living in other states. Emotionally Ahmed is uncertain about his 
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identity and this loss of rootedness and connection for him has caused an 
internal conflict. Omar points out that: 
 
“I am not sure who I am, I mean my identity part of me is 
in Kurdistan, with my childhood memories, my family and 
friends, my village. Some nights I dream of Kurdistan and I 
can almost smell the air, then I wake up and feel relieved 
that am in Devon safe and with more opportunities, I feel I 
don’t really belong in either place, it’s hard to explain” 
(Omar 48:M). 
 
Omar and Ahmed have an apparent inner conflict about identity, belonging and 
homeland, and this feeling of living in a ‘no man’s land’ extended to their new 
home. Hall, in his work on cultural identity and diaspora, considers:  
 
“…the history of transportation, slavery and migration can fail to 
understand how the rift of separation, the ‘loss of identity’, which has 
been integral to the Caribbean experience only begins to be healed when 
these forgotten connections are once more set in place […] They are 
resources of resistance and identity, with which to confront the 
fragmental and pathological ways in which that experience has been 
reconstructed within the dominant regimes of cinematic and visual 
representation of the West” (1999:224). 
 
Many interviewees see living between different countries as a loss of identity. 
Hersh explains, “I was born outside the mother homeland (Kurdistan) and 
raised within a different society and culture, it makes me think about my identity 
and belonging more” (Hersh 30:M). Hersh attributed the reason behind his 
belief about the construction of his identity and belonging to the fact he grew up 
within a different culture and society. Being a citizen of one country does not 
necessarily mean that one fully belongs, and one can identify to other identities, 
which are still state based. Nagel and Staeheli (2004) point out that “it is 
possible to claim identity as a citizen of a country and to negotiate membership 
within the bounds of belonging, even without claiming to be of that country” (4).  
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It is important to understand the feeling among those participants who feel the 
loss of identity due to living in-between as well as not being accepted by the 
host society or Kurdish society in Kurdistan. As Kardo confirmed himself as a 
second generation Kurd in Devon, he explained that: 
 
“I have never been in Kurdistan yet. I was born in Devon 
from a Kurdish family so it’s very hard for some of my 
friends to accept me as English, but I have been 
westernised so when I am with some of the old Kurdish 
men they look at me differently. I mean because I have got 
more western culture than Muslims, so they are not 
accepting people like me, but with the young Kurdish 
generation I don’t have any problems. The English people 
[are] also always questioning my identity, so I think I have 
lost or am between two identities and sometimes I don’t 
know who I am or where I belong, but the internet is the 
best place to find people in same situation” (Kardo 19:M). 
 
Kardo expressed his view that growing up with different cultures and not being 
accepted by the first generation of diaspora and the host community has given 
him a feeling of non-identity. Identity is often imposed by society as a result of 
physical and social characteristics such as nationality, race, gender, and class. 
Integration to the western society in Kardo’s account has impacted upon his 
acceptance within the first generation of diaspora. Many young people from 
diaspora find their place of belonging via social media. The internet also affords 
marginalised people a place to discuss and debate amongst themselves, which 
facilitates the process of individual and collective identity reconstruction. Self-
identity can occur through the construction of labels or semantic designations 
that reflect shifts in consciousness and sensitivity to the socio-political milieu. 
Living in-between both societies of Kurdistan and the UK was reported by some 
of the participants as the loss of identity. Ava explained that: 
 
“I feel that I am in two pieces, that I belong to here and 
there but I struggle to identify which place I need to 
identify myself with. My school mates call me the Kurdish 
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girl, I grew up with both cultures and I have difficulties with 
identity choice but with my ethnic identity I don’t have 
problem but I have mixed heritage” (Ava 18:F).     
 
Ava aptly sums up the difficulties with personal identity. However, she identifies 
her ethnic identity as easier due to being born and raised with a Kurdish family 
with mixed heritage. Hall (1991) points out, “Identity is a structured 
representation which only achieves its positive through the narrow eye of the 
negative. It has to go through the eye of the needle of the other before it can 
construct itself” (21).    
  
5.5 Dual identity 
During the process of interviewing, it became apparent that many participants 
had a dual identity. They recognised that they belonged to a host country as 
well as another homeland. Deldar, a second generation Kurd born in Britain, 
says: 
 
“My identity is between two nations, so I am Kurdish-
British, I was born here and have a British passport, 
English is my first language, however I feel proud to have 
a Kurdish heritage. I have a Kurdish traditional dress and 
take part in Kurdish festivals. I love to hear the stories 
from my parents, and one day I hope to visit the homeland 
of my people” (Deldar 21:M). 
 
Deldar believes he has a dual identity belonging to two places, the place of his 
birth and the place of his parent’s birth. His parents reinforce his Kurdishness by 
passing on traditional stories and customs, keeping alive the memory of 
Kurdistan, and making it tangible. Many Kurdish people in diaspora like Deldar 
hope to pass their Kurdish identity onto the next generation. 
 
It is evident that the majority of the participants of this study were ambivalent 
about their dual hybridity, they may live in the West Country, have British 
citizenship, and play an active part in their local community, but they still saw 
Kurdistan as their homeland, and their allegiance lay there as well as Britain. 
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The term “Kurdish-British” has been identified among the participants to 
describe their identity. This dual identity is described by Ali: 
 
“…when people ask where I am from? I say I am Kurdish-
British, Kurdistan is my identity but I have a British 
passport and my life is here now so this is my identity too, 
it doesn’t mean that I don’t belong to Kurdistan, just I 
belong to Britain too” (Ali 44:M).  
The identities of those in diaspora are often seen as hybrid or dual as result of 
the ways in which people consciously and subconsciously deal with living in 
between. Many participants during this research felt living in between as 
physically living in Devon, but their minds and lives are connected to Kurdistan. 
Ali of the above quote illustrated his dual identity of Kurdish-British as an 
important identification in response to the identity of diaspora. Holding a dual 
identity would create the environment for diaspora people to belong in an 
inclusive society. It becomes evident that some people think themselves loyal to 
both societies. In reality there are no limits to identifications, and in fact most 
people have no problems with gliding in and out of different roles in various 
contexts and interactions. Marr (2000) has described the United Kingdom as a 
“World wide web of people with different connections, sympathies and 
nationalities, all of who may feel attached to local as well as national 
communities” (162). The dual identity among the Kurds in Devon has 
strengthened and brought pride to the Kurdish-British, as Hewa, who come to 
live in the UK seventeen years ago, describes: 
       
“I am proud to be here as Kurdish-British, I have 
everything here and have built up my new life and that 
includes my new identity as Kurdish-British. I celebrate the 
Kurdish culture and activities and pass on my heritage to 
my son who is 16 years old and proud of Kurdistan. He 
told me one day when he was at college he was asked 
about his identity, he said he was born in Devon but he 
belonged to Kurdistan” (Hewa 32:M). 
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Many participants like Hewa are proud to have a dual identity and experience 
the new life in diaspora. The cultural activities or educational programme that 
Hewa illustrates could become a strategy of the Kurds in relationships with 
everyday life in Devon. The second or third generation’s experiences are more 
confronted with question of identity than those faced by the first generations. 
McDowall found in their study of a modern history of the Kurds, that “the second 
generation showed stronger interest in its origin than their migrant parents 
(McDowall 2004:456). Hewa’s sons belief system identifies with both societies, 
and according to Hall (1992, 21), “cultural identity’ always requires the position 
of a subject which a specific representation system provides, and with the 
addition of fantasy and desire, people articulate themselves with the position.” 
Drawing on a sample of Kurdish migrants in Devon, they predicted and found 
that dual identification as both Kurdish and British was positively related to 
respondents. Many young Kurdish people find out that dual identity has a 
positive identification, as Roken identifies herself, saying:  
  
“My identity as young Kurdish female is Kurdish-British, 
and I told many of my friends during college I am Kurdish-
British. Even during my visit to Kurdistan I always identify 
myself as Kurdish-British and I think it is hard to be born 
and grow up here and not identify as part of this society” 
(Roken19:F).  
 
Kurdish-Britishness as dual identity has been identified by many participants. 
Roken identifies herself with both homeland and host even on return to 
homeland. Diaspora people with dual identities in fact have consistently shown 
better adaptation to receiving, dominant societies, than those with single 
identities (Sam and Berry 2010). The numbers of people who identified 
themselves as both Kurdish and British has risen not only with second or third 
generations, but also with the first generation after obtaining British citizenship. 
The important phenomenon of dual identity among the Kurds in Devon has 
developed positive feelings of self-identification. As Miller recognizes, in those 
countries where there are ‘nested nationalities’, people usually hold dual-level 
national identities. They tend to think of themselves as belonging to both 
societies without experiencing ‘schizophrenia’ (Miller, 2000).  
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In the last three decades the Kurdish diaspora has played a significant role in 
the development of Kurdish identity, nationalism, and started to identify 
themselves as Kurds in the UK or countries of settlement. For that reason, 
Kurdish political parties have also realised the importance of the Kurdish 
diaspora and have started to engage more with Kurds in diaspora, particularly 
the second and third generations that strongly believe in the Kurdish identity or 
having dual identity. Hajeen, a member of a Kurdish political party, explained: 
 
“I was eleven years old when my parents took me to a 
Kurdish political event and I met many political activists, 
many of them told me what happened to the Kurds in the 
mother land. When I ask them “what is your identity?”, 
they responded saying “Kurdish and Kurdish British” […] 
[T]he story of the bombing of the city of Halabja and the 
thousands of people who were killed by chemical gas 
impacted on me greatly. From that day I become a 
member of the young Kurdish political party and invited 
other young Kurdish British to join” (Hajeen 20:F). 
 
Hajeen’s involvement with political life started at a young age, through her 
parents’ influence and party activists involving her in Kurdish activities. The 
response to the question that Hajeen asked the activists helped her to discover 
her belonging to a national Kurdish group and gave her the impetuous to tell 
other Kurdish British about the politics of Kurdistan. However, diasporic 
experience has allowed the Kurdish people in the diaspora to have dual 
identities rather than one based on a very strong reference to the homeland. 
The story of Halabja becomes important in defining the violence against the 
Kurds and how the regime used chemical gas against the Kurds. 
 
5.6 Memory of violence 
It is important to point out the different motivators behind voluntary and 
involuntary migration due to the political or domestic situation. All of the first 
generation participants in this research were involuntary diasporas; their 
decision to migrate to another country was forced upon them or their family 
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members by factors outside their control. In some cases, even the destination of 
migration was not known when entering as asylum seekers. Factors such as 
violent regimes, conflict between political parties, or tribal disputes, led 
participants to leave involuntarily. Therefore, the majority of the Kurdish 
diasporic migration to the West Country since the late 1970s has been 
involuntary. This has a significant impact on the disaporic community, where 
shared experiences of violence and exile draw people together and create an 
environment for nationalism to flourish. What cannot be understated is the 
physiological impact that this involuntary migration has had on individuals. For 
many diasporas, homeland was a place where human rights and freedom of 
choice did not prevail, so to be placed in a state which is not a voluntary 
decision underpins an individual’s lack of control and self-worth.  
 
Rizgar explains the dilemma he faced in making the decision to leave his 
homeland, family, friends, and a place of familiarity, and go to an unknown 
destination with a culture that was alien to him. The involuntary decision to 
leave occurred after his house was bombed: 
 
“I still see it now, that dreadful day when the village was 
bombed my house is destroyed in front of my eyes, no one 
can forget it your home there and then gone [...] all those 
memories they can’t take those away from you can they? I 
didn’t want to leave my village but it was no longer safe. 
My village is safe in my heart, now it can’t be bombed 
again. My home was destroyed in front of my eyes” 
(Rizgar 46:M). 
 
Witnessing extreme violence and living in an environment of fear and paranoia 
greatly affected many of the participants. The percentage of respondents with 
mental health problems within the diasporic community is high, the uncertainty 
of a new host land with a different culture and belief systems, the asylum 
process, and the experience of violence witnessed first-hand either to 
individuals or family members, are all contributory factors with lasting emotional 
effects. Ali describes the inability to sympathise with people when they get 
upset: 
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“My wife gets upset when I can’t comfort her. When she or 
anyone else cries it’s like I am dead inside, I have shed 
too many tears for too many people, I can’t cry  anymore, 
that’s what war does to you it mucks your head up” (Ali 
44:M). 
 
Many interviewees referred to the brutality of the regime, and the persecution of 
the Kurds, which reinforces and strengthens this sense of belonging to a 
homeland, which was fought and blood spilt for. The loyalty for homeland where 
so much was witnessed created a solidarity for a shared experience of 
home(land) and a sense of belonging. Sharing his experience, Hoshyar 
recounts the day his home was destroyed and how this tragedy intensified his 
feelings of home: 
 
“My home is always Kurdistan, you know why? I will never 
forget my hometown and many other Kurdish villages that 
were burned by Saddam’s army and that killed many 
Kurdish men. One thing I will never forget about my home 
was the destroying of our town in front of the children and 
women” (Hoshyar 38:M).   
 
For many participants, witnessing conflict towards other Kurds has kept the 
memory alive of home and identity. There is a shared commonality, and within 
that, comfort in knowing that other people have experienced the same. This 
connection is a powerful tool for nationalism and keeping alive a feeling of 
Kurdishness, through shared suffering and persecution. It is not just the past 
conflicts, but also the present war with ISIS that heightens the memory of home, 
while the media reinforces this with coverage of the past and present conflicts. 
Safeen, like Hoshyar, feels passionately about her home that was destroyed in 
the conflict: 
 
“I may live in the UK now but my home is in Kurdistan, and 
Kurdistan is in my blood. I have lived in many places and 
countries before arriving here, but in my mind home is 
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always in Kurdistan. Before 1990 many Kurdish people 
were killed by Saddam’s army, and they destroyed and 
burnt many Kurdish villages, and one of them it was my 
village or home” (Safeen 23:M). 
 
Many participants discuss the memories of home and the image of the home is 
a place deep within their psyche. Sarup (1994) explains:  
 
“It is usually assumed that a sense of place or belonging gives a person 
stability. But what makes a place a home? Is it wherever your family is, 
where you have been brought up? […] Where is home? Is it where our 
parents are buried? Is home from where you have been displaced, or 
where you are now?” (95). 
 
It is clear, as Sarup writes, that home is many different things to different 
people. Feelings of belonging and home among the Kurdish participants are 
different, but for the majority of the interviewees their feelings are that they 
belong to Kurdistan, and that one day they will return to an independent 
Kurdistan, the homeland of their people. Barzan also explained that he feels as 
if: 
 
“…at the moment I live in Britain, but I belong to Kurdistan, 
Kurdistan runs through my veins, one day I will go back 
there and everything will be alright... Yes, one day” 
(Barzan 28:M).  
 
Extreme violence witnessed by participants creates solidarity, a shared 
experience of home/land that excludes other people, because they cannot 
relate to it. For many participants, leaving Kurdistan was a violent process of 
being separated from family and friends, of familiar places and going to an 
unknown host land, this painful process has been compared to childbirth as 
Saywan explains: 
 
“Having to leave my country and being separated from my 
family and friends and going to a place I did not know, was 
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like being born, I was born to a new place and the cord 
cut, I was like a baby” (Saywan, 36:M). 
 
Saywan illustrated that moving to a new place feels like a child is born and it 
looks like imagining the future. However, for many participants the memory of 
the past is kept within them and becomes part of the self-identification story.  
 
5.7 Belonging, identity and citizenship 
The perceptions of the relationships between belonging, identity and citizenship 
are analysed in this section in order to understand how the Kurdish diaspora in 
Devon may use symbolic narrative and articulations of citizenship as part of 
their constructions of being Kurdish. While the majority of Kurdish people 
interviewed for this study are British, several are in the process of applying for 
indefinite leave to remain (ILR) in the UK or for British citizenship, typically 
involving a lengthy period of waiting (in some cases as much as 8 to 10 years). 
This section outlines these differing and complicated categories of legal status. 
These legal ambiguities play a major role in the creation of feelings of 
ambivalence, discrimination and injustice, as well as constructions of 
Kurdishness, citizenship, belonging and engagement. For the majority of Kurds 
in Devon, it is the psychological and physical effects and consequences of non-
citizenship that they often experience. This explains why many Kurds in Devon 
look at citizenship as a set of processes that are inclusive and would provide 
benefits, rights and protection for citizens in defined nation states. However, 
such processes can also be exclusionary for foreigners and those with complex 
residency statuses and feelings of home and belonging. The importance of 
becoming a British citizen is having the right of movement. As Joseph (1999) 
has highlighted regarding the importance of citizenship:  
 
“…while there is no simple definition of what citizenship is, who can be a 
citizen, we are constantly impinged on as citizen subjects, operating 
between the legal, the cultural and the political, often in tandem, in our 
everyday gestures” (4). 
 
The participants talk about their experiences in the process of getting British 
citizenship and the ways they are obstructed from exercising full citizenship 
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rights which they formally and legally possess but are informally denied. It is in 
this context that the question of formal citizenship and substantial citizenship 
will be explored. This idea engages with the ways in which the boundaries of 
Britishness and British citizenship are constituted, through interviewing those 
participants that are targeted by exclusionary practices and insights about the 
practices of inclusion and exclusion that are related to citizenship. Eliassi (2010) 
has described that “Citizenship rights are not only legal rights” but they also 
inform us about how “belonging to a collectively is constructed.”   
 
The responses in this section also provide insights into the mechanisms that 
established a sense of belonging and non-belonging to British society. An 
awareness of not being British was shared by the majority of participants during 
this research, as Khani emphasizes:  
 
“I’m not English and my awareness of not being English is 
part of my daily life and I cannot stay away from it due to 
day to day life. As soon as you become British, you have 
come [a] long way in your life and start a new career in 
society” (Khani 20:M).  
 
Khani points out that being named, recognized and defined as British involves a 
good starting point for exercising one’s citizenship, rights and life opportunities. 
Not being recognized as British, implies negative consequences for the 
outcomes of one’s position in society, that is structured in unequal power 
relations between the dominant British position and subordinated immigrant 
position. Classification as an immigrant indicates a subordinated public position 
due to not being identified as fair in social interaction and a lack of recognition 
has real effects for participants’ social lives as result of the exclusionary 
procedure that they encounter in their day to day life. The majority of 
participants discuss an exclusive British identity, as Yassien illustrates:      
 
“I am a British citizen now after waiting 11 years but I don’t 
feel that I am British because the people of this country or 
those living in our areas don’t accept us as British and 
even if I change my hair colour or have lots of tattoos on 
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my body, they know I’m not British. As soon as I speak 
they know through my accent that I come from outside the 
UK and when I told them I am British and I have got British 
citizenship, they respond by saying you are not, and they 
don’t accept us and you  feel excluded from them” 
(Yassien 23:M).      
      
Holding a British passport has benefited the Kurdish immigrants in the UK, 
however, as opposed to this formal belonging, the respondents encountered 
informal exclusion in day-to-day life. Yassien points to the way his belonging to 
Britishness is declined by people around him, as they exclude those who have 
not satisfied the same criteria, or have the same accent, hair or skin colour. 
Yassien’s experience points out that there is a clash and an inconsistency 
between the criteria of people that belong or do not belong to a British identity 
as well as the formal criteria for citizenship. The intimate processes of exclusion 
and inclusion are related to the sense of belonging as illustrated by the above 
quotes. Throughout the study, the Kurdish participants pointed out their 
frustration in regarding how exclusive the British identity was, this exclusivity in 
Britishness was a barrier in facilitating inclusiveness and integration to British 
society. The daily life experiences of exclusion is part of the Kurdish 
background in Devon and many of Kurds that live in Devon feel uncomfortable, 
and have had experiences with non-belonging. Several uncomfortable 
experiences were discussed by the participants, where they felt that their 
Britishness was rejected, as demonstrated in an interview with Shilan: 
 
“One day I was at college and we were discussing about 
naturalisation in the UK, after the class one English girl 
with two others said to me, you should go back to your 
home, you do not belong to England you are an immigrant 
[…] and we cannot accept you in our class. I was very 
angry and told them that because I do not dress like her 
and don’t have a white skin colour, that doesn’t mean I do 
not belong here. I told them because you are from an 
English family that doesn’t mean you own this country, she 
170 
 
then told me that immigrants were taking over our land” 
(Shilan 29:F). 
 
In Shilan’s experience, having white skin colour seems to be a central criterion 
defining how belonging and Britishness to Britain or the UK is constituted. 
Immigration is pointed to as an occupation, and people with a different skin 
colour, such as immigrants, are defined as intruders who challenge the 
boundaries of Britishness. Shilan not only refuses this belief, but also makes 
claims to the UK, and doesn’t accept the “immigrant positions.” Therefore, 
immigration obstacles, such as the boundaries of national identities and 
citizenship, make it necessary to redefine the boundaries of a nation state that 
is made up of migrant groups. However, for the Kurdish born in the UK who 
have strong Kurdish back grounds they do not feel that they have other 
collective identities than British and talk about non-acceptance. Kardo illustrates 
that: 
 
“I am British and I was born here and I feel British, if I am 
allowed to say that. Some people become suspicious as 
soon as I say that I am British as though I have said 
something wrong. And if I say British, they always ask but 
where were you born? And I respond here, but then 
asked, I mean where were your parents originally from? 
So I feel that I was born here and I am British but only on 
paper as people do not accept me as British” (Kardo 
M:19).  
Kardo suggests that despite a sense of belonging to the British identity, and 
having citizenship or a British passport, he was not regarded as British and his 
Britishness became an object of suspicion, and his ownership of his identity was 
questioned. While Kardo’s parents were born in diaspora in the UK, his 
comments evoke ideas about who can be considered a genuine British citizen, 
and those who are considered only paper citizens. The concept of inheriting 
membership and belonging to a collective identity prevents formal citizenship 
from functioning as proxy for everyday belonging. Kardo’s ambivalence toward 
claiming British identity was due to rejection from the people regardless of the 
fact that Kardo had been born in the UK and had never had been to his heritage 
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homeland of Kurdistan. His ethnic identity of Kurdish was accepted, but he was 
challenged in his claim of British identity due to his Kurdish or mixed heritage 
background. Therefore, even when Kardo maintained Devon as his 
geographical place of birth, this was not a powerful enough argument to 
vindicate his right to British identity.  
 
Some participants who arrived in Devon as young children – in contrast to 
Kardo who was born here – were more comfortable with their initial encounters 
with the host society, however it was later in life in their day-to-day interactions 
that racial discrimination was encountered. Nareen came to the UK when she 
was nine years old, and has since not returned to Kurdistan. She talked about 
her experiences of living in Devon: 
  
“I was born in Kurdistan and came to the UK aged nine, 
initially it was very exciting to come here and learn a new 
language. I went to school and learned English very fast 
and at the beginning I didn’t know I didn’t belong to British 
society. However, one day after my swimming lesson 
some of my swimming classmates told me that ‘oi you 
darkie f***ing Paki, go back home’. That influenced me 
negatively and I asked myself “Why don’t they recognize 
and accept me as part of here?” […] And I asked them 
why? They said you can’t be British and you should go 
back to your homeland and you don’t belong here” 
(Nareen 21:F). 
 
Nareen’s experiences provide evidence that a sense of non-belonging does 
develop in a political space, but is linked to exclusionary experiences that define 
the outsider and insider within the political boundary of the nation state. These 
experiences of exclusion were defined through the way Nareen was victim to 
racist taunts and criticisms, such as being called a ‘Paki’. At the same time, 
when she responded she was told to accept the reality of a subordinated 
position of being an immigrant or to leave the UK. The ‘guest/host’ metaphor 
can be understood at best as an unequal relationship, where immigrants are 
considered as guests who should exhibit appreciation with regard to the 
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generosity of the host society and should not blame or criticize the request from 
the ‘host’ community (Gullestad 2002).                                   
 
5.8: “Diaspora life has brought freedom and a good environment”  
Diasporic experiences in Devon are multi-layerd, and therefore cannot be 
simply defined as either negative or positive experiences. For some 
respondents their identity as being recognised as Kurdish was a positive 
experience, but this was often against the negative experience of racism and 
exclusion. These experiences have to be recognised in relation to experience in 
homeland, because of domestic or political situations. In the UK there is a 
political freedom that is often denied or not recognised in Iraq, because of the 
prevailing paradigms. Kovan a young Kurdish businessman says of his 
experience of living in Plymouth:  
 
“Living here has given me a freedom I have never had 
before. I have the right to speak and know I will not get 
into trouble, I can say things, I don’t have to fear going to 
prison. I feel I have been born again, it’s liberating” (Kovan 
M:23). 
 
Many of the respondents feel they have more political freedom and knowledge 
since living in Devon, they feel there is no indoctrination, and that they are free 
to formulate and express their own ideas without fear of reprisals. They have a 
broader knowledge base, and sourcing information is easy and accessible. This 
in turn has made respondents more respectful towards others and their beliefs. 
Awaz discussed how education has changed the way she thinks: 
 
“…when I was in Kurdistan, all that was important to me 
was being Kurdish and being recognised for this, other 
countries didn’t really mean too much too me. I had to fight 
to be Kurdish, so what did it matter what others thought? 
But that changed when I came to the UK. I learnt so much 
more about other people and their identity, I had a pride in 
being educated to wider world issues. Someone said to 
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me that knowledge was power; I think they are right about 
that” (Awaz 29:F). 
 
This view of recognition and empowerment in the UK was vocalised by Ashti: 
 
“…when I arrived in Plymouth I was amazed to find that 
Kurdish was a recognised language. I had a translator 
who spoke my dialect, and the pamphlets of information I 
was given contained many different languages, this was a 
nice surprise to me. In Iraq, in Saddam’s regime, we had 
to be careful with our Kurdish language and heritage, but 
here we can be Kurdish and I can pass this on to my 
children safely” (Ashti 38:M). 
 
Human rights and having a voice in the UK are major factors in respondents’ 
positive attitudes towards British society. Opportunities to access education and 
other resources underpin respondents’ acceptance of tolerance towards other 
nationals, while living in a positive open society encourages inclusion and 
belonging. Ali says: 
 
“I find it hard to understand that I was not recognised as 
Kurdish in Iraq but here I am, I am encouraged to be 
Kurdish I feel very proud to be British Kurdish my 
language and identity is recognised here it” (Ali 44:M). 
 
For some respondents who settled in Plymouth, they could not read or write in 
their own language, but access to a Kurdish education in Plymouth has 
encouraged and broadened the second generation to retain their identity. Banaz 
a first generation Kurdish migrant explains that passing and retaining Kurdish 
identity to her children is important in keeping her links and belonging alive to 
homeland: 
 
“I cannot read or write in Kurdish, but I speak in Kurdish to 
my children all the time. I am so very proud that my 
children are learning to read and write they are doing so 
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much more than I could ever dream of, they are keeping 
alive our Kurdish identity” (Banaz 33:F). 
 
Living in a democratic state outside their homeland has created an environment 
that positively facilitates the ideology of a utopian state. Outside the homeland, 
Kurdishness is allowed to grow and evolve in a way that was difficult in 
Kurdistan. Political activities, aided by social media and freedom of speech, 
have increased the sense of identity and belonging for many. Hazem explains 
his excitement of the Kurdish state outside Kurdistan: 
 
“I loved Kurdistan, it’s in my blood, but when I was there I 
could not be Kurdish, in Saddam’s regime we were not  
allowed [to be Kurdish], it was as if we were invisible, that 
we did not exist. But here it is different, I have meet many 
Kurds and we are very visible, we are recognised, here we 
have identity, we can openly gather for the Nawroz 
festival, we can talk politics and talk openly and freely. 
There is much on the social network, I feel more Kurdish 
here than I did in Kurdistan, one day I hope it will be like 
that back home” (Hazem 27:M). 
 
Hazem and other participants point out the denials of Kurdish rights inside their 
own homeland by the regime denying the Kurdish people political and cultural 
freedom. The freedom of Kurds outside the Homeland has been recognised by 
many interviewees, and the lives of diaspora has made a significant impact on 
Kurds, providing transnational links as well as opening access to the modern 
world. Scholars have considered a “centre of gravity” for the Kurdish diaspora 
(Khayati 2012b, Bruinessen 2000, Ahmadzadeh 2003), and as Ahmadzadeh 
has highlighted:  
 
“Kurdish nationalism, both cultural and political having faced much 
harassment in Kurdistan, has found a golden situation in the diaspora 
from which to narrate its identity and construct a Kurdish imagined 
community” (Ahmadzadeh 2003:164).  
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Diaspora becomes a home to many Kurdish cultural and political activities that 
did not take place in Kurdistan. Living in the UK has made respondents more 
conscious about their human and political rights. During the research, many 
participants expressed that in diaspora there were more opportunities to access 
different resources, and believed that their political knowledge and awareness 
had advanced. Many in diaspora had therefore engaged with the greater 
opportunities to organise, learn, study and express themselves. Participants 
also acknowledged that they had learned to be more tolerant, open-minded, 
and patient towards other nationalities and their rights.    
 
5.9 Kurdish national identity  
In this section, I reflect upon participants’ discussion of Kurdish identity situated 
within a nationalistic framework. The interviews provide different concerns and 
reasons why there should be a Kurdish national identity and why a Kurdish 
nation-state is of predominant importance in the interviewees lives. They draw 
upon issues of collective suffering, the fight for independence, national identity, 
national pride, international visibility, distancing from inferiority, stigmatisation, 
and stateless people, as arguments and discursive strategies to justify Kurdish 
nationalism and support for a Kurdish nation-state. Furthermore, in response to 
political divisions amongst Kurds in the UK and other western states, some 
research participants called for a unified Kurdish nationalism. One interviewee 
argued that having a national Kurdish identity and a Kurdish nation-state is 
related to the suffering, atrocities, crimes, and chemical weapons, that Kurds 
have been subjected to by the regime of Saddam Hussein. Karokh said: 
 
“My Kurdish identity is very important for me because I 
don’t want the Kurds to be forgotten, and that is why I 
continue to call myself a Kurd. My parents fled Kurdistan 
because they were Kurdish and that was the main reason 
for their flight. I don’t want that reason to die out […] I 
regard Kurdistan as a state. I don’t think about Turkey, 
Syria, Iraq, or Iran, but Kurdistan. I know that is divided, 
but I still see it as a united country even if they do not 
recognize our homeland. Often, people ask me where I 
am from, and I tell them that I am a Kurd. Then they ask 
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you what part, and if you say from North Iraq, then you 
become an Iraqi in their eyes” (Karokh 22:M). 
 
For Karokh, it became important to rename the present state of Iraq and replace 
it with Kurdistan, with Kurds as its political subjects. According to Karokh, the 
experiences of his parents – Kurds who have been exposed to oppression, 
suffering, forced migration and subordination – are important argumentative 
strategies to justify Kurdish claims to a national identity. Further, Karokh 
politicised sacrifices made in the name of ‛Kurds‛ or ‛Kurdistan‛, and used these 
as sources of political justification for a Kurdish nation-state. Another 
interviewee pointed out the importance of history in determining the fate of the 
Kurds within the present nation-states in the Middle-East:  
“It is important to know where you come from, where you 
belong and where you have your history, especially we 
Kurds are oppressed and we do not have our own state. I 
think it is important to know who you are and where you 
come from because we fight for Kurdish independence 
and therefore we should know our history and situation” 
(Befreen 32:F). 
 
Befreen’s statement highlights that knowing Kurdish history and origins is 
related to Kurdish struggles about gaining independence and freedom from 
oppression. Oppression, a lack of a nation-state, and the experience of 
statelessness strengthens the rhetoric of knowing one’s roots and origins. As 
Vali (2003) reminds us, history, and the question of origin, is central to the 
nationalist project, because discursive construction of the origin is related to 
how the present political situation is experienced. In order to gain legitimacy, it 
is important to construct history as linear, in the sense that a coherent Kurdish 
identity can be found that connects the political challenges, sufferings, victories, 
interests, and priorities of the past to the struggles for a coherent shared identity 
in the present. Several participants connected the idea of having an own nation-
state to the feelings of pride and recognition by other states and nations: 
 
“…the Kurdish people all around the globe want to have a 
Kurdish state. Some of us as Kurds have never had a 
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Kurdish pride, the reasons behind that are not having an 
independent Kurdistan. I know I am Kurdish and from 
Kurdistan and it is a dream of all Kurds to have an 
independent state and not be part of Iraq, Iran, Syria and 
Turkey. The Kurdish people around the world are still 
fighting to have a recognized state and so many Kurdish 
people died and struggled for Kurdistan [...] we as Kurds 
have lots of history behind us but still we are not able to 
become a nation to participate in the Olympics or the 
World Cup, and feel proud of a Kurdish identity. We want 
Kurdistan to be a state in its own right” (Rizgar 46:M). 
 
Rizgar suggests representation and identity are understood in links to pride and 
shame, with a focus on the defeats, victories, achievements and under-
achievements. His understanding of history is a challengeable tool that 
legitimizes the nation-state and nation-hood building. Rizgar refers to sporting 
events such as the Olympic games and the World Cup as peaceful battlefields 
for nations to conduct their struggles for representing national virtues, but also 
recognising and strengthening national feelings through defeating other nations. 
As Rizgar points out, the invisibility of the Kurds in the world and recognition of 
Kurdistan as a state for all Kurdish people are important because of a shared 
sense of nationality.  
 
Some respondents deliberately separated themselves from other minority 
groups believing that separating oneself would be a good way of justifying a 
cause for a nation-state. This nation-state would uphold the culture and belief 
system that was the essence of being Kurdish. This fear, of discrimination and 
alienation, and for not having a nation-state, leads to separation and 
marginalisation. The emergence of a Kurdish national identity as a collective 
phenomenon has been a subject of debate in the spheres of both scholarship 
and politics. Denying Kurds a national identity and character as a people means 
delegitimizing their claims to a Kurdish state. Saywan, a Kurdish businessman, 
describes his emotions: 
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“Kurdistan is an important place for all the Kurds and it is 
the place that all of us can associate with, as we have very 
rich history, culture and land that extends our-self more 
back in history than other people or groups. The people 
from the global community don’t accept to have a 
Kurdistan as a Kurdish state, where we can live our 
culture, beliefs and values. We don’t want people around 
the world to think negatively about the Kurds, we want to 
show the rest of the international community how great the 
Kurds are. During the decades the Kurdistan Regional 
Government has been seen as a golden opportunity for 
the economic partnerships around many countries, due to 
the rich oil industry. I don’t want people to see us with no 
state and looked on as Kurdish as people without a land, 
as people don’t like other people if they don’t have a state 
or homeland. It is very important for all the Kurds, it 
doesn’t matter what you do but always remember the 
Kurdishness and show the positive signals of Kurds to the 
rest of the community in Devon” (Saywan 36:M). 
     
The international community has not recognized Kurdistan and the Kurdish 
national identity, and as Saywan argued, not having a state that could be a 
vehicle for achieving that recognition, creates a loss of pride. The economics of 
the oil industry within the Kurdistan regional government (KRG) have been 
identified by participants as a potential mechanism towards the independence 
of Kurdistan in northern Iraq. The role of western countries in a partnership will 
further support the Kurds for an independent Kurdistan. As President Barack 
Obama highlighted, Kurdistan is an “island of decency the Kurds have built”. 
Saywan’s account the positive signals of Kurds are important to show the rest of 
the community and helps to build a cultural awareness of Kurds.  
 
Some respondents did not have pride in their Kurdish national identity because 
of a lack of recognition by other countries of Kurdistan as a state. Being labelled 
as stateless reinforced feelings of besmirchment. The historical context of 
Kurdistan and the Kurdish people with a rich heritage has been used to argue 
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the legitimacy for the existence of a state. This historical claim is used to justify 
the present politically-held ideas of a nation-state, and being recognised would 
give a sense of pride. Ibrahim says: 
 
“If Kurdistan was recognised as a state, and not just part 
of Iraq, I would be filled with pride. To be recognised 
properly, to have a Kurdish passport, that would be the 
best. People look down on you if you don’t have a 
passport, you are viewed as a criminal, it’s wrong. They 
think there must be something wrong with you and that is 
why you don’t have a passport, it’s like living in a sort of 
non-world” (Ibrahim 30:M). 
 
Ibrahim continued that it is important to mix with groups that are not 
marginalised. He explains that belonging to a recognised nation-state gives a 
certain respect, and with that, a recognition of fitting in: 
 
“I know it’s wrong but I am careful who I mix with, I mean I 
am already labelled as someone with no homeland. When 
people ask where you from, and I say Kurdistan, they say 
“Where is that?”, I tell them it’s in North Iraq. Some people 
think you are a terrorist, it’s hard, they don’t understand or 
have never heard of the struggle of the Kurds and our 
history” (Ibrahim 30:M). 
 
Ibrahim describes the importance of the perception from other people of not 
having a homeland, and the implications from the lack of understanding of other 
people, who assume that people from Iraq – not knowing where Kurdistan is – 
are therefore terrorists. The participants’ answers to the question of ‘Where are 
you from?’ have been responded to with pride for Kurdistan. This sense of 
national pride is seen when respondents explain their sheer delight of seeing 
the Kurdish flag after crossing over the border into the region administered by 
the Kurdish regional government, the nearest thing to a nation state. Layla says: 
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“The first time I went from here to Kurdistan and I saw the 
flag flying on the border between Kurdistan and Turkey it 
was a recognition of my belonging” (Layla 23:F). 
 
For many Kurdish living around the globe, the flag of Kurdistan has been 
recognized as a symbol of Kurdish national identity. As Layla discussed, during 
the journey to Kurdistan through Turkey she saw the Kurdish flag flying on the 
border and recognised the homeland where she belonged. This belonging and 
affiliation with something tangible is also seen in combination with the various 
Kurdish political parties. However, the second generation of diasporas see 
these as more of a divisive hindrance than of helping with the established 
argument for an independent state. The energy put into maintaining the various 
different political parties can be seen as a negative response, where once a 
political party was part of an identity, especially where there is no recognised 
state. Some respondents believed that political parties should actively 
encourage unity towards a collective independent state and not focus on their 
individual agendas. Rekan reflected upon his father’s involvement in a political 
party as going against his beliefs: 
 
“My father was so proud to be part of the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party. All that was talked about was politics 
and the right party to belong to, but I see it very differently, 
I want to be part of an Independent Kurdistan. I sometimes 
think that people from outside must think, how can they 
possibly be independent when their own political parties 
don’t agree, I think they are right” (Rekan 20:M). 
 
Rekan identified the proudness of Kurdish belonging to a political party that 
defined the right of the Kurdish people inside the homeland and across the 
globe. Many respondents saw their past and present persecution as Kurds as a 
common factor for their identity. The historical persecution from other countries 
bordering Kurdistan in the Middle East made them more united, especially 
outside of their homeland. The UK and Europe are considered as a safe place 
to exchange views without fear of imprisonment or persecution, which creates 
an environment where greater nationalism can evolve and develop. Hajeen 
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indirectly stressed the political significance of Kurdish people in Plymouth being 
politicised toward the national identity: 
 
“I have met many Kurdish people in Plymouth and the one 
thing we all have in common is that our families have 
fought and suffered so much hatred and abuse just 
because we want our own country. All of us have lost 
family and friends in the brutal regime, but here we can 
talk about it, this is a good country and our identity is 
recognised and that makes us feel proud. But there are 
many other countries who do not recognise us and would 
still hurt us if they could, and that makes our national 
identity strong and solid” (Hajeen 20:F). 
 
Nationalism and identity are therefore paramount in underpinning an individual’s 
values. Where there is not a recognition of an independent state, there is a 
collaboration of thought and feeling from a shared historical perspective, and 
changing values and ideals from the second generation diaspora unite 
individuals far from their homeland. The Kurdish national identity has become 
stronger in diaspora, and national and ethnic identities have become very 
central in this process. 
  
The support for a Kurdish nation-state was justified in order to inform a range of 
discursive strategies that were used. These included global visibility, a lack of 
pride due to not having a nation-state, evoking collective suffering and 
recognition, as well as the historical origins of Kurdistan and the Kurdish people. 
The question of Kurdishness has become incredibly important among the 
participants, particularly when they encountered denials of Kurdish identity in 
their day-to-day social relationships with other Middle Eastern people in the UK. 
Individual experiences of injustice, repression, and suffering cannot be counted 
as the main reason behind the strong nationalist sentiments among the Kurdish 
people.  
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5.10 Individual and Collective Identity 
The fundamental expectation of a collective identity, as Eder has highlighted, is 
that “collective identities are narrative constructions which permit the control of 
the boundaries of a network of actors” (Eder 2009:428). The social construction 
of collective identities gives answers to the questions of “who do I belong to?” 
and “who do we belong to?” (ibid:432). Collective and individual identities are 
important to physiological and social well-being. The effects of collective identity 
formation can vary greatly. Perceiving oneself primarily as a member of group 
can be appropriate in one situation, problematic in a different situation, and 
even dangerous in a third. In addition, collective identities create a 
psychological sense of people‘s needs through concrete social interactions.  
 
Eder claims that the construction of identity sometimes does not imply a return 
to a psychological notion of a sense of identity; rather, social relations imply the 
shared meanings or ‘narrative bond’ that people share together in some social 
relations and not all of them which create being part of a particular ‘we’ (Eder 
2009:431). Collective identity comes into being when the members of a 
collective perceive themselves primarily as members of this collective, so that a 
depersonalisation of both perception and behaviour occurs. Therefore, Eder 
characterises collective identity as a “metaphor for specific types of social 
relations” (ibid). It is possible to find a number of points of contact within the 
concept of “collective identity”. That is these narratives are produced and 
reproduced in social relations in a dynamic way, in ongoing social 
communication. Collective identities are therefore based on the categorisation 
carried out in the course of the perception of the social world, by means of 
which individuals allot themselves a particular place in the world. A better use of 
the term collective identities is required in this study, since the social relations 
among people shape the construction of identity, and this illustrates the macro-
theoretical argument that “The more a human society is differentiated, the more 
it needs a collective identity” (Eder 2009: 430). This assumption demonstrates 
that the indirect social relations vary with collective identities and the network 
that links people shapes the structure of identity, in which collective identity 
could be multiple and not unitary (ibid).  
One can best illustrate the process of collective identity formation with the help 
of a conflict situation. Brubaker and Cooper (2000) point out that “identity is a 
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very rich concept” (8), however there are many key uses to it. The first use is 
that identity, whether ‘collective or individual’, is ‘self-understanding rather than 
‘self-interest’. The second use concerns identity in a collective phenomenon that 
refers to sameness among a group, which is perceived objectively “(sameness 
in itself) or subjectively (experienced, felt, perceived sameness)” (7). The third 
use is to understand identity (collective or individual) as a deep and valued 
concept rather than superficial and fleeting. The fourth key use is understanding 
the collective identity as groupness, process, and interactive development of the 
collective self-understanding. The fifth and the last use is that identity 
represents the multiple, fragmented, unstable nature of the self (Brubaker and 
Cooper 2000:6-8). In this section I take into account some of these key uses, 
however my attention is specifically on the first use. For some respondents their 
collective identity was valued. The appreciation of Kurdishness as distinctness 
was formed by their experiences in Kurdistan and Devon. As Awat says: 
 
“When I am in my village back in Kurdistan I am part of a 
much bigger community, I know I am Kurdish, I belong, 
this makes me feel good. When I come back to Plymouth 
it sometimes can be hard, but I have a place in my local 
community and I belong here too, they are different but a 
part of me belongs in both places” (Awat 31:M). 
  
Shared experience gives a collective identity, and for many first generation 
Kurds who fled brutal regimes and dictatorships the shared experience of pain 
and hardship brought a bond that is hard to understand unless experienced. 
Mala explains: 
 
“When you have seen blood spilt for your homeland and 
you share with others the pain of loss you have something 
in common that other people can’t understand, you have a 
common identity” (Mala 23:M). 
 
Mala talks about the shared emotional attachment that is shared with other 
people who have witnessed, or been party to, situations so abhorrent that 
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unless experienced cannot be empathised with, bringing a commonalty to a 
collective, a victim, the homeless, or marginalised and displaced groups. 
 
The rise of nationalism and allegiance to different political parties within second 
generation Kurds living in diaspora, provides a different perspective on 
collective identity. For some respondents living in diaspora has meant easier 
access to engage and follow different groups and political parties. Social media 
has provided an international platform for political parties to be heard from and 
viewed by diasporic Kurds who have heard stories sometimes romanticised by 
family members. Bashir came to the UK aged 9 with his parents and says: 
 
“I belong to KDP I am proud to be a member, I might live 
in Plymouth but one day I will go to the homeland of my 
parents, my homeland. A lot of my friends belong to the 
KDP, that’s what we have in common it keeps us united” 
(Bashir 24:M). 
 
Bashir sees belonging to a political party as a shared collective identity, it is 
something he shares with his family and friends, though being detached from 
his perceived homeland. 
 
For many respondents being part of the Kurdish community in Plymouth 
brought a shared collective identity of being diasporic and living in a host 
country. The community in Plymouth is close-knit, where a Kurdish school has 
been established to keep alive the Kurdish language,culture and belief system. 
Shilan explains why it is so important to keep alive the traditions and 
Kurdishness in the Plymouth community; 
“It is important that our children know they are Kurdish, 
that they do not lose the ways of homeland and all our 
traditions that are passed down, our children go to schools 
in Plymouth but they also share the Kurdish school, this is 
good, this is what we all share” (Shilan 29:F). 
 
Shilan places importance upon Kurdayati and its traditions within the local 
community. Belonging is more than just a geographical place, but a belonging 
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to customs and a certain way of life, which is shared with their neighbours in 
their community.  
 
Due to the individual’s need for a social identity, the life of social groups always 
leads to the formation of collective identities, which can be understood as a 
subjective feeling of belonging, or as a community formation.  Identity comes 
into being and changes as a consequence of individuals’ interpretations of their 
own behaviour which entails a reflexive concept of identity. Anthias highlighted 
that “ethnicity is a highly contested term: sometimes denoting a sense of 
belonging to an ethnic group; sometimes meaning shared cultural ingredients; 
sometimes being depicted as a social place structured by the existence of 
ethnic hierarchies, and so on” (Anthias 2002:497). Furthermore, ethnic identity 
is constructed through social organisations and a shared culture.  
 
When it comes to self-identity in collective identity issues, it contains crucial 
processes that can be distinguished in terms of boundaries of sameness and 
otherness because the self is embedded in the collective idioms and draws 
defining features from them. In addition, the boundaries of sameness and 
differences and hierarchical social positions are produced and reproduced in 
interactions with the narrative structures around them (Anthias 2002: 497, 500). 
Therefore, collective identities are the boundaries that construct an individual’s 
sameness or otherness. Anthias claims that, “however, narrative accounts by 
actors are often the most accessible for social researchers who are interested in 
the way individuals understand and interpret their place in the world and are of 
particular interest to scholars of collective imagining around belonging” 
(ibid:498).  
 
Referring to Anthias’ claims, social researchers and scholars are among those 
people who are most interested in analysing the way individuals position 
themselves in the social world through narratives. Social identity is understood 
to mean “those aspects of an individual’s self-image that derive from the social 
categories to which he perceives himself as belonging” (Tajfel and Turner 
1986:16). This means that we can speak of ‘collective identity’ whenever a 
certain social identity is of overriding importance for the members of a 
collective, as Barzan explained: 
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“My self-identity is my name but part of the very large tribe 
in Kurdistan, we as Kurds have many tribes and 
sometimes we from Plymouth need to remind our children 
to know who we are, and where we come from. And I think 
being a member of large Kurdish club we all have the 
same dream of an independence for Kurdistan” (Barzan 
28:M). 
 
Barzan accepts being part of the larger community and categorises himself from 
the rest of society. The process of Kurdish collective identity is to value the 
group more highly, and this approach has more connections between individual 
identity and collective identity. The tribal society that Barzan refers is more like 
a reminder of the past within the Kurdish society. The dream of an independent 
Kurdistan has from childhood informed many participants during this research. 
This childhood could be applied to what Hall describes as an “organic 
community” (Hall 1997:46), a community that existed in childhood and is left 
behind now. Kani is similarly from the second generation and was born in 
London and married to a Kurdish man and moved to Devon. She identifies 
herself as:  
 
“I always identify myself as a Kurd I was born within a 
Kurdish family and grew up with a very strong Kurdish 
culture. We celebrate Kurdish Newroz every year and that 
will serve as a reminder to the other Kurds and local 
people to understand who we are as Kurds, but I also 
celebrate Christmas as I feel that I share a sense and 
belonging to British culture and integrate with British 
Society and I am very familiar with British society” (Kani 
28:F). 
 
Kani shares a sense of collective identity with British society that she is familiar 
with and resides in, she identifies her belonging to British society through her 
knowledge of being born here. Her identification is related to her ethnic group 
although the environment around her is British. What Kani feels about being 
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Kurdish is more related to her Kurdish-born parents and learning Kurdish norms 
and values, with cultural elements such as the celebration of Newroz that binds 
her to her Kurdish identity.              
 
5.11  Kurdishness as a religion 
Some respondents interviewed expressed strong opinions on Kurdishness as a 
religion, and opposed Islam, regarding it as an enforced religion from the Arabs 
which took away the ‘authentic origin’ of Kurdish identity and imposed a 
uniformed Islamic identification with the stereotypical religious and cultural 
values associated with it. 
 
This section considers the identity of Kurdishness as a religion in itself and the 
opposing stances of Islam as being both positive and negative indicators of 
being Kurdish. It asks whether Kurdishness transcends religious, national or 
ethnic belonging, or whether Kurdishness is grafted to one of the former. Has 
Kurdishness lost its ‘authentic origin’, or is there a resurgence in a new belief of 
fundamental roots including religion as being the ‘real Kurdish’? Bafreen one of 
the participants explains why she feels that Kurds should undergo a de-
Islamisation process: 
 
“Why should we Kurds be Muslims? I know there are 
Kurds who are Muslims and I have my opinion about 
Islam. So many bad things had been done to Kurds in the 
name of Islam. Saddam killed Kurds in the name of Islam 
and now ISIS in the name of Islam is killing the Kurds” 
(Bafreen 32:F). 
 
Bafreen believes that Islam has not been kind to the Kurds, it is a vehicle which 
is and has been used to persecute and put down the Kurds and their identity. 
This can been seen in the current situation in Iraq with ISIS acting as an Islamic 
state, continuing to brutalise Kurds. Historically the Kurds have been 
persecuted in the name of Islam, and even the Koran has been used to justify 
suppressing the “infidel” which resulted in mass genocide with huge populations 
of Kurds being murdered by Saddam Hussein in the 1980s. Bafreen believes 
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that Islam has played such a negative part in Kurdish life that she feels justified 
in alienating herself from Islam. 
 
Participants with a nationalist view-point believe that going back to the authentic 
Kurdish religion of Zoroastrism is going back to the roots of Kurdishness, and is 
viewing the Kurdish question holistically. Participants with a strong nationalist 
belief consider Kurdishness a religion; this was stronger than any religious 
identity. Awat explains: 
 
 “Zoroastrism is my religion not Islam, people here have 
not heard of Zoroastrism and think because I am Kurdish I 
should be a Muslim. I tell them that the founding religion of 
Kurds is Zoroastrism, it is the beginning of the Kurds, I am 
very proud of my heritage. The Kurds have suffered much 
at the hands of people saying they are acting as Muslims, 
that’s not my heritage. My heritage is strong and I am 
proud of our Kurdish heroes like Saladin, he fought and 
ruled a large part of the Middle East. It makes me cross 
that people see him in history as a Muslim fighter against 
the Crusades and not a Kurdish fighter” (Awat 31:M). 
 
Awat and Bafreen are not in the minority in distancing themselves from the 
Islamic religion. Many of the participants living in Diaspora were secretive about 
their Muslim religion but for different reasons. Since 9/11 many Muslims have 
been scared to be openly seen as Muslim, as they fear racist attacks and 
discrimination, often resulting in isolation, and does not support the process of 
integration. PREVENT strategies have tried to support the security of Kurds and 
other Muslims in the West Country but since the 7/7 bombing in Exeter with 
Nicki Riley there has been a significant decrease in numbers going to the 
Mosque. Many young Kurds feel threatened especially with the increasing anti-
Islamic stance taken in Western countries and the stereotyping of Muslims and 
Islamic politics. Warina recounts a journey she took on a bus not long after the 
7/7 bombing: 
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“I was catching the bus to town wearing the traditional 
Islamic dress. As soon as I got on everyone stared at me, 
I heard one woman say how bad it was, that I could be a 
suicide bomber. This really upset me and made me feel 
scared. I thought Britain was supposed to be a free 
country, sometimes it feels like I am in Iraq again, I don’t 
feel free to show who I am” (Warina 32:F). 
 
For Warina this feeling of not being free and the correlation between Iraq and 
Britain reinforces feelings of alienation, and ironically where she fears being free 
to express herself through her religion being a Muslim gives her a sense of 
identity and belonging as well as her Kurdishness. Warina goes on to explain 
why being Muslim gives her a sense of uniformed identity: 
 
“Everyone in the mosque are my brothers and sisters, we 
are all the same, we may be from different countries but 
we are all one, we are Muslims.” 
 
Warina feels a collective identity with her religion, but most of the interviewees 
did not express this, they saw Islam as another form of suppression against 
their Kurdish identity and long held aspirations for nationhood. Rejecting Islam 
for some respondents meant rejecting Arabs and their cultural dominance, and 
acknowledging an authentic Kurdish culture. Kamyar describes how his 
Kurdishness is his religion: 
 
“I am not Muslim, I am Kurdish. I live, eat, and breath 
being Kurdish, my religion is the honour of being Kurdish, 
of my motherland, of one day going home, this is my belief 
and religion”( Kamyar 20:M). 
 
Distancing themselves from Islam for some meant a modern pro-western 
outlook that was culturally acceptable and inclusive in a Western country that 
had anti-Islamic sympathies. Some Kurdish nationalists saw the harmful 
labelling that being associated with Islam could bring to the Kurdish nationalists. 
Bafreen said, “Some British people think that Kurdish families take part in 
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honour killings, I don’t understand why they think this. It is not so, you see one 
case in the news and everyone is labelled the same. This is not how we like to 
be presented, this is not Kurdish” (Bafreen 32:F). 
 
It is clear for some that Islam is a way of unifying people regardless of ethnic 
origin and crossing social backgrounds enabling individuals to have a collective 
identity, while others feel that Islam is an organised religion that is used to 
suppress the Kurdish identity and removes true authentic Kurdishness. The 
demands of being a Kurdish Muslim in an increasing anti-Islamic western 
culture where two different identities are present is a challenge to Kurdish 
diasporas. 
 
5.12 Conclusion  
This chapter demonstrated what has happened to Devon’s Kurdish peoples’ 
identities in diaspora and how their identity is constructed or reconstructed 
when encountering and interacting with another society such as the British 
society. Their life experience is analysed through their views and perspectives 
about Devon as a place of living and British society in context. The research 
shows how Kurdish people in Devon identify and understand themselves in 
relation to the society and community they live within. The participants illustrate 
that maintaining their Kurdish identity, as well as the informants, in one way or 
another, all attempt to integrate with British society. Stuart Hall points out that:  
 
“…identity is not as transparent or unproblematic as we think. 
Perhaps instead of thinking of identity as an already accomplished 
fact, which the new cultural practices then represent, we should 
think, instead, of identity as a ‘production’ which is never complete, 
always in process” (Hall 1994:392).  
 
The term identity has been used in a number of ways to refer to a number of 
concepts (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). The individual’s identity changes when 
encountering a society that is completely different from their country of origin, 
the “nature of the individual depends upon the society in which he or she lives” 
(Burke and Stete 2009:4). As a consequence, the first generations of Kurds who 
arrived at a young age and grew up in diaspora lived between two different 
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societies, and are “confronted with two motherlands” (Jodeyr 2003). The 
evidence suggests that many participants feel in-between with dual identities. I 
call this group margin dwellers: individuals who feel marginalised and not 
belonging to one particular group or place. However, here I have also been able 
to show that it is important not to believe identity as something fixed. Identity 
should be looked at as something that is discursively constructed that it is fluid 
and transient. The connotation of this research lies in the fact that it displays 
identity as changeable, fluid and not fixed, and that this change results from the 
interaction with people from another culture. 
 
The key infrastructure of ethnic identity is the genuineness that “it is generally 
acquired at birth” (Horowitz 1965:113). Nevertheless Horowitz does believe that 
this conceptualisation of ethnic identity is more of a “putative ascription” than an 
absolute one. It is true that ethnic identity can be changed through linguistic, 
intermarriage or religious conversion, nevertheless it takes time and can often 
take generations for that to be accomplished. Therefore, in the present analysis 
ethnic identity is very closely connected with the notion of ethnicity or ethnic 
group. The new generations that are born and reach adulthood in Britain have 
been of great significance in studying their identities in their diaspora 
community. This research shows that Kurdish people who were born or raised 
here have more attachment to British society compared to the first generation of 
Kurds. The importance of identity and belonging is paramount to an individual’s 
place in society, whether that is actual or perceived, having British citizenship 
does not automatically give access to a place in society where an individual is 
valued and accepted. Many of the participants interviewed encounter exclusion 
on a daily basis. Kani explained: 
 
“I have been in Britain for a large majority of my life, I have 
a British passport, I can vote, I pay tax, but yet people still 
don’t consider me as British, as I was not born here and 
do not have an English accent. This is hurtful to me. I find 
it difficult to become involved with people who are outside 
the Kurdish community” (Kani 28:F). 
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This exclusion does not facilitate integration, and this is particularly the case in 
Devon, a rural county that has limited interaction with the BME community. 
Those in diaspora who live across the world as citizens (who lawfully live in the 
country), may be in a very difficult position as they realise the importance of 
cross-border connections and boundary transgressions, but at the same time 
are limited and interfered with by the borders protected and enforced by nation-
state institutions and the coupling of citizenship with national identity. 
 
For many first generation Kurds living in diaspora there is a dichotomy of 
homeland and hostland. Many respondents who have been forced to leave their 
homeland by threats and violence and are living in diaspora, recognise the 
empowerment that living in another country brings, this additionally adds to a 
sense of identity. For the first generation Kurds who can openly practise their 
customs and Kurdishness, the diasporic host gives recognition and 
opportunities in a secure environment that the homeland could not provide, 
there is a sense of shared experience in this identity. 
 
For all humans identity is essential to a person’s psychological well-being, it 
gives an individual a sense of purpose and a place in society. For the first 
generation Kurds living in diaspora in Devon, where homeland was a place of 
birth, or is a utopian ideal or perceived religion, the question of identity will 
continue across generations. As Saleh says: 
 
“Kurdistan, my beautiful homeland where I dreamed a day 
of freedom, Plymouth a city that has made my dreams 
come true and those of my children, I will never forget my 
homeland or my struggles but for my children and 
grandchildren who knows” (Saleh 37:M). 
 
In addition, all of the participants know they are Kurds and belong to the Kurdish 
ethnic group. They are proud of their Kurdish background, however the British 
society has great influence on their identity, and each of the interviewees share 
a strong collective identity with the British society.  
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Chapter Six: Diaspora Community Engagement  
 
Britain has been a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and culturally diverse country for 
decades. The UK government is committed to promoting community 
engagement, and services are being delivered by a range of providers, with 
correspondingly diverse opportunities for user and community involvement, 
needs and priorities. This poses major challenges for community engagement 
and community cohesion agendas.  There is a growing concern about how to 
connect these different structures of local governance, for example through 
Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs). The last two decades has seen increasing 
interest among researchers, practitioners and policy makers in community 
engagement. Community engagement applies to the manner by which 
individuals and organisations within a community create ongoing, permanent 
relationships with the intention of applying a collective vision for the advantage 
of a community and promoting community cohesion. Recent literature has 
demonstrated that having a voice in the community and feeling a sense of 
empowerment, gives black and ethnic minority groups a stronger devotion to 
their local area. Thompson (1990) argues that:  
 
“…communities may be viewed as a system, composed of 
individual members and sectors that have a variety of distinct 
characteristics and inter-relationships, these sectors are populated 
by groups of individuals who represent specialised functions, 
activities, or interests within a community system” (cited Olodo 
2008:19).  
 
It is important for governments, and other agencies involved, when working with 
communities, to understand the characteristic complexities of the same or 
different communities in order to reach their strategic goals.There are quite 
distinctive characteristic differences between new arrivals and the ethnic groups 
established in settled communities. New arrivals can feel excluded within the 
new social environment as a result of cultural differences and representations, 
their voices being heard despite language barriers. Government policies for 
community engagement have typically been high profile, as have community 
cohesion agendas, but these have been developed in parallel. Research by the 
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Joseph Rowntree foundation (Blake et al. 2008) has noted the challenges of 
bringing communities together, examining ways of enabling new arrivals to 
become involved, promoting solidarity and cohesion rather than competition and 
conflict between newer and more established communities.  
 
During recent years, community engagement has been used by governments to 
establish a more democratic or political ground, however there is no agreed 
definition of community engagement. Communities and local government define 
community engagement as “the process whereby the public bodies reach out to 
communities to create empowerment opportunities” (CLG 2007:12), while the 
Metropolitan Police define community engagement as, “the proactive 
harnessing of the energies knowledge and skills of communities and partners 
not merely to identify problems but also to negotiate priorities for action and 
shape and deliver solutions” (M.P.A 2006-2009:5). Rogers and Robinson define 
the community engagement as “the opportunity, capacity, and willingness of 
individuals to work collectively to shape public life” (2004:434). Community 
engagement can provide opportunities for marginalised residents to develop the 
skills and networks that can enable them to tackle social exclusion.  
 
There is no single definition to capture the position that community engagement 
plays within black and ethnic minority groups in the UK. The terms ‘community’ 
and ‘engagement’ both have numerous meanings and definitions with 
academics and policy makers. For example, the definition of engagement can 
include how black and ethnic minority groups or other wider population engage 
with projects, activities or any strategic planning. However, this insufficiency of 
definition could be measured positively rather than negatively, provoking local 
discussion as to what these terms might mean in different frameworks. 
Maddison and Laing outline community engagement saying it, “takes a 
particular form, and is context-dependent – arising for institutions from their 
individual histories and locations, and from their view about their strategic 
position” (2007:10-11).  
 
In many community engagements there are different styles describing 
community. There are geographically defined communities, which could identify 
a city, number of streets or communities of interest where the members share 
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specific features or concerns. The term of community is also defined as an 
informally organized social entity that is characterized by a sense of identity 
(White, 1982), while community can also be defined by researchers for the 
purpose of their project. It is likely to engage with groups or residents in a range 
of different routes but it is important to emphasise which kind of engagement it 
is that specific residents or community groups prefer facilitating to use them in a 
way that supports citizens and community.  
 
The term Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) communities applied within this 
research is used to identify the limits on those being examined in the research.  
As Platt emphasises, “an ethnic group is, theoretically, one where the 
association with both a particular origin and specific customs is adopted by 
people themselves to establish a shared identity” (Platt 2007:18). However this 
statement shows that ethnic groups share comparable features and can be 
used as an identity characteristic, it is vital not to overstate these commonalities 
and therefore creating a homogenous group. The study is aware of the term 
‘hard to reach’ which is not a label covering all black and ethnic minorities, 
however the intersectionality of black and ethnic minority residence is 
dependent on that engagement. Nevertheless all black and ethnic minorities 
share an important part, in which not all white populations are included. Isajiwa 
highlighted that:  
 
“…the majority ethnic groups are those who determine the 
character of the society’s basic institutions, especially the main 
political, economic, and cultural institutions. They determine the 
character of the norms of society as a whole, including the legal 
system. Their culture becomes the culture of the total society into 
which the minority ethnic group assimilate” (Isajiwa 1993:12).  
 
This statement illustrates how similar experiences are shared within black and 
ethnic minorities, and in some studies the term of ‘other’ is used toward black 
and ethnic minorities to identify them among the communities. As a result of 
lack of resources, the research will notionalise the black and ethnic minority in 
localities whose ethnic origin is not white.     
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Highlighting the ideological link between active participation and community 
oriented governance, King and Cruickshank review the key components of 
community engagement as involving:  
 
"…continuity and sustainability of good engagement, trust and local 
relationships; opportunities for deliberation; the ability to deal with 
anger and the legacy of previous poor engagement; tailor-made 
opportunities for various stakeholder groups to participate; […] 
facilitat[ing] joint influence over issues; mak[ing] use of community 
‘hubs’ and existing communication link- ages, understand[ing] the 
engagement needs and aspirations of community groups and 
produc[ing] effective engagement networks (King and Cruickshank 
2010, 3).  
 
 
This chapter contributes to diaspora studies by examining individual diaspora 
experience, particularly that of new arrivals in the asylum and refuge process, 
how experience relates to community engagement, and what is needed for 
successful integration into the host society. Within the context of community 
engagement processes, the chapter focuses on intercultural and cultural 
experiences among all generations of Kurds and key actors that work closely 
with diaspora groups in the host society. In addition it provides insights into 
community engagement, tools to engage with diaspora groups, and issues with 
regards to integration and community cohesion, and will also explore issues of 
integration and trust. The final section examines the Kurdish diaspora 
citizenship process and the Prevent strategy, which seeks to engage with 
community groups to reduce the threat to the UK from terrorism by stopping 
people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. 
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6.1 Community Engagement Levels:                         (Figure 6.1) 
1. Inform:  
2. Consult:  
3. Involve: 
4. Co-Produce: 
5. Empower:  
It is important to engage with 
black and ethnic minority 
communities in the early process 
of community engagement and strategic 
development. Engagement with diverse communities, particularly with diaspora 
groups, has become top of the agenda for the key actors and partners in 
Plymouth, to involve and build the trust and confidence within these new 
communities. However more recently it is recognised that a professional lead is 
required in relation to diverse communities. This lead should support service 
delivery by: 
 
 Developing a high level of knowledge concerning the specific needs of 
diverse communities, in particular new and changing communities where 
beliefs and cultural norms may change over time;  
 Passing on and sharing knowledge so that organisations as a whole 
assimilates it and changes service delivery accordingly; 
 Engaging with representative and support groups to gain knowledge 
concerning community needs and challenges within communities;  
 Working with partners to help plan and deliver improvements to service 
delivery; and 
 Monitoring and checking to ensure that standards are met.  
 
Key actors from organisations must provide ongoing attention to developing and 
maintaining the structural capacity to engage with diaspora communities and 
create community engagement. Effective collaboration requires important 
commitments in developing and mobilizing organisational resources essential to 
helping with engagement activities.   
 
198 
 
To explore the ethnic minority communities, particularly the Kurds, and how 
they have engaged with community consultation, government policy 
development and decision making processes at local and national levels it is 
necessary to try to understand to what extent the local Kurdish residents are 
integrated with the democratic society. However, it is also apparent that there is 
a lack of strategy for community engagement in Plymouth towards black and 
minority ethnic groups, as Peter explains: 
 
“Plymouth City Council does not have any written 
community engagement strategy plan in place yet. We are 
looking in the future to develop a city plan and […] will 
include a section on community engagement” (Peter, 
community leader). 
 
The above statement from Pete confirmed that there is a lack of written policy of 
community engagement with diaspora groups in Plymouth. The concept of 
community engagement towards black and ethnic minority groups or individuals 
is of immense importance because of our diverse communities. Community 
engagement has often been substituted for other previous concepts; it is 
sometimes difficult to see the difference between community engagement 
processes and previously used consultation and information processes. By 
looking at the year 2011 Census data it is clear that the diaspora population in 
Plymouth has increased dramatically.  
 
Community engagement, as a concept, has emerged relatively recently in 
relation to public policy in the UK. Providing a definition of the concept is 
complicated by the fact that both the component terms – ‘community’ and 
‘engagement’ – are themselves problematic. Community is a notoriously 
slippery concept, and many definitions exist in academic literature and 
elsewhere. Engagement, likewise, can mean a number of different things in 
different contexts. The concept of engagement seems to have appeared more 
recently in the policy vocabulary. However, other terms that can be seen as 
being encompassed by the concept of engagement – such as ‘participation’, 
‘consultation’ and ‘partnership’ – have been around longer. The research 
themes are designed to help and better understand what kinds of policies, 
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plans, outlines and strategies of each of these key actors and institutions have 
towards diaspora communities in Plymouth, especially the Kurdish community. 
The information collated gives a broader idea on the true engagement of 
diaspora community from the perspective of different and widespread intuitions. 
Ali explains that: 
 
“It’s very important to find out which organisations or key 
actors seek to engage with BME groups in Plymouth. 
Having a community engagement policy in place is very 
important. For example the council only consult with us 
before the end of the financial year by having a team 
meeting to discuss the issues among the diaspora 
communities” (Ali 44:M). 
 
Many diaspora group members like Ali feel they have been engaged just for 
political box ticking, and he has illustrated the importance of a clear community 
engagement policy. Engaging with the community is more than just consulting. 
There are two kinds of characteristics to engagement. First, their dedication to 
constructing and maintaining connections with local black and ethnic minority 
organisations, businesses, charities and other groups in the wider population 
and, secondly, their dedication to increase their membership to involve local 
black and ethnic minority individuals. Community engagement includes (see 
figure24) There is a greater chance of delivering services that people need, 
when they are developed with communities, rather than done to communities. 
Community engagement is highly successful when presented in collaboration 
with voluntary and community sector groups.  
 
The interview data shows there is concern that the PCC, Police, NHS, 
Education and other organisations working with diaspora groups, are not 
genuinely committed to the importance of ethno-cultural diversity and new 
diaspora groups that have often been ignored or discounted by local authority 
and other organisations in the city. As a result, these groups have little incentive 
to dedicate to the process of community engagement, and there is a substantial 
distinction between Plymouth and other major UK cities in this regard (see 
chapter four).   
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6.2 Tools to engage with diaspora communities 
The UK Government has introduced a number of measures to ensure that 
statutory agencies involve local communities and groups in decisions that affect 
them. Therefore, all key actors in Plymouth including local authorities, volunteer 
sectors, and the police, are willing to engage with diaspora communities. During 
the interviews with key actors, different tools were identified to engage with 
diaspora communities, but it was clear by the majority of key actors that there is 
not a quick process to engage with diaspora communitie,s and different 
methods have been used in connection with one another to reach a large 
amount of black and ethnic minority residents.  
 
6.2.1 Personal direct contact 
Personal direct contact with people has been identified as a tool to engage with 
communities, particularly the new arrival of diaspora groups into the city. Having 
personal contact involves professionals liaising around problems, exchanging 
information, building the bridge of trust, and understanding the needs of 
individuals or groups among the diaspora communities. Jonathan highlighted 
that: 
 
“…personal contact with people is the best tool of 
engagement [...] to get to know people is the only way and 
this works across communities, community engagement 
depends on relationships and there are no short cuts […] 
you to get to know people and they have to get to know 
you, you have to build trust, you have to build respect” 
(Jonathan, Community worker). 
Jonathan points out that having personal contact and building relationships with 
people in order for them to trust you to engage with organisations and with 
activities that are provided. Similarly, Graeme, who works in community 
engagement, recognises that direct contact is key to community engagement, 
working and engaging with all protected groups or groups at risk which include 
new communities in the city: 
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“It is effort, it is time, it’s consistency but it’s initial contact. 
You have to walk outside the building and you have to go 
and find people” (Graeme, Police officer). 
 
This initial contact has been stated throughout the interviews in order to develop 
community engagement, Graeme continues:  
 
“…. you need to go to see people, to meet groups, work 
with groups, but I think a lot of time one-to-one 
conversations are also very useful with the key people 
from communities because you have to start somewhere 
and you need to be able to converse with people in order 
to understand the frustration and any questions that come 
to you. So for example, you could speak at events which 
might give people more awareness […] if somebody 
speaks at that event a lot more people see that person, 
but if you want to properly engage I think they need to 
keep coming and speak to individuals first and then 
broaden how they talk to people in the community” 
(Graeme, Police officer).  
 
Face to face contact with diaspora groups or individuals are a mechanism to 
engage with and develop trust-building relationships with BME residents, 
sustaining and developing over a period of time to gain confidence. When 
talking to diaspora organisations, the key actors were aware that personal direct 
contact, or the contact point from organisations such as police, NHS, Education, 
PCC and others, is a route to engage with diaspora communities. This research 
found that ‘personal contact’ was pivotal for some key actors to tackle issues 
that affect the understanding of different cultures. However relying on personal 
contact without a strategic plan could be problematic for the future of community 
engagement, especially when key individuals have built up relationships within 
the community, the dynamics can change when the position changes, and new 
contacts have to be established. Roya illustrated that:  
 
202 
 
“…many large organisations in Plymouth don’t have plans 
in place to engage with BME communities, but sometimes 
we see staff from those organisations that are titled BME 
community engagement officers, which we think is great to 
have contact with persons within those organisations. But 
when we met the officer for example, he/she didn’t know 
anything about the diversity of the world as they didn’t 
provide diversity training to the officer, so it is a lack of 
cultural training. Also it takes time for those people to build 
trust and connections with the BME communities and after 
some years at the job this person has left or got promotion 
and another person will come to the post, so whole 
contacts were lost” (Roya, Community leader).   
 
A lack of community engagement strategy was identified when working with 
diaspora communities, and the study found relying too much on one person to 
do all the engagement work with diaspora communities as a negative approach 
to community engagement. The quote above illustrates how personal contacts 
may destroy and affect the community’s engagement with organisations that are 
willing to engage and work with the groups.   
          
6.2.2  The right individual in the right job 
During the research process it was found that large organisations in Plymouth 
such as the Police, Plymouth City Council, the Fire Service and other statutory 
organisations have a member of staff or department to engage with diversity 
work, in particular with new communities from diaspora communities. Another 
important tool that has been identified during the process of this research is the 
role of the individual or putting the right person in the right job. Dave from the 
Fire service believes that good tools to engage with communities particularly 
with a cultural difference among the communities are: 
 
“…having the right individuals engaged with the community 
engagement for a start because you are only going to get one 
chance, so if you let those communities down then you tarnish 
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the reputation of your service or organisation, so by putting the 
right people in roles is very important” (Dave, Fire officer).  
 
Dedicated officers or staff members in roles of diversity work seemed to be a 
continuous process of community engagement, again demonstrating the 
potential expanding needs of a dramatically increasing diaspora population. The 
study found that having a dedicated staff member with links to the diaspora 
community was valued as a useful tool for engagement. Ann appreciated the 
dedicated department or staff members from organisations such as the Police, 
Education, Health, Fire Service, PCC and others to work directly with diaspora 
communities in Plymouth she says; 
 
“It’s very important to have the right person to work with 
BME communities and understand the differing needs of 
BME groups to prevent racism and promote respect” (Ann, 
community worker).  
 
This study has clearly noted that engagement with black and ethnic minorities is 
a slow process and takes time; this could be as a result of a vacancy or the 
incorrect individual in the post. During this research it became apparent that no 
organisations provided diversity training in working with different cultures. The 
study found that there are cultural awareness training needs, particularly for 
those who work with diaspora communities. Graeme describes diversity needs 
among the staff to understand cultural differences: 
 
“…the future development for strategic levels are officers 
even in departments such as domestic abuse, and child 
protection. While we may have people who are described 
as specialist in those roles they will not all deal with 
honour based violence, they may not have dealt with 
female genital mutilation, they may have done a one day 
course, or they may have done online training, but will that 
give them real knowledge of the community dynamics 
within the community? I don’t think it does, so more 
training, more mandatory training for people. So if you 
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become detective I think you should then have to revisit all 
the training and the reasons why in a more specific way, if 
you are working with honour based violence then you 
need to have training not just what you had when you first 
joined, which was interesting, but you haven’t met 
anybody from another community. As soon as you have a 
victim in front of you, you are exposed very rapidly and 
you may not necessarily understand the people you are 
dealing with, but you may understand that the crime is 
wrong” (Graeme, Police officer).     
 
Indeed without cultural training it takes time to develop the relationships and 
build trust within the diaspora communities. For example after losing the PCC 
Asylum Seekers and Refugees coordinator position and the Police diversity 
officer in Plymouth both organisations have struggled to engage with diverse 
communities, and this raises issues among the diaspora communities. The 
nature of the work with different cultures and ethnicities has increased due to 
the growing diverse population in Plymouth. Key actors provide staff members 
to be engaged with diaspora communities, but at the same time they don’t have 
any diverse strategy plan to follow. As Ali and other members from diaspora 
communities explain, some individuals from the large organisations such as the 
Police come to work with BME communities for promotion: “the last decades we 
have seen many officers applying to work with BME groups but after a short 
time they have left the role and got promotion” (Ali 44:M). It can be argued that 
the culture of ‘box ticking’ has established among some key actors in this area 
of work, and even within most of the diaspora communities. Key actors have 
become aware of who is the right person to engage with. The right person has 
to be able to facilitate a process whereby the community does not become 
dependent on a particular individual, a working system enabling independence 
that creates an equal working partnership. Dependency on particular individuals 
can create a debilitating environment where a community struggles and fails in 
being fully inclusive and not self-reliant.       
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6.2.3 Social media and community engagement  
Social media has become a vehicle for social engagement globally, and has the 
capacity to increase engagement efforts. In recent years social media such as 
Facebook and Twitter have significant multidirectional communication and have 
created the opportunities for key actors and community organisations to engage 
with not only diverse communities but also the wider community. In that way 
communities can raise issues, facilitate the exchange of ideas, and engage with 
society in establishing online community forums to engage with large 
communities. A 2012 Office for National Statistics report shows the number of 
households with internet access has increased by 7.1 million (23%) since 2006, 
which means 21 million (80%) households in the UK had internet access in 
2012 (Office for National Statistics, 24/08/2012). Peter from Plymouth City 
Council describes: 
 
“…social media or organisation web pages are a great 
means to access easy tools to provide communities with 
information, activities and sometimes engage with groups 
discussions” (Peter, community leader).  
 
Social media tools are a new mechanism for community engagement that 
includes the groups and individuals that might otherwise be hard to reach (Fine, 
2006). This study identifies the importance of social media in engaging with 
community and individuals. Social media is used by communities in the initial 
stages of community engagement, and plays a significant role in developing 
and sustaining networks by facilitating ongoing communication and social 
exchange. Moreover, social media could support the building of bridges of trust 
among communities and organisations.  
 
However, social media networking sites can sometimes create tensions 
between the communities or individuals. The freedom of social media networks 
increases the problems, as Chris describes, “the networking sites such as 
Facebook, Twitter and sometimes the comments on the local press develop 
racial tensions and negative attitudes towards community engagement” (Chris, 
police officer). The use of social networking sites has significantly increased, 
with many organisations and individuals using sites to engage positively with 
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other members, however the use of social media can also be seen as a 
negative contribution toward community engagement, causing incitement, 
mistrust and hate with some communities. Like any community engagement 
effort, the use of social media for communication engagement will take time. It 
is important to understand the use of social networking sites and when it is 
appropriate to use specific social media to engage with communities.   
       
6.2.4 Community hubs  
Community centres, community places or community hubs are another tool 
used by many organizations to engage with diaspora communities as an initial 
point of contact. This research has found that the needs of established diaspora 
are different to the needs of new diaspora communities, or as described by 
some researchers and key actors, as new arrivals, where the needs of these 
communities change. The diaspora community hub is valued by all key actors 
as a great example of engaging with all new diaspora individuals or groups 
arriving into the area, and forms discussions with key actors.It is evident that 
using the community hub for consultation and engagement with diverse 
communities to insure that they have engaged with diaspora communities. It 
was apparent during the interview process that there are clear needs in 
establishing a diverse community hub in the area, which will promote the 
innovation and creativity between social sectors that find solutions to build and 
empower individuals and community groups for all people living in this area 
(including the wider community). Dave described the valuable role of a 
community hub: 
 
“…a gathering place or community hub where diverse 
groups and individuals can meet and collectively work 
towards a more sustainable way of living and will be a 
much easier access for partners to engage with diverse 
communities, and provide those people through the 
community hub with some tools to go back to their 
communities, and also to have strands and links back so 
we can then support those people within their own 
communities with our own expert advice, so it is backed 
up all the time” (Dave, Fire officer). 
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By establishing, offering and supporting a place to build relationships, trust and 
a strong community identity, the hub brings together people from a wide range 
of backgrounds or cultures and supports the local community to discover the 
solutions to problems that individuals have from day to day.  
 
Other organizations that supported BME and diaspora communities in Plymouth 
were forced to stop operating due to local government budget cuts and coupled 
with the creation of the Big Society with the start of the coalition government in 
2010, which left organizations with no finical backing. Key actors value bringing 
diaspora communities together in one place, and this importance of community 
hubs is explained by Graeme: 
 
“The community hub is important as it gives a focal point 
and identity for community members. It offers support for 
all community members who may find themselves with a 
variety of different needs, these could range from asylum 
status claims, housing and benefit issues, health and 
children’s services, education or volunteering 
opportunities, as well as support around crime and 
victimisation. It can also be a valuable meeting place for 
companionship and meeting new people” (Graeme, police 
officer). 
 
While the positives are apparent regarding the value of community hubs 
supporting community engagement, the negatives cannot be ignored. Because 
there is such wide diversity within the diaspora communities, some people may 
find that national identity, religion, tribal or cultural differences may prevent 
some communities from attending or sharing the hub space or values. The 
relationship between other ethnic groups in large cities e.g. London, 
Birmingham, and Bristol, are different due to a longer established history of 
multiculturalism. Many diaspora groups in Plymouth are new as a result of the 
asylum process, and have specific needs, such as language, community hubs 
or places would support the needs of diaspora communities to use the hub for 
activities supporting integration and the promotion of community cohesion. The 
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effectiveness of diaspora community hubs is to provide community cohesion 
and improve integrative relationships within the context of supporting and 
sustaining existing diaspora communities.  
 
6.3 Issues with regards to integration and community cohesion  
Integration is one of the important phases of community cohesion, since 2001 
community cohesion has been one of the most significant policies and has 
generated a range of responses from research, policy and practitioner 
communities. It has been argued that characteristics of community cohesion are 
also key to the success of the coalition government’s aspirations to build the 
‘big society’. The ‘big society’ was developed to replace community cohesion by 
a new coalition government that effected many diaspora communities and 
organisations in Plymouth, as Jonathon points out:   
 
“promote what we do as something that contributes to 
community well-being and after September 11th and right 
the way through to 2000 and up to three years ago there 
was a very clear agenda around community cohesion and 
there was some funding clearly linked to that, but you 
don’t hear people talk about David Cameron’s vision of the 
big society and it didn’t have any funding attached to it, so 
I think the work we do is a real challenge and about 
keeping it in the public eye. Now sadly things often come 
up that do not help to promote it and are the draw back. 
As you know we are involved with preventing violent 
extremism so where is the real threat around terrorism […] 
so often when things are going wrong, the preventative 
side is very difficult, and the sustainable side is very 
difficult to get funding for repairs or damage limitation and 
a response after these tragedies […] then people sadly 
become aware and money for training is often there 
because it is seen to be directly connected to preventing a 
certain type of extremism from developing, so 
unfortunately it is often the route by which you get little bit 
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of funding, often not much, but the actual building work is 
difficult to get money for” (Jonathan, community worker). 
 
Many voluntary organisation sectors (VOS) and small charity projects will see 
their funding cut by half and some may lose their entire budgets. These cuts will 
have a major impact on the services and staffing of the voluntary organisation 
sector. How local authorities will act is causing considerable concern. Councils 
across the UK need to invest in evidence-based intervention or preventative 
programmes: 
 
“…the risk, however, is that we see an increase in slash and burn 
approaches to cost cutting which is rather like turning off the tap rather 
than fixing the leak. As a result, we may make the savings targets in the 
short term but we are banking up a whole load of debt further down the 
line” (Barnard, 2010:14).  
 
Most at risk are the small and medium sized voluntary organisation sectors with 
the greatest local potency. The impacts of public expenditure cuts will limit the 
voluntary organisation sector’s response to the Big Society.  
The independent audit of The Big Society finds that if The Big Society is to 
succeed it has to incorporate the more marginalised, poorer communities, 
ethnic minorities, and the young, to work in honest partnership with the 
voluntary sector. The government needs a shared "vision and strategy for 
delivery" with the voluntary sector, the report says, and should reform the 
tendering process for government contracts to remove the "implicit bias toward 
larger organisations, mainly in the private sector" (Rowley, 2012). A report by 
the Civil Exchange found that civil society organisations have been hit hard by 
public service cuts, particularly in deprived areas leaving them in vulnerable 
positions. The director of Civil Exchange, and writer of the report, Caroline 
Slocock, said: "It is absolutely critical that the government engages with the 
voluntary sector as a genuine partner. You can’t drive the big society from 
Whitehall without engaging the voluntary sector, which has deep local 
connections, particularly in deprived communities" (Rowley, 2012: Online). It 
was estimated the voluntary sector would suffer cuts of £3.3 between 2011 and 
2016 with the introduction of the ‘Big Society’. This has been particularly 
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worrying for those working in disadvantaged areas with marginalised groups. 
The big society could well provide new opportunities for the charitable and 
voluntary sectors, but alternatively it could leave them destitute and fighting for 
funds. Peter illustrates that budget restraints will make a difference:  
 
“…as part of a wider challenge to us as the Council, we 
have got to find £65 million over the next three years so 
we are not going to be able to continue to deliver the right 
services in the same way as we do at the moment, that is 
quite clear, so we are looking to see how we can transfer 
not only just cuts, existing services, but how can we 
expand the way we do business, the cooperative council 
approach is a very, very big part of that, so we need to 
work with communities as a part of our cooperate value 
that talks about everybody doing their bit” (Peter, 
community leader). 
 
However, it was noted through key actors that there could be issues with the 
projects that are commissioned by local authorities and other partners in the 
city, such as the voluntary sector. While the quote above illustrates the role of 
the cooperative council, it will play the biggest part in building bridges with the 
networking of the communities and have cohesion, integration and partnerships 
working despite the cuts to the city. Available evidence suggests that diverse 
places with a history of migration are more likely to adapt more easily to new 
migrations, to be more inclusive, and to foster a positive integration experience 
for migrants (Netto 2011; Spicer 2008; IPPR 2007; Robinson et al 2007). Such 
neighbourhoods can provide access to inclusive local resources. These findings 
are consistent with analysis pointing to the positive impact on interethnic 
relations of living in a more diverse environment.  
 
Zetter (et al 2006) explains that diversity and cohesion, in relation to national 
cohesion policies, and asserting identity and challenging prejudice, can be 
exclusive as well as inclusive for those regarded as ‘others’. Examples of 
exclusionary attitudes in this context are issues in more recent years around 
Islamophobia, however through citizenship processes there is the possibility for 
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‘others’ to sign up to governmental social cohesion policies. This strategic 
choice places them on an inside track to influence policy agenda, while other 
groups are strongly opposed to Britishness conceived in terms of citizenship, 
cohesion being less about accommodating diversity with shared social values 
and aims, but more crucially about issues of justice and equality of opportunity 
where ethnic minorities remain disadvantaged (ibid). 
 
Robin Cohen (1994) revealed that following post-war Commonwealth 
immigration, it has become increasingly difficult for British people to uphold their 
territorialised identity, challenging their exclusionary attitudes towards those 
considered ‘others’. In the identity defence frontier, a dangerous gap between 
perceived British powers, based on the former British Empire, the global 
importance of the use of English language, and British power that is imagined, 
leaves room for extreme hostility of Britons towards people classed as foreign 
(Cohen, 1994). Whittaker clarifies that state expenses, incurred by offering 
asylum, is as minimal as 0.425 percent according to Home Office calculations. It 
is noteworthy that, by Home Office calculations, asylum seekers contribute 
significantly more to the British economy through taxes and national insurance 
than what it costs to take in asylum seekers, this is calculated to be 10 per cent 
more than the costs incurred by offering asylum (Whittaker, 2006). 
 
6.3.1 Integration and Trust  
Integration and trust have become reoccurring themes among the key actors 
during the process of this study. Successful integration into any community is 
built on trust in the establishment and local environment. Within Plymouth, trust 
is a hard process for the diaspora communities due to prejudice from the local 
community. Plymouth, in comparison to other cities in the UK, is a relatively new 
destination for diaspora groups. This means that integration is not always a fluid 
process. Education is a key role for understanding difference and diverse faiths 
and cultures. Jonathan points out: 
 
“…we will also encourage people from BME communities 
to get involved in schools so they can be informed, as we 
ask faith speakers, people from different religions and 
different cultures to go into local schools, because to me 
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religious education must also involve the local 
communities so the children in the schools can understand 
they are part of a much wider, diverse society” (Jonathan, 
community worker). 
   
Providing the opportunities for individuals and diaspora groups to become 
cultural and faith speakers within the educational environment is part of 
acculturation. For migrants coming from countries with corrupt systems, there is 
often mistrust of institutionalized groups or organizations, which hinders the 
process of integration. This is shown, for example, in regards to reporting 
incidents of crime, especially hate crime, as there is lack of trust that the 
establishment will do anything once the crime has been reported. Peter 
explained how the city council is trying to change this perception: 
 
 “We have done a whole range of work to increase 
reporting, we set some targets which we have made to 
increase the number of reports we get on racist and other 
hate incidents, so those set in line after consultations with 
communities and then presented to local strategic 
partnerships, as a result of demand from communities. We 
work very closely with the police around areas where hot 
spots have emerged or where we are getting repeat 
incidents and we do as much as we can, to publicise the 
feedback we get when people do use our services and 
report hate crimes, we have got our 80% satisfaction rate 
with people who come through the service” (Peter, 
community leader). 
  
Though there is work being done to encourage and support diaspora groups in 
reporting crime, there needs to be more positive inputs in supporting the local 
community, dispelling preconceived ideas and suspicions about BME groups, 
concerning issues such as employment and benefit fraud. This lack of 
knowledge is often flamed by the media, while certain organizations have 
negative responses to BME groups, making positive integration difficult. The 
way to build trust with developing communities is to build relationships, and 
213 
 
once they are built, maintaining them at a level where dialogue is equal and free 
flowing. As soon as the contact or relationship alters it can lead to mistrust and 
the belief that agencies or statutory bodies are merely ticking a box. Integration 
and trust is a two way process and though it is evident that positive work is 
being done to build bridges between different communities and groups, there is 
still a need for greater inclusion and community cohesion. However, the big 
society agenda appears to go much further. It relies much more on voluntarism 
and the replacement of publicly funded positions by local volunteers and the 
third sector, providing what is a much reduced service.  
 
The concept of multiculturalism as well as integration presupposes that 
immigrant relationships to society are problematic. These problematic relations 
must therefore be regulated and controlled by the state. As Wahlbeck argues, 
“Multicultural policies presume that there are easily recognizable communities 
which have clear cultural boundaries and constitute viable ethnic communities. 
These policies have also played a part in the racialisation and culturalisation of 
differences between groups in society (Wahlbeck 1999:14). Language skills 
were the main obstacle for Kurdish migrants to overcome in their quest for 
better communications. For Berry the integration of international migrants will be 
part of a much wider process of ‘acculturation’, a phenomenon that involves the 
cultural changes that take place when individuals, groups or even communities 
from other cultures come into first-hand and continuous contact with a host 
culture (Berry 2006). Integration is a challenge for any country with a massive 
diaspora population, as Ibrahim reflected: 
 
“…every day we hear from the public that there are too 
many immigrants arriving in their country, and I think 
sometimes this is due to the impact of news of immigrants 
through the media and politicians. So this kind of thinking 
will affect the process of integration but we will always 
deliver our cultural activities and projects” (Ibrahim 30:M). 
 
The accounts above identify the role of some media and politicians in affecting 
the process of integration especially among the new diaspora groups. This 
remark by Ibrahim is important because it indicates that there are challenges 
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towards diaspora groups or individuals but they intended to contribute to the 
integration of diaspora communities into British society. However, the 
integration of culturally diverse populations into British society, especially in 
Devon, adds a layer of complexity to the diaspora argument and demands a 
higher level of cultural understanding. Additionally after the 11/7 tragedy and the 
War on Terror, the integration of diaspora groups, particularly Muslim groups, 
into the host society has become a complex and sensitive topic. Immigration to 
the host country may have an impact on integration and cohesion. This is 
identified as communities outcomes set against the societal average.    
 
Multiculturalism illuminates the cultural pluralism through diaspora existing in 
every society. Multiculturalism has produced fragmented communities in which 
people of different cultures experience ‘parallel lives’, with few opportunities to 
integrate and a limited understanding of cultural meanings, values, and 
identities other than those of their own culture. Now, the notion of 
multiculturalism occurs within discussions on integration, diaspora and 
migration. Multiculturalism can be defined as “promoting tolerance and 
integration while allowing immigrants and ethnic groups to maintain cultural 
identities and customs” (Gallis, et al. 2005:12), and this research draws upon 
this definition.  Evan explains that integration is a two way process: 
 
“…the Kurds in Plymouth need to integrate within the local 
community and I understand it’s very difficult as Plymouth 
does not have a large population of black ethnic 
minorities. I think it’s a two way process of education, as 
we are teaching our local people to understand about our 
culture and at the same time teaching our own people to 
be integrated within the Plymouth society and build up the 
bridge of trust” (Evan 29:F). 
 
The indication of geographical place and space has been expressed by many 
participants during this study, and as the above statement explains, the process 
of integration will be harder due to a lack of diaspora groups in Plymouth. Evan 
goes on to highlight the importance of a two way educational process to build 
up the bridge of trust towards integration. Plymouth’s society has changed from 
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an homogenously white population within the last decade, to a more culturally, 
religiously and ethnically diverse society through immigration. In order to 
understand the integration process of the Kurdish diaspora in Devon it is 
important to understand the different spatial distribution of Kurds in Devon. In 
the section of ‘No money in my pocket’ (see chapter 5) the economic 
contributions of the Kurdish diaspora from initially arriving until now was 
discussed. Susan explains:  
 
“My department has received an invitation to attend the 
cultural differences workshop. My colleague and I 
attended and we were shocked to see how many other 
people from different communities are living in our city. 
The greatest thing for me was the cultural food provided 
by the local the Kurdish shop and from that time onwards 
we invited them to our training and workshops. I think food 
plays a very great part of the success of integration” 
(Susan, community worker). 
 
Cultural food as Susan mentioned is part of a road map towards the integration 
process. The integration implies a strong sense of identification to both the 
original and the majority culture. Cultural food integration interacts in significant 
ways with how resources from diaspora groups contribute to the host society. 
Some diaspora groups facilitate cultural awareness activities in Devon, and 
have highlighted that far more needs to be done due to the lack of relations with 
integration and British society. The Kurdish diaspora are very concerned about 
the official discourse on integration. Saleh believes that: 
 
“…the aim of the Kurdish organisation in Plymouth, and I 
think those around the UK, has been to build significant 
bridges between the Kurds and British society. As an 
example our organisation in Plymouth explains our culture 
to the rest of the community or people, as well as being 
representative. I think creating cultural activities and 
opening to the rest of society will create integration and 
make greater opportunities for British people to meet us 
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and have knowledge of the understanding of differences” 
(Saleh 37:M). 
 
Saleh’s description of how the various Kurdish diasporas organisations play a 
fundamental part in the initial bridge building of integration and trust to the host 
society. He defined organisations as representatives for diaspora groups, and 
how they work as mediators and cultural ambassadors to be presented to the 
British populations. The other role of diaspora organisations is to support their 
own people to build up confidence and trust with the host society. Wahlbeck 
identifies that Kurdish organisations could be a valuable resource for new 
arrivals in order to solve the difficulty they face within the country of settlement 
(1999). Saleh admits that organisations representing individuals get a better 
reception and are taken more seriously than contact with the host society. Many 
participants admit the role and value of the Kurdish diaspora association as a 
platform towards integration and trust-building as a way of organising people 
and projects as well as meeting the host society in a more organised manner. 
For Berry the integration of migrants will be part of a much wider process of 
‘acculturation’, a phenomenon that involves the cultural changes that take place 
when groups, individuals, or even communities from other cultures come into 
first hand contact with a host culture (Berry 2006).    
 
6.4 Kurdish diaspora and citizenship process  
The location of the diaspora is central to understanding contemporary questions 
concerning citizenship, in that, local knowledge about community, settler, 
immigrant, race, nation-state must be engaged dialectically when talking about 
citizenship, sovereignty. Many first generation Kurds in Devon and new arrivals 
(who now have naturalized) were faced with several challenges during the 
process of citizenship. Citizenship is normally defined as the rights and 
obligations that individuals accrue as full members of a community, usually 
taken as being given by the nation state. As Painter and Philo have pointed out, 
citizenship “rests upon the construction of an identity, complete with a related 
package of known rights and obligations, which posits residence in a definable 
place or […] territory” (1995:111).  
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In the UK, individuals applying for citizenship must have lived in the country 
lawfully for more than five years, and have a good character (no convictions for 
a serious crime and stay closely linked with the UK norms and values). Since 
2004 all local authorities in England and Wales are required by the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002 to arrange ceremonies on behalf of the 
Home Office for applicants for British nationality to make a citizenship oath and 
pledge. This is mandatory for all individuals aged 18 and over for British 
citizenship, while children under the age of 18 years are welcome to attend a 
ceremony, though are not required to take the oath and pledge, but may stand 
and do so if they wish. There are two types of ceremony that applicants can opt 
for. The first is a group ceremony that can be up to 40 applicants all saying the 
oath and pledge together as a group. The second is a private ceremony held at 
the registry office and is a much shorter ceremony. In November 2005, formal 
naturalisation tests became obligatory. A test for British citizenship was 
introduced by the late Labour government to address community integration 
and cohesion, as a minimum standard for being British, comprising a 
geopolitical and historical exam and language test. This could be seen as a 
positive way forward for community cohesion and integration, but community 
cohesion and integration will be needed to address equality and diversity at a 
much deeper structural level. Peucker pointed out that:  
 
“…the rising debate was debate was dominated by critical voices that 
accused the long-standing British multicultural policy of being too 
indifferent, too laissez-faire. Although the positive attitude towards 
cultural pluralism and diversity was not fundamentally questioned, British 
integration policy shifted rapidly towards greater inclusiveness and 
emphasis on the connecting bond of a commonly used language, shared 
key values and the sense of belonging to the British community (Peucker 
2008:253).  
 
Integration policy plays a more active role in supporting immigrants and calls 
upon them to make greater efforts to participate in society. Rizgar points out: 
 
“I am so happy now I got my British citizenship after many 
years of waiting, and feel less vulnerable and I can travel 
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on a British passport all around the world. For me having 
British citizenship after being granted asylum is way 
forward to free life and it has open many doors in my life” 
(Rizgar 46:M). 
 
Rizgar recognises his sense of rights and how this gives him a level of 
protection in his life after getting British citizenship, and also identifies 
citizenship as the key to opening many doors to his future. To the same degree, 
Brnic (2002) identifies that nationality can be looked at in two different ways. 
The first is identification of a specific individual with the nation. The other is an 
administrative association to a specific country. Brnic highlighted that citizenship 
is “not necessarily a symbol of one’s sense of national belonging. It can simply 
be seen as a document that relates to one’s rights and to the state’s obligation 
to protect, or provide for, the individual” (ibid:8). Many first generation Kurds 
have lived in uncertainty for a considerable amount of time before getting British 
citizenship. Awat provides an illustration that was shared by many Kurdish 
participants: 
 
“It took nine years to have a final decision on my asylum 
application, I was very uncertain during this time and it 
was very difficult to make any plans it was like prison. I 
believe many people are psychologically effected because 
of uncertainty […] all this time it has been very hard. A 
year after my Indefinite Leave to Remain, I applied for 
British citizenship, it took almost one year and a half, and 
in the end I got my British citizenship but I still feel I am 
Kurdish” (Awat 31:M). 
 
The uncertainty of Awat’s future makes it difficult for him to make any plans or 
to start a new life in the host society. Many participants identified having 
Indefinite Leave to Remain as not enough to create that feeling of security. The 
Indefinite Leave to Remain visa consists of people who have been granted the 
right of residency in the UK on a permanent basis. Awat feels Kurdish after his 
British citizenship process. The relationships between citizenship and identity 
for migrants are complex due to their multiple attachments, and feelings of 
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belonging (Mavroudi 2008). For some Kurdish participants, citizenship could be 
a concern of security but not an identity. It can be argued that Kurds will apply 
for British citizenship as soon as they have the opportunity, however not all the 
participants’ applications for British citizenship went smoothly. Hardi tells how 
he missed out on his opportunity to become a British citizen: 
 
“…when I first came to the UK nobody told me I must have 
insurance for a car before driving, because back home in 
Kurdistan we don’t have car insurance or road tax. I was 
stopped by police for having no insurance and I told them I 
didn’t know about insurance and I thought I wasn’t guilty. I 
went to the court but received penalty charges with three 
points. The year after that I applied for British citizenship 
and after nine months waiting my application has been 
refused due to the court  appearance, and I have been 
told I can’t apply until 2021” (Hardi 29:M). 
 
Hardi explains that there was a misunderstanding between the country of origin 
and the country of settlement. He was refused due to a misunderstanding and 
in his knowledge of British law, driving a car without insurance; he feels an 
unfair decision was made due to his lack of knowledge. British naturalisation 
has come to be regarded as a process of characterisation and integration. In 
Britain, obtaining citizenship is regarded as an integration tool. The government 
have explicitly highlighted that “becoming naturalised should not be seen as the 
end of a process but rather as a good beginning” (Home Office 2003:13). Many 
European states have recently experienced some fundamental changes of their 
integration and citizenship policies. A number of respondents, including Hardi, 
believe that people who want to become British citizens have to work much 
harder and prove themselves more, in order to reach the same level as British 
people. Since the last decade there have been many changes to the citizenship 
policy in the UK, such as policies and the cost of becoming a British citizen, 
Nazdar tells of her experiences:  
 
“I came to the UK on a spouse visa and after spouse visa I 
applied for Indefinite Leave to Remain, and year after that 
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I applied for British citizenship. But I have been told 
nowadays UKBA policy has changed and you must pass 
Life in the UK test and ESOL level B” (Nazdar 25:F). 
 
Nazdar married a UK citizen, and this allowed her to apply for citizenship one 
year after securing ILR, with a total of three years living in the UK. However, the 
policy changed in July 2012: those who now enter in to the UK in the same way 
as Nazdar may obtain ILR through five years of residence, and are then 
required to live in the UK for further one year before being eligible to apply for 
citizenship. Several changes were introduced as a result of the 2002 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act. The applicants applying for citizenship 
are required to pass an English language test, followed by citizenship 
ceremonies and swearing the oath of allegiance to the Crown. In some cases 
the Home Secretary has the power to remove citizenship from people deemed 
to have done an act against the interests of the UK. Phil Woods, the Minister of 
Immigration added “that engagement in anything that offends British values or 
individuals who fail to integrate can be denied citizenship” (cited in page 8). 
Citizenship can be seen as a tool in facilitating integration but conversely the 
model was challenged by a number of studies that suggested poor levels of 
integration and a low level of BME participation in politics (Jurado 2008; Painter 
and Philo 1995; Heath and Roberts 2008). Jurado highlighted “the same British 
governments that facilitated access to citizenship gave insufficient attention to 
the institutional and structural barriers that hindered the effective exercise of 
political citizenship rights by Britain’s minority ethnic populations” (Jurado 
2008:9). The majority of Kurds in Devon arrived here as asylum/refugees and 
later became citizens. Sania explained her experiences: 
 
“I arrived in Dover and applied for asylum, after 11 days in 
Dover NASS provided me a permanent address which 
was in Plymouth. After one and a half years I got my 
Indefinite Leave to Remain but I cannot apply for British 
citizenship until I have lived here for five or more years, so 
as soon as I passed my five years, I applied and now I am 
British [...] to be honest all Kurdish refugees want to 
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become British citizens because it’s the final destination to 
having a British passport” (Sania 29:F). 
 
It is interesting to contrast this attitude and classification with the ways that 
Sania and other first generation participants experienced their various routes to 
get British citizenship. Soysal characterised refugees as effectively stateless 
persons who are granted rights as individuals, with basis of their status in host 
countries resting upon an appeal to human rights (Soysal 1994). When a state 
admits refugees they are providing them with the basic rights of citizenship. As 
Babacan explained, “refugees have a much stronger claim to the citizenship of 
receiving states when compared to economic migrants, who still retain an 
element of their citizenship of origin” (Babacan 2009:54). Sania feels it is the 
final destination to have British citizenship. Citizenship is regarded as a 
fundamental right of vulnerable groups like asylum seekers and refugees as 
well as long term planning of settlement. Levesley illustrated that, “British 
citizenship and the passport that symbolised and confirmed it, was permanent, 
meant freedom from deportation and allowed the individual and his or her family 
to plan for long term” (Levesley 2008:33). More over human rights should be 
regarded as universal. 
   
6.5 The Prevent strategy and engagement  
Britain, along with other European countries, has endorsed a community 
focused de-radicalisation strand as a key part of its counterterrorism strategy 
(Van Dongen 2010, O’Toole et al 2012). The recent attacks by members of ISIS 
terrorists in Paris and San Bernadino, California, have once again focused 
political attention on measures to prevent radicalization. After the 7th July 2005 
attacks in London, Prevent has become a much stronger element of CONTEST 
as the government sought to deal with the risk of ‘home-grown’ terrorism. 
Prevent was conceived as a ‘hearts and minds’ approach aimed at ‘challenging 
the violent extremist ideology and supporting mainstream voices’ (HM 
Government 2008:6). This plan saw partnering to engage with Muslim people 
as key to tackling radicalisation. The Prevent strategy under the Labour 
government was widely criticized particularly in the way it merged with 
community cohesion (O’Toole et al 2012), and was regarded as ‘failed and 
friendless’ (Thomas 2010). The merging of community cohesion as part of the 
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Prevent strategy, it was argued, “had the effect of dissipating the local goals 
and rationale of prevent whilst securitising and undermining community 
cohesion” (O’Toole et al 2012:374). In addition, Prevent was viewed with 
suspicion by those Muslim communities with whom the government sought to 
partner, who tended to see it as a mechanism for the surveillance of Muslim 
people (O’Toole et al 2012; Birt 2009; Kundnani 2009).   
The coalition government, which came to power in 2010, immediately 
announced a review of the Prevent strategy and publicised it on July 2011. The 
current government has several new objectives for Prevent, which has specified 
that in future, Prevent and cohesion policies will be kept separate. It also 
indicated “a hardening of the government’s position on how the state engages 
with Muslim groups by emphasising that engagement must be limited to those 
groups that espouse a shared commitment to core British values” (O’Toole et al 
2012:374).  
The 2011 Prevent strategy has three specific strategic objectives: firstly, 
response to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from 
those who promote it; secondly, prevent people from being drawn into terrorism 
and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and thirdly, to 
work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation that 
need to be addressed. Rizgar explained: 
“I think the Prevent policy has failed to stop people 
becoming radicalized. There is not enough engagement 
with Muslim groups and there are many Muslim groups 
which Prevent groups didn’t involve and those who are 
involved with prevent are seen as spying, so many Muslim 
people don’t want to engage with prevent and prevent 
risks undermining positive intercultureation work on 
capacity building and community cohesion” (Rizgar 46:M). 
Almost all of the Muslim participants’ expressed the view that there was not 
enough community engagement around Prevent and the fear of being accused 
of spying and causing damage to the reputation of those who are involved with 
Prevent. Rizgar mentioned that Prevent has a lack of engagement with other 
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Muslim groups. The relationship between prevent and other Muslim groups has 
been instrumental in the failures of Prevent. Tomas has illustrated that, 
“Preventing Violent Extremism in the way it has been designed and 
implemented is contradictory to other key governmental priorities such as 
community cohesion” (Thomas 2010:443). Thomas also suggested there was 
clear tension between Prevent strategies that targeted Muslim groups for 
funding and community cohesion initiatives that aimed to end such community 
specific initiatives and to mainstream public funding streams (ibid). As Kundnani 
point out:  
“…over the last five years, policies have been subjected to ongoing 
critical scrutiny and reform [...] the Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) 
programme that seeks to stem radicalization and extremism has 
developed through a number of iterations in response to challenges from 
various constituencies. On a fundamental level, though, the legacy of 
policy failures in the last six years after 9/11 is well documented, there 
has been little attempt how the UK government responded to the events 
of 9/11 and the 7/7 London bombings, particularly in relation to domestic 
counter-terrorism policy” (Kundnani 2015:8).    
The experience of discrimination while travelling internationally is common to 
Muslim respondents. Participants recounted incidents, where they were 
subjected to extra or intrusive checks, particularly at ports and airports. Muslim 
respondents reported being taken off flights; being asked to remove clothing; 
and being interrogated and accused of having undertaken ISIS or al-Qaeda 
training. Travel destinations such as Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Pakistan seemed 
themselves to be treated as suspect by airport officials. Mala explained 
encountering such treatment during his journey:  
“I was planning to travel to Amsterdam for Christmas but I 
was stopped at Bristol airport and 8 officers interviewed 
me for 6 hours, I was given an apology but it was too late I 
missed my flight and confidence. I was a suspect due to 
the way I looked” (Mala 23:M)   
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Many participants thought that Muslims were more identifiable and therefore 
could not hide and were more easily harassed. For Mala the experience of 
being treated as a member of a ‘suspect’ community was shared by other 
Muslim respondents, and resulted in negative responses in everyday 
encounters from police activity and security operations at ports and airports. 
Mala and other participants felt marginalised, as being a Muslim meant that they 
were treated differently and mistrusted by a large section of society. As part of 
the Prevent strategy the government has focused on tackling non-violence, as 
violent, extremism “intervening to stop people moving from extremist groups or 
from extremism into terrorist related activity” (Home Office 2011:6).  
 
The initial implementation of Prevent was criticized as it engaged with certain 
groups of Muslim communities and unfairly with others. As Ali points out: 
       
“Prevent focuses on one side of the Muslim community 
disregarding Shia communities and other sects. The 
Prevent strategy was delivered by individuals that were 
not from the Muslim communities, there was lack of 
representation from these other groups it was very 
unbalanced” (Ali 44:M). 
  
Ali saw the Prevent work as a failure, it did not encompass the whole 
community, and this in itself caused separation and disintegration within the 
Muslim community, leading to distrust and friction from within. The lack of 
representation caused alienation for some members of the Muslim diaspora 
group that already felt marginalised and excluded from mainstream society. 
Saleh expressed his feelings on Prevent in his local community, Plymouth: 
   
 “I find Prevent really confusing as it keeps changing from 
central government, and in this area Prevent didn’t do 
much work with Muslim communities because large 
Muslim groups here are Kurds, and they are against 
extremist ideology and almost every one of us within the 
Kurdish community has lost friends or relatives on the 
ground fighting ISIS” (Saleh 37:M). 
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Saleh talks about his confusion with the Prevent strategy, which he says is 
being changed continually by the government, and shares the views of other 
participants that are against the extreme views held by extremists. The Kurds 
are the largest Muslim population in Plymouth, however there is a lack of 
knowledge within the local community about their war in Kurdistan against ISIS. 
More recently an article in The Herald, a local Plymouth newspaper, interviewed 
a case worker working with the local Kurdish community, and said:  
 
“…she had heard a litany of stories about the Kurds in the city who had 
to endure accusations of being terrorists, while they received reports 
from their war-torn homeland of entire villages being destroyed, relatives 
killed and friends murdered” (Herald 22/12/2015).  
 
Participants who worked with Prevent have varying feelings towards the 
program, as Paree explains: 
 
“I am personally scared to tell Muslim communities about 
Prevent, as they will think I am part of the police and no 
one will trust me anymore, so I think the government 
needs to change or work to build more around 
understanding the terminology of Prevent, particularly 
within the Muslim groups and I don’t think Muslim 
communities in Plymouth understand Prevent” (Paree 
29:F). 
 
Paree’s feelings are common with other respondents, who are apprehensive 
about sharing Prevent with the wider community for fear of being distrusted and 
losing their standing in their local community, thus causing an irretrievable 
breakdown of trust between the various actors in the community. Bigo et al 
(2014) found that the purpose of ‘counter-terrorism’ in designated target areas 
with a specific percentage of a Muslim population has had adverse effects, 
generating suspicion and contributing to frustration and alienation among 
Muslim groups. This frustration and mistrust could marginalise vulnerable 
individuals who are in danger of being radicalised. The bridge between Muslim 
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diaspora groups and other BME communities is being overlooked by Prevent’s 
narrow focus on Muslim communities. 
 
6.6 Conclusion            
Kurdish participants in this study show and aware of  their Kurdish roots and 
display pride in them. However while encountering another culture, changes 
often occur due to the different  cultural and social environment they find 
themselves in.  Acculturation and integration from the informant’s point of view 
have different dimensions. Many British citizens view immigration as a positive 
influence that enriches culture and communities. It brings diversity and a wealth 
of cultural experience to the UK. Integration is also a dynamic process, with 
vicious as well as virtuous circles. A tolerant and diverse society can more 
readily accommodate not only people who want to fit in but also those wish to 
be different. 
    
Community cohesion has its successes, but much work needs to be done. Its 
success is more visible in larger cities such as London, Birmingham or 
Manchester with over two hundred different nationalities, because historically 
they have been more divers societies. This does not mean that other cities fail, 
but that there are greater opportunities for employment and integration than in 
rural areas or smaller cities where often any type of difference is noticed and 
subject to undeserved criticism. As time progresses the traditions of this ever 
evolving and growing nation will have to adapt and grow to accommodate the 
diversity and differences of the many people who now, and in the future, will 
inhabit Britain. Without this acceptance that change cannot be good, British 
values will need to change with the times, and grow as part of a bigger more 
inclusive picture. Glick (et al 2009) argue that migrant incorporation is 
influenced by the positioning of the city, along a continuum of power and 
influence. At one extreme are ‘top-scale’ cities, which are identified as offering 
the broadest range of possibilities for migrant incorporation and connection. At 
the other are ‘down-scale’ cities that have not succeeded in restructuring, and 
where migrants are not highly valued and opportunities for integration are more 
restricted.   
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Some respondents deliberately separated themselves from other minority 
groups believing that separating oneself would be a good way of justifying a 
cause for a nation state. This nation state would uphold the culture and belief 
system that was the essence of being Kurdish. This erratic fear of discrimination 
and alienation in not having a nation state leads to separation and being marginalised. 
As Mavroudi has argued, “diasporic, migrant, and refugee populations with often 
complex and difficult relations to homeland-host country states […] are at the cutting 
edge of contesting the relationships between community, territory, citizenship, and 
identity” (2010:246). No Kurds would deny that living in another society and facing 
new circumstances necessarily involves change and adaptation. Changes in 
mentality, culture and life style might be both conscious and unconscious, 
wanted and unwanted.  Many first generation participants have skills and 
experience to positively contribute to the country of settlement.  
 
This chapter has examined individual diaspora experience and the relationship 
of experience to community engagement, and what tools are required by the 
local and wider community for successful integration. It has focused on cultural 
and intercultural Kurdish diaspora experience and the interaction of key actors 
working within the diasporic community. Participants’ experience in the 
processing of new arrivals within the asylum and refugee process and the 
changes in the citizenship process. The chapter has contributed to diaspora 
studies where there has been a lack of literature in community engagement with 
new arrivals, and has focused on participant’s first-hand experience. Finally it 
has looked at the Prevent strategy and the obstacles in the local community to 
support it, to understand the complexities of differing communities, and what is 
key to successful community cohesion and engagement. 
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Chapter Seven: Return: Intention and Experiences of the 
Kurdish Diaspora 
 
7.1  Introduction  
Within the last two decades migration scholars in different fields have become 
increasingly interested in diaspora groups that have been dispersed across 
various countries globally, as a result of ethno-political persecution, or due to 
economic factors and are united by a sense of connection to, and longing for, 
their homeland (Safran 1991; Cohen 1997; Van Hear 1998, King and Christou 
2011, Alinia and Elissi 2014). Recently, several scholars have begun to study 
how certain diasporic groups have been returning to their country of origin (the 
homeland). Braakman (2005) has highlighted that “actual return hardly ever 
takes place, even if individuals express a strong longing to do so” (107). 
Furthermore, Tsuda (2010) has classified return into two types: the first group 
are those of the first generation who have returned to their homeland, the 
second group refers to the second generation diaspora, or those that were born 
here after living outside of their homeland in a host country and their different 
experiences.   
 
After the Gulf War in 1991, thousands of Kurds began to return to their 
homeland in south Kurdistan, from neighbouring countries including Iran and 
Turkey.  However, the complexities introduced by transnationalism and 
globalisation provoked an active debate around the issue of return. A number of 
intellectuals equate diaspora with transnationalism. Other studies have argued 
that diaspora implies a returning to the country of departure (Tololyan 1991). 
Brubaker in his categorisation of diaspora, characterises three stages in 
diaspora return. Firstly, he emphasizes the dispersion of people from the place 
of departure. Secondly, a real or an imagined connection to the homeland. 
Thirdly, he suggests the feature of ‘boundary maintenance’, which underlines 
the significance of the homeland and the necessity of return (Brubaker 2005). 
Conversely, King and Christou (2011) argue that a return by diaspora is more 
likely to be developed on the diaspora’s beliefs and feelings in connection to the 
return, instead of in relation to statistical records. The imagined view of 
Kurdistan by those in diaspora, has constructed and contested complexities 
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between life in diaspora and return. Christou and King (2010) claim that 
returnees more often contrast the life they left behind in diaspora with the life in 
the homeland, and this disrupts returnees’ fictional vision of the homeland, 
making realities on the ground harder and more complex than were imagined, in 
turn being looked upon as strangers in their place of return (Christou and King 
2010).   
  
After the collapse of the regime of Saddam in Iraq and established autonomy of 
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in north Iraq, thousands of Kurds 
living in neighbouring countries and Western countries have returned to 
homeland permanently.  
 
For example, since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, more than 600 Kurdish people 
in Devon and Cornwall have returned to their homeland in Kurdistan of Iraq 
(PKC 2012). The issue of return among Kurdish in diaspora globally has 
suddenly become relevant, however this relevance is double-edged. On one 
hand, the British government, among other western countries, are putting an 
increasing pressure upon Kurdish asylum seekers without secure legitimate 
status to return to their homeland. On the other, the Kurds themselves are 
suddenly faced with the opportunity to travel to Kurdistan of Iraq and remain 
there,  perhaps permanently. Direct flights now connect from many different 
countries to Erbil the capital of Kurdistan, and an increased number of Kurds 
are getting the chance to visit the homeland that they had left for a variety of 
reasons several years ago;   
  
Kamal is a return diasporan who had been living in diaspora for nine years. He 
had heard through friends and social media that England was a good place to 
live, and was driven to start a new life there as he believed there were more 
opportunities than in Kurdistan. Kamal made the decision to return to his 
country of origin after nine years, as it was difficult to get a good job and the 
cost of living in the UK was too expensive. While in the UK, Kamal was offered 
a job in the family business, but acknowledged that he found it difficult 
assimilating into the local community. On return to Kurdistan Kamal met with 
similar challenges of fitting in, and at present Kamal is undecided on what to do 
next. 
230 
 
 
Rashid is a second-generation diasporan, who on completing university in 
England returned to Kurdistan to teach English as a second language at a 
university. Currently he is happy living in Kurdistan, and says that he has no 
plans at present to return to the UK. Rashid has become involved in local 
politics and is using his skill base not only at the university, but also to help 
children at the local school. 
 
Kawa is a diasporan who had returned to the UK where he had lived for 22 
years. He returned to Kurdistan as the cost of living in the UK prohibited him 
having the standard of living that he would like. Kawa lived for four years in 
Kurdistan, but the change in security and economic environment there forced 
him to return to diaspora life.  
 
The concept of return is the primary focus of this chapter, and here I explore 
how Kurds speak and think about a return to their homeland (Kurdistan), 
examining what factors prevent or discourage a permanent return to their 
homeland. It also provides a critical view of the British and Kurdish 
governments’ role in not supporting individuals to return to their homeland. This 
chapter examines and analyses the drivers for the intention of return and the 
experience of return among the Kurds, considering both the positive and 
negative outcomes for the diaspora returnees.   
 
It is also necessary to highlight that return experiences are different for families, 
in contrast to individual experiences. Women and children within the family unit 
may have very different experiences of return (Figure 7.1). Women who have 
lived in western diasporic countries may have to face a very different society 
where their liberty and freedom is restricted, while children who have been born 
in a diasporic country may have become westernised and find the prospect of 
returning to a very different culture and society a daunting prospect. This 
chapter will focus on the intention of return and actual experiences of returnees, 
considering social, cultural economic and historic factors. 
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Figure 7.1  Kurdish Region 
 
The actual experiences of returnees have been recorded while in the south of 
Kurdistan (Kurdistan of Iraq) with permanent members of the Kurdish diaspora 
returnees. It will explore their experiences in their homeland and difficulties in 
re-establishing into mainstream society, the reaction of the homeland to 
diaspora and whether they would consider a return to diasporic life.  
 
The intention of return takes place among first and second generation Kurds 
resident in Devon, to explore the issues of returning to their homeland, and to 
understand the reasons preventing them returning to their country of origin. I 
also examine how Kurds think and speak about returning to Kurdistan 
permanently, analysing the way in which potential dreams of returning are likely 
to clash with practical considerations. 
 
7.2  Why do diasporic people want to return?  
The notion of return was an underlying theme for diaspora participants. Though 
the reasons were varying, the belief that one day Kurdistan would be an 
independent state was a driver. The desire for return may not be an immediate 
wish but a hope for the future or future generations. Return diaspora has been 
identified as a product of the homeland.  
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7.2.1 Economic drivers and development  
The respondents interviewed had differing reasons for returning to Kurdistan, 
especially those of the first generation as opposed to those of second or third 
generation. Many of the diaspora returnees found it difficult to integrate into a 
society that was so different from their own. The lack of friends and support 
from family, led some respondents to have physiological problems and 
depression, and often felt excluded. Whether this was exclusion from their 
diasporic community – where individuals had experienced racism and inequality 
– or an imagined exclusion that emanated from within, such exclusion created 
boundaries leading to isolation and alienation from the host countries’ 
communities, ultimately preventing the ability for successful integration. For 
some respondents it was easier to have an imagined exclusion, than trying to 
assimilate into the local host community. these perceptions of alienation and 
isolation heightened the desire to return to their country of origin. Rebin explains 
why his loneliness in Devon made him ill and why that motivated him to return 
home: 
 
“I felt so alone in Plymouth, it is a large place and it was 
difficult to meet new people. I really miss my family and 
friends in Kurdistan, it made me ill. It was like a big black 
hole over my life, I hated it. I went to the doctor and he 
said I had depression and gave me tablets and said I 
could speak to someone. I wanted to speak to my family. 
They said “come home, you will be better,” so that is what 
I did” (Rebin 26:M). 
 
Rebin felt that he could not cope with the depression and the mental pressure; 
he needed to have a support network. Other pressures that were experienced 
included economic concerns. With recession in the UK, and broadly throughout 
Europe between 2008 and 2013, it was harder finding employment, particularly 
meaningful employment. Some respondents interviewed felt there was greater 
opportunity in their homeland, as the economic situation had greatly improved 
due in large discovery of oil in Kurdistan since 2004. The choice of employment 
was wider and varied and this was an attractive motivator. Examining the case 
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of returnees after a period of time, I found that people searched for the best of 
both the host- and home-land.  Rashid a second generation diaspora explains: 
 
“The only work I can get is in a car wash or takeaway, 
don’t get me wrong I am a worker, but in Kurdistan I could 
do so much more, make a real difference to society, have 
self-respect, make my parents hold up their heads with 
pride. I am working at a Kurdistan University using my 
qualification, it feels good [...] back in the UK everything is 
so expensive, you have to pay for everything, you never 
have any money” (Rashid 22:M). 
  
This is a sentiment shared with Tara who tells of her frustration of never having 
enough money to pay bills, which in turn leads to feelings of despair: 
 
“I dread the post coming, I have so many bills to pay, I 
can’t cope any more, all I do is work and never have 
enough money for things. It makes me feel sad and it 
messes with my head. I am going back to Kurdistan, my 
brother is sending the airfare because I have no money for 
that. I am going to work in the family business” (Tara 
32:F). 
 
The economic theme has been particularly identified by second and third 
generation, as well as some first generation diasporas, who have succeed in 
higher levels of education in western countries and returned to get well paid 
employment in Kurdistan. Cohen (2009) contends how homeland promotions of 
ethno-national justification for returnees covered by economic rationalism and 
the selection of ‘quality migrants’ can cause strains between the homeland and 
its returnees. Neyaz explained that: 
 
“After I finished my masters in the UK, I was invited to a 
Kurdish meeting in London and I met a representative of 
the Kurdistan regional government. She told me there are 
many opportunities for young Kurdish people like me to go 
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and work in our homeland. I have returned to Kurdistan 
and work as director at one of Kurdistan’s universities. 
When I went for the job interview I was told Kurdistan is 
under massive development and it would not look like the 
UK life. It is like a dream come true to return and be part of 
Kurdistan’s development” (Neyaz 29:M). 
 
Neyaz pointed out an important issue, that many participants would like to 
return and be part of Kurdish development. It can be argued that Neyaz and the 
other participants are a significant group of talented individuals with a high level 
of human capital, which constitutes one of the major factors in promoting ‘brain 
drain’ in growth and development of the region’s economy. 
 
The recession in the UK and Europe saw a rise in self-returnees to Kurdistan. 
Many UK diasporas felt that life was too expensive in Britain, that the 
employment opportunities were limited, and generally the quality of life would be 
better in Kurdistan. This was often underpinned by visits back to the country of 
origin, where respondents felt reassured about safety, and could see for 
themselves that economic growth brought a new prosperity to the country. 
Kazem pointed out: 
 
“After the invasion of 2004 and the fall of Saddam and the 
Baath party, I returned to Kurdistan for several visits. I was 
surprised at how much it had changed and the 
opportunities available for diasporas there. There was a 
real need for people who were qualified and could speak 
and understand English well, not just in the commerce and 
industry sector, but the political scene as well. I knew I had 
more of a chance of making something of my life in 
Kurdistan, and the UK has become so expensive, I have 
not regretted my decision at all about returning” (Kazem 
35:M). 
 
UK diasporans who felt frustrated by the lack of professional opportunities 
available to them in the UK, found the opportunity to professionally thrive in 
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Kurdistan, especially those who had a British education and could speak 
English well. Sarvin, when asked why he returned, replied:  
 
“It is an easy answer. The reason I returned back to 
Kurdistan, was job security and prospects, I have a job in 
an Educational department that I would never have got in 
England. Executive and professional jobs are easier to 
attain in Kurdistan than back in the UK, there are not as 
many people applying for the same positions, the job pool 
is larger. As soon as I finished my teacher training in 
England I saw jobs advertised in Kurdish schools, there is 
a high demand for teachers who have trained in the UK, 
as the UK is considered to have the best education 
system in the world. As more international businesses are 
based in Kurdistan, educational establishments are 
looking for Kurdish people who have trained in the west” 
(Sarvin 27:F). 
  
Returnees felt a sense of worth, that in returning they were contributing to their 
country of origin. Others felt guilty for leaving their family and Kurdistan, and 
saw returning with skills and knowledge as a way of atoning for their ‘desertion’, 
as Kadir said: 
 
“I felt guilty leaving my family and my homeland in a time 
when they needed people to help in building the region, I 
felt I had deserted my homeland, but I know I can make a 
difference there, my education will bring skills needed 
especially in the banking system” (Kadir 30:M). 
 
Some respondents felt that there was too much pressure in the UK with 
increases in the cost of living, and this caused anxiety with some, at times 
leading to mental health problems. With no immediate support due to being 
separated from family, the solution was to return. Araz explained:  
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“The UK is so expensive, you work all the time and don’t 
get very far in paying the bills. It is so hard, I became ill 
with worry, and when my cousins told me that I did not 
have to pay any sort of tax in Kurdistan I went back for a 
visit to see if I would like to live there. I have been here for 
four years now, life is more manageable, I work hard but I 
feel I have money in my pocket, I don’t worry about bills all 
the time” (Araz 28:M). 
 
Araz acknowledges that life is easier in Kurdistan compared to that of the UK, 
and that financially he can manage. Some respondents made reference to the 
fact that they had an element of control in their lives, where as in the West they 
were controlled by the demands of the everyday cost of living. He continues: 
 
“In the UK everything has got out of control, petrol seems 
to go up every week. Sometimes I would have to think, 
“Do I need to make certain journeys?” Money governs 
you, that is not the case here, I can take more control over 
what I do, and not the money” (Araz 28:M). 
 
7.2.2 Return through family 
For some diasporas the pressure to return came from their own families to take 
on responsibilities to support a family run business, or elderly relatives left 
behind. Marriage was also a return factor with many respondents having 
arranged family or tribal marriages. The pull of the family network was stronger 
than the desire to stay in a country with few family obligations. Khalil had to 
return to his homeland when his older brother could no longer look after the 
family business: 
 
“I did not really want to go back home but I had to help my 
brother. His children are too young to help him, there is 
only me, I am the youngest so I have now to work in the 
family factory, it is my duty and responsibility [...] My family 
have found a wife for me, I have to do this it is my 
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responsibility, I do not want to bring shame on them” 
(Khalil 35:M). 
 
Returning to Kurdistan was often influenced by family members, however the 
responsibility and obligations faced by many respondents to do ‘the right thing’ 
caused many personal dilemmas. Adnan recounts how he met his wife, and 
being bound by family obligation and duty, decided to stay in Kurdistan: 
  
“I went to Erbil for a family wedding, I meet and fell in love 
with Sophia who is now my wife. Sophia’s family didn’t 
want her to go to the UK, so I decided that I would stay. It 
was a hard decision for me to make but my family and 
Sophia’s wanted us to stay and make our life in Kurdistan. 
I have set up a business here, which is doing very well, I 
don’t think I would have had the same opportunity in 
Plymouth. It is definitely easier in Kurdistan for me, staying 
was the right decision” (Adnan 29:M). 
    
Through Adnan’s decision to stay he recognised that he had an opportunity of 
starting a new life, an opportunity that was not available to him in Plymouth. 
Sami another Kurdish diasporan had his life interrupted in the UK when he had 
to go back to Kurdistan and take on family obligations after a family 
bereavement. He too saw the experience as a positive factor in return: 
 
“When my father died I went back to Kurdistan, everyone 
was so kind and supportive, I felt I had a real connection, it 
was different to being back in England, I had a real rooted 
experience. As the only son I had to stay and look after my 
mother and youngest sister, it was a hard decision to 
make, but sometimes you have to respond to your family 
obligations, sometimes blood is stronger than your own 
wants” (Barwan 33:M). 
 
However not all respondents like Adnan and Barwan were happy with family 
decisions to return. Many women found it particularly difficult to settle back in 
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Kurdistan, and many wanted to return back to their host countries where there 
was equality in the gender roles, and women had independence and greater 
opportunities to succeed. Ronia shared her concerns and her hopes that she 
will return to Plymouth: 
 
“Mom and Dad said I had to go back with them as I was 
too young to be left in England; I didn’t want to go to 
Kurdistan. Being a woman is so difficult here you don’t 
have the freedom that you do in England, as soon as I am 
old enough I will return back to England. I haven’t made 
many friends here [in Kurdistan] because I feel I am 
different to the others, I really miss my friends in 
Plymouth” (Ronia 18:F). 
 
This was an almost universal feeling amongst younger women returnees, who 
were pressured by the family to return home, or were too young to be left in the 
UK. Though women’s rights have improved significantly in Kurdistan with many 
women working, there is still a large gap with western and Kurdish gender roles. 
Many women marry and raise a family with no career aspirations, and this can 
cause internal conflict within the family unit. Barin tells of the frustration she felt 
with not having the independence in Kurdistan that she had enjoyed in 
Plymouth: 
 
“I was worried when my husband told me we were going 
home, life for women in Kurdistan is not the same as it is 
in the west, there is no expectation other than getting 
married and looking after the home. I had some 
independence in Plymouth. I know it was only a part time 
job in a shop, but I earned and it made me feel good that I 
too was contributing to the family household. My husband 
says it will look bad for us if I work in Kurdistan, but I feel 
bad not working, I feel like a caged bird who once tasted 
the air but can only look at others from behind the bars” 
(Barin 30:F). 
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Women returning from the west faced many challenges – not just the gender 
stereotyping – but pressure from relatives to conform to certain norms of 
Kurdish ‘womanness’, under the traditional family matriarch hierarchy. 
Respondents who had lived in the west for an extended period of time found the 
family interference particularly difficult, an intrusion into marriage and family life 
that they resented, in their host country they were not bound to such norms. 
Asmer tells of the heartache and loneliness she felt on returning to Kurdistan, 
as she found it difficult to re-establish her life within her family circle and the 
disconnection she felt from her extended family: 
 
“I know my mother in law was trying to help me, but it felt 
like she was criticising everything, the way I looked after 
my children and husband, my house. Everything I did was 
wrong, or she would make a joke saying “was that the 
British way?” Inside I was screaming, but I could not tell 
her that I hated what she was doing to my family, the way 
she always undermined me. My husband and I would 
argue a lot about it, but he would not stand up for me. I am 
so unhappy I just want to go back to England, but I can’t 
go by myself and I can’t leave my children” (Asmer 33:F). 
 
This sense of helpless desperation is also voiced from Donya, a second-
generation diasporan who followed her husband to Kurdistan. 
 
“I did the right thing, I went with my husband and family 
back to Erbil. I know many husbands commute to and 
from Kurdistan and the UK, but I wanted us to be a 
complete family. It has been awful, my husband’s family 
are so critical of how I run my home, even my children. It 
is particularly hard when my husband travels for work, I 
feel I am in prison, I hate it” (Donya 27:F). 
  
Many Kurdish women like Donya enjoyed a different family life in their diaspora 
host country, where family life was less complicated and greater intimacy grew 
between husband and wife, as there was no direct interference from the 
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extended family. Their return to a more traditional Kurdish family life brought to 
many diaspora women unhappiness and difficulty in settling into a different way 
of life. 
 
7.2.3 Self-return  
Between 2004-2012, the biggest return factor was the change in the political 
and economic situation of Southern Kurdistan. Respondents felt that it was a 
safe place to go back to, with increased security and stability in the country of 
origin. It had become a more attractive place to live without the worry and threat 
of violence against them, which respondents or their families had been exposed 
to for a prolonged period of time. With the region being secure it encouraged 
outside international and diaspora investors to set up businesses in Kurdistan, 
and this in turn has had a major impact on the economy, which saw an 
enormous boost in income. Business opportunities were numerous, and land 
was given by the KRG to individuals who had business plans. This period of 
time was economically vibrant with the opportunity of buying land, building 
homes and setting up new businesses.  
 
Many diasporans wanted to make a positive contribution to the redevelopment 
of Kurdistan, using the skills and knowledge learnt in the host country, and they 
viewed this as an exciting opportunity to bring about a platform for change. 
Having being exposed and assimilated in very different environments in the host 
country had expanded the diasporans’ viewpoints, which they hoped would 
change wider society. They were often supported by family members who were 
benefiting from the booming economy and offering employment in the family 
business. Dara explains why he left England: 
 
“When I finished University I went to Kurdistan, I wanted to 
be part of the new generation of people to develop 
Kurdistan to the place it should be. All my life I have heard 
stories from my parents and my cousins, what an amazing 
place it is. My cousin offered me a job, which I took. I feel 
a sense of pride that I have brought to Kurdistan skills and 
knowledge gained in England” (Delawer 25:M). 
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There are many other diasporans like Delawer who recognised the 
opportunities of returning, not just as personal gain, but in supporting their 
families and taking a proactive stance in the redevelopment of Kurdistan. This 
sense of nationalistic pride is supported by the KRG. A number of Kurdish 
diaspora returnees are intensely involved with politics and development in south 
Kurdistan, with many people both in the KRG and political scene having dual 
lives, with homes both in south Kurdistan and in the West. Returning to south 
Kurdistan is often seen as an opportunity to be close to family and work within 
their field of expertise, which sometimes is difficult to achieve in the UK or other 
western countries. 
 
7.2.4 Aspiration to return 
Whilst some returnees found adjustment to life in Kurdistan difficult, other 
respondents in Britain maintained aspirations to go back to their country of 
origin. Loneliness, separation from family and friends, the feeling of exclusion 
and lack of self-worth, the absence of valuable employment, and the recession 
in the West, were all contributing factors to the aspiration to return. Suzan 
explained why she wants to go back home: 
 
“I miss home so much, my family and friends, the town I 
lived in. My family are missing the children growing up, 
and my children are missing out on their heritage. Things 
have changed so much, my husband says he is happy in 
Plymouth and Kurdistan is a good place to visit but not to 
live in, but I still hope that one day he will change his mind 
and we can live there permanently” (Suzan 39:F). 
 
The feeling of ‘missing out on heritage’ is a consistent feeling of diaspora 
children. Some second and third generation young people explained that they 
wanted to connect to their homeland and their aspiration to return has been 
supported by social media. Stories told by their parents, grandparents and 
extended family in Kurdistan, and supplementary Sunday school – which 
explores the Kurdish language, heritage and culture for diaspora children – 
have all contributed to supporting some respondents in being fiercely proud and 
having a nationalistic outlook, as Warvan told: 
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“I love hearing stories from my Mum and Dad about 
Kurdistan, I look on the internet about places there, it 
looks so beautiful. As soon as I have left university I will 
definitely go there to see if I can get a job. I have lots of 
family there who would help me, it is my dream.” (Warvan 
19:M). 
 
Warvan express his desire to live life in Kurdistan, and his support network to 
help realise his aspirations. The majority of respondents, when questioned, had 
family support in either employment or accommodation, with a large proportion 
working for the KRG: 
 
“When my lecturer asked what do I want to do when I 
leave university, I say I want to go to my homeland 
Kurdistan, I want to help develop it, make it an 
independent state, a great nation, I am Kurdish and proud 
of it” (Warvan 19:M). 
 
7.2.5 Between dreams and reality 
Many Kurds in diaspora often dreamed about returning to their homeland of 
Kurdistan, particularly among the first generation, although they were not 
always certain when they could return permanently. However, Alinia and Eliassi 
(2014) have emphasised that, “the dream of return seems to be as existential 
for them as the creation of a home (land) is here and now for the young 
generation” (79). The dream of return to Kurdistan was discovered in this 
research to be not only with the first generation but also among the second and 
third generation Kurds who were raised and grew up in the UK. Kamal stated 
his experiences that:          
 
“It is strange, I wanted so much to go to England, I heard 
that life was good there, it was safe and a place where 
there were many opportunities. When I arrived in England 
it was not like I thought it would be. It took a long time to 
get to know people, I felt that a lot of people didn’t like me 
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being there, in the papers there was something all the time 
about migrants. It was difficult to get a good job, there 
were plenty of jobs in take-aways and car washes, 
everything was too expensive as well. So I made the 
decision to go back to Kurdistan, my family said I could go 
and work in the family business. I have been here nearly 
two years, and I don’t feel that I belong - I think I have 
become too westernised – I say things and people 
disagree with me or I disagree with what they are saying. I 
miss England, I want to go back, but I know I will still feel 
that I don’t fit in, I don’t know where I belong really” (Kamal 
29:M). 
 
Kamal talks about the alienation he feels in both the host and country of origin, 
and of not belonging to either. For some respondents this was a shared 
experience, where the long-held dream of going back to the motherland did not 
match the reality of life once there. Some returnees felt disappointed, while 
others felt betrayed by family or friends, or even the political system that painted 
a picture which was biased, and in some cases a total distortion of the truth. 
Rizgar articulates how he felt: 
 
“For so long I dreamt about what life was going to be like 
back home (Kurdistan). My family and friends told me 
things had changed so much, I know it was safer, they told 
me the standard of living was good and attitudes had 
really changed. There was growth and a good standard of 
living, it sounded great, I was so excited […] Things were 
not how everyone said it would be, to find a place to live is 
so expensive. There are not plenty of jobs, and the way of 
thinking for many people hasn’t changed either, I feel I 
have been cheated and lied to, this is not what I expected” 
(Rizgar 44:M). 
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Rizgar was not the only respondent who saw a disparity between the dream 
and reality of return. Hajeen, a second-generation diasporan, recounts the 
resentment and the prejudice she experienced on her return: 
  
“I had a dream for so long to go back to my homeland, to 
see where my ancestors came from, I heard that it was a 
beautiful country and there were many opportunities there. 
But when I arrived the stories I heard were all wrong, there 
were no opportunities and I would never be able to buy a 
house as land was too expensive. I felt that people 
resented me because I grew up in the West, the dream did 
not match the reality. I felt I had been lied to cheated” 
(Hajeen 20:F). 
 
The disappointment felt was especially true for second and third generation 
diasporans, who enjoyed the cultural variety and freedom that the UK offered, 
the gap between the two countries was apparent and stories they heard from 
their families had a biased stance. Ronia explains how her excitement was 
short lived: 
 
“When my family returned to Kurdistan I was so excited I 
had read so much and saw lots on TV about Kurdistan, 
how it was our motherland, my Father spoke about it as 
the Promised Land. It was very different from how I 
imagined it to be when we arrived. There really wasn’t 
much for young people to do, in Plymouth I would go out 
for coffee, but here there is nowhere to go. This is not the 
Promised Land for me” (Ronia 18:F). 
 
There was acknowledgement from some respondents that life in Kurdistan had 
indeed improved, in regards to women and children’s rights, and a growing 
economy. However, things were slow, particularly on the political scene, and 
impatience was evident that the dream of a better society was far from 
complete. Delawar explained: 
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“You take things for granted in the UK, simple things like 
electricity the health care, the choice of things to buy in the 
supermarkets and the transport system, it really has taken 
me a long time to get used to Kurdistan. I know parties are 
trying to work hard for positive change, but things take so 
long, my dream of a better Kurdistan is only partly there” 
(Delawar 25:M). 
 
7.3 The positive and negative experience of return 
During the first year of return, the majority of Kurdish returnees faced many 
problems in readjusting. This was especially related to family conflicts and weak 
interactions with the non-returnee population of the country. Male returnees had 
more political challenges than female returnees; on the other hand male 
returnees suffered less socio-cultural related adjustment problems than female 
returnees did.  
 
When living in the UK, Kurds in diaspora encountered a totally new 
environment. Regardless of positive or negative challenges, the diasporans 
could identify problems and perhaps adjust to them over a period of time. On 
return to Southern Kurdistan they were supposed to fit in and not act as aliens, 
however when Kurdish diaspora returnees come back to south Kurdistan they 
encounter diverse and complex challenges. The degree of the challenges 
should, therefore, be seen in terms of the frictions between the past 
experiences and the situations returnees encounter in South Kurdistan.  
 
A considerable amount of Kurdish returnees are not only surprised, but also 
bewildered about the changes they see in south Kurdistan, not only in the 
physical infrastructure but also socio-economic situation or in some cases a 
lack of change. This is particularly true for Kurdish returnees, who left south 
Kurdistan at an early age or were born in western countries as second 
generation Kurds, the return experience could be almost identical to that of an 
immigrant population leaving the home country for another country to settle in. 
An extended time of absence makes Kurdish returnees lose their memories or 
give distorted ones of Kurdistan, regardless of how many relatives are living 
with them in diaspora to assist with relocation. Due to the extended periods of 
246 
 
absence from the homeland, friends and relatives may have moved on or died, 
and familiar landmarks been taken down or redeveloped. 
 
Education and skill building are an investment in human capital, and the 
outcomes will usually not be noticeable within a short phase of time. Some 
Kurdish returnees assimilated skills during their diaspora experience, and they 
continuously increased their level of education. The Kurdish returnees who 
gained a higher standard of education faced less readjustment challenges than 
those with lower standards of education, because of their exposure to fast 
growing technological changes. Those diaspora who made frequent trips to 
South Kurdistan had a higher success rate of resettlement compared to those 
who visited occasionally or not at all, their successful transition was accelerated 
and a smoother process, due to knowledge and workings of what was 
happening in the country. I have found that frequent trips to South Kurdistan 
have had positive and strong connections with returnees’ successful settlement.    
Respondents’ experiences of return were mixed, especially in the time of 
adjustment. The adjustment of returnees depended on their ability to live in an 
alien environment participating in the system and also in challenging the 
impediments that could prevent them from being a part of the system (Smith 
1982). Diasporans who had spent the longest time in their host country found 
readjusting the hardest. King and Christou (2010) explore the connection of the 
journey into spaces of selfhood in a place of return. Aziz explains why initially 
returning was a positive experience with the reconnection of family and friends 
and the feeling of belonging that he did not experience in Plymouth, however as 
life became more routine the reality of day-to-day living became apparent, with 
a lack of choices and family expectations to resume his former life before 
diaspora, the pressures become too intense: 
    
“Life in Plymouth was OK but I did feel that there was 
something missing, I felt I didn’t really fit in though there is 
a large Kurdish community there. When I went back to 
Kurdistan to live I instantly fitted in, I was invited to so 
many people’s houses to eat, I felt really valued that I 
belonged. As time when on it began to change, and 
though I still went to friends and families houses, life 
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became routine and I started missing my life in Devon, the 
freedom and the freedom of choice, doing things for me 
and not because it was expected of the family. The 
banking system wants to make me shout, it is so slow and 
there is just not the choice here that there is in England. I 
feel expectations here are too high, I can’t be myself, I 
have to be Kurdish first and do what the family tell me to” 
(Aziz 29:M). 
 
For many diaspora the realities of living with services that are inadequate, 
compared to those of the West, proved challenging. Health care, education, and 
amenity supplies gave cause for concern and frustration. Some respondents 
stated that though they had no professional status, they enjoyed in the West 
services that were excellent compared to that of Kurdistan, especially health 
care and education. They also said that administration in the UK, especially that 
of banking, was well organised, the systems in Kurdistan made life difficult and 
simple tasks became laborious and time consuming. Kazem explained that: 
 
“I enjoy being back with my family in my country again, but 
I didn’t realize how bad the administration system was 
here, it hits you when you leave and go to a country that is 
so totally different. I don’t know whether I will get used to 
it, I will just have to wait and see” (Kazem 35:M). 
  
Kazem voices his frustration of the internal workings of the region, and is 
unsure whether he can adjust to it. However, these frustrations were often 
overlooked by respondents who said that the social interaction and belonging to 
a culture that understood them far outweighed the internal annoyances. This 
was especially true of those respondents who felt isolated or marginalised in 
their host country, or individuals who found life isolating being away from their 
extended families. Ronak explained that she receives additional support from 
her family and has found this particularly helpful, as she has been struggling 
with her new baby: 
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“I am so glad we have moved back to Kurdistan, my sister 
lives nearby and my husband’s mother lives with us, this 
has been such a big help, I have not been well after the 
birth of my second child. I know in Plymouth the health 
care was very good, but you need more than that, you 
need help and support from your family too, and that I did 
not get in Plymouth” (Ronak 29:F). 
  
The recurring theme amongst respondents who returned to their country of 
origin was that of belonging and the feeling of isolation in the host country, their 
transition between the two countries and cultures was eased by family support. 
Karima underlines the fact that for her, the problems that she encountered in 
Kurdistan were bearable with her support network: 
  
“I love being back in Kurdistan, being with the people I 
grew up with and my family. It is even better since 
Saddam’s downfall, it is a good place to live. Living in 
Britain was hard, I did feel lonely and sometimes people 
were racist towards me, but there is none of that here. I 
am not saying there are no problems, but when you are 
with people who understand and love you, problems can 
be faced, so returning was definitely the right decision for 
me” (Karima 31:F). 
 
The sense of belonging for returnee diasporans was a motivator in return and 
made a significant impact on an individual’s wellness, knowing that others 
empathised with them. The lack of belonging in their host country created 
isolation and separation from their local environment. Ayub explains how he 
feels happy and fulfilled and how the anxiety he experienced has ceased: 
 
“I had no purpose in Plymouth, I worked in my friends’ 
take-aways, I knew I could do so much more, I had 
dreams and aspirations, it all got too much for me. The 
doctor said I was suffering from anxiety. It was a big 
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decision to go to Kurdistan, but it was a good one, I feel at 
peace with myself now” (Ayub 22:M). 
 
Ayub is a second-generation diasporan who experienced extreme anxiety in his 
host country. His levels of anxiety grew when he could not get a job that fulfilled 
him, he felt he had no status, purpose, or direction, he felt marginalised by his 
peers who did not seem to empathise with him, and pressured by his family to 
return back to Kurdistan. Ayub eventually returned, where he got a job in a local 
school using his skills and knowledge, and gained status and recognition in the 
local community.  
 
7.4 Future plans in the host country 
Many first generation Kurds living in Devon arrived in diaspora single, and after 
many years of exile they returned to Kurdistan with the intention to marry, with 
plans to bring their spouse to the host country for settlement. Many individual 
participants in this study highlighted their plans for the future, a future plan in 
their host country in case return remained impossible, and plans for the place of 
departure. 
       
Diasporans in the UK had future plans for Kurdistan – if not for themselves, then 
for their children – these hopes included independence. The reality of return 
seemed to hinge on the independence question, and independence seemed to 
be a driver. Some acknowledged that the probability of independence would not 
happen in their lifetime, but remained optimistic for the future. Taher a first 
generation diasporan outlines his hopes: 
 
“For the future I hope that Kurdistan would be an 
independent state, then I would go back, but I don’t really 
think it will happen in my lifetime. So I will do the best I can 
for my new homeland Britain, and be a good citizen and 
do what I can here” (Taher 53:M). 
 
For some respondents the dream and reality of return did not match up to 
expectations. Long-held dreams and aspirations of returning to a mythical 
250 
 
motherland underpinned by family members, and social media portraying 
Kurdistan as a utopia, left some respondents feeling deflated and bewildered. 
There appears to be an acknowledgement that time spent in the host country 
should be spent wisely with a commitment to education and getting a good job, 
but not all diasporans had the desire to permanently go back. Yassien stated 
that: 
 
“I really want to make the best use of my time here and 
get a good education, go to university, and get a good job. 
At the moment I don’t have any plans to return, but no one 
really knows what is really going to happen in the future” 
(Yassien 23:M). 
 
These feelings were not just felt by individual diasporas, Omar details his hope 
for his children’s future, where retaining their Kurdish heritage and identity was 
important, but he had no desire to return to the country of origin on a permanent 
basis. Instead he envisaged a transient life, passing from one country to 
another, being a ‘diaspora tourist’: 
 
“I want my children to have a good education, even go to 
university if they want to. I want my daughters to get good 
jobs and do more than I did with my life, and it is important 
that my children know the Kurdish way of life, the customs 
and cultures. So I want us all to go back home at least 
once a year to celebrate our traditional festivals like 
Newroz” (Omar 48:M). 
 
Participants in diaspora identified the importance of their children succeeding 
and doing well. Omar wants his children to benefit from the opportunities that 
were not available to him, however it is important to him that Kurdish customs 
and heritage are remembered and practised, reinforcing the Kurdish way of life. 
The term ‘diaspora tourist’ refers to a tourist vocation in which members of a 
diasporic group return to their family homelands in search of personal and 
cultural heritage. This is accomplished in a manner that reflects a sense of 
personalised belonging and connectivity. 
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Many first generation diaspora want to return to Kurdistan, but they also want to 
establish a life in the host country. Some Kurds wish to take advantage of their 
lives in diaspora, in order to further professional and personal goals that are 
related to their place of return. Some studies argue that it is possible to 
understand the new arrivals and first generation life in diaspora, as a career 
during which they are trying to prepare themselves for their ultimate goal, which 
is a return to the country of origin (Lundberg 1989, Wahlbeck 1997). Wahlbeck 
pointed out that “many refugees spend their time studying and gaining 
knowledge which they can utilise after they have returned” (1997:145). 
 
7.5 Contribution or impacts of diaspora 
Diaspora groups play an important part in the facilitation of the movements of 
skills, capital, production and goods. Many studies have identified that the 
existence of a large diaspora group is very significant for growing foreign trade, 
investment, and the transfer of knowledge. Diaspora connections can make 
diaspora groups seem more appealing to those in the country of return by 
easing the job search, development of links to other,s and integration into the 
host country. Newland and Patrick (2004) have illustrated that “for many 
countries, diaspora are a major source of foreign direct investment (FDI), 
market development (including outsourcing of production), technology transfer, 
philanthropy, tourism, political contributions, and more tangible flows of 
knowledge, new attitudes, and cultural influence” (2). However, in some cases 
diaspora group participation could prolong conflicts. In a study made by Smith 
and Stares (2007), they discovered that: 
 
“…diaspora can be both ‘peace-makers’ and ‘peace-wreckers’; they can 
be both at different periods and at the same time, and in order to assess 
their role it is necessary to understand the historical context, as well as 
their interests, aspirations, institutions and objectives” (cited in Hendow 
2010:12).  
 
Natali (2006) also found that the Kurdish diaspora were both ‘peace-makers’ 
and ‘peace-wreckers’. She shows that there were “varying diasporic roles 
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during different periods of the conflict cycle, some of which supported peace-
making and some of which encouraged conflict” (8).  
 
Kurds who attained high academic achievements and experience whilst in 
diaspora have greater opportunities in the place of departure than those who 
have fewer skills and knowledge. A number of high-level positions within the 
Kurdistan Regional Government and political parties have been held by Kurdish 
returnees from diaspora. Ben Porat (2011) highlighted that:  
“…return diasporas can be a product of homeland’s needs and policies, 
this determines fluid relations between diaspora and homeland. 
Therefore homeland also becomes fluid by claims, reclaims or renounces 
the status of certain groups as its diasporas according to its changing 
needs and goals, thereby indicating its own fluidity” (91).  
 
The contribution and impacts of Kurdish diaspora can be argued as a product to 
the Kurdistan homeland, but it is also important to note that some individual 
returnees become prominent in non-political fields in their place of return 
(Kurdistan) and have an important impact on the relationship and development 
of both the host country and Kurdistan. Khazal illustrated that: 
 
“I returned to Kurdistan to be part of place recovering from 
tragedies and horrors that one could never imagine. I 
moved to Kurdistan in the spring holiday (Newroz) to see 
what life would be like in my homeland. I was invited to a 
political party meeting and after that day I was invited to 
be a minister within the KRG. I accepted the challenge, as 
I was able to contribute positively and use my skills and 
knowledge to great effect. I hope I have made a 
contribution to Kurdistan” (Khazal 35:F). 
 
Khazal, having gained professional status in the diasporic host country believes 
she can be part of the changing process, part of the new body of young 
professionals returning to homeland and contributing to the redevelopment of 
the new Kurdistan. Hawkar, another diaspric professional, explains that for him 
return is not just about getting professional recognition, but the nationalistic 
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pride and reconnection to his heritage and his part in being proactive in the 
development of the region: 
 
“I decided to return initially due to the fact I always had a 
nationalistic attraction to Kurdistan. I want to make a 
serious effort to be part of the development. Kurdistan has 
become the focus of world attention and will be so for the 
next few decades. We will be experiencing huge changes 
in the region – it makes sense that the people of Kurdistan 
will benefit from these opportunities and work positively in 
being part of this development. When I got a job as 
president of a university in Kurdistan, I knew I had to 
accept it due to my skills and political arena, but also to 
connect with my roots. My return is related to my political 
and professional career but more importantly, to serve and 
contribute to the development of Kurdistan” (Hawkar 
46:M). 
 
Experiences gained in the diaspora are important to the development of the 
political and professional arena, as such skills are not readily available in 
Kurdistan. From the perspective of the KRG, certain experience and skills are 
required to contribute within the redevelopment of the region. Diasporans who 
remember their experiences have an interest in returning to support the 
development of their country and actively help people who remained in the 
Kurdish homeland.  
 
Many diasporans have also contributed to families left in Kurdistan by sending 
money to support businesses, education and building property. Medication and 
other merchandise which is hard to come by, or of an inferior quality, have been 
sent to Kurdistan by diasporans, and they see this as supporting their families 
and their country by injecting cash into the economy and thus supporting 
indirectly the redevelopment of the region. Said says: 
 
“I try to help out as much as I can, I send money back to 
my family and sometimes I buy medical items such as 
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blood pressure monitors these, things are hard to come by 
in Kurdistan” (Said 37:M). 
 
Omar also stated:  
 
“The quality of clothes and toiletries is not very good in 
Kurdistan so when I visit I try and buy toothpaste, and 
make up also things like paracetamol for my nephews and 
nieces, they love it when I return” (Omar 48:M). 
 
Money was not the only contribution made by diasporans; many respondents 
gave their time and skills when visiting Kurdistan, as they saw their education 
as a valuable resource and asset. Nazdar, a teacher in the UK who visits 
Kurdistan in the holidays, values her visits there and the contribution she feels 
she makes: 
 
“I try to use my education as much as I can to help my 
country especially in the higher education departments. 
Resources are limited and sometimes things can be a little 
out-dated, I feel I make a real contribution and am proud 
of what I do” (Nazdar 25:F). 
 
Sania also feels she has made a positive contribution as a role model. She 
hopes that her life in the UK will impact on the girls in the local school she visits: 
 
“When I go back I am always asked to give English 
lessons in the local school, the kids love it and the stories I 
have to tell them. I think I have inspired some of them, 
especially the girls as I am a woman” (Sania 29:F). 
 
This cultural exchange of ideas is seen by many diasporans as a way of forging 
change, they see that being immersed in the West has given them the ability to 
have a wider outlook on many aspects of society. Hawkar feels that living in the 
UK has given him an advantage in seeing beyond his own sphere: 
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“Definitely living in the UK has given me a broader political 
outlook, I try to see things more objectively, when I lived in 
Kurdistan I saw things from a very biased narrow way, the 
information and knowledge I have learnt from western 
politics can definitely help the political scene in Kurdistan” 
(Hawkar 46:M). 
 
The impact of return is seen not just economically, but socially. Diasporas have 
informal and formal experiences and knowledge (Emanuelsson 2008), and 
when returning they do so with different informed cultural norms and values 
acquired in their host country, in particular, attitudes towards women and 
children. Many respondents felt awkward within family situations where social 
norms of the West were not met in their country of origin. Warvan, a 
secondgeneration diasporan points out that hitting children as a punishment is 
not an accepted norm in the West, and how his change in values might have a 
chain-reaction with his brother: 
 
“My family was surprised when I returned, as I picked up 
some British ways and manners. We never say please or 
thank you in the Middle East, but in Britain most people 
do. I also found it hard when my brother would hit his 
children, I was uncomfortable, I explained that you could 
not do that in Britain, that the police would be called, they 
laughed at me, but I think they thought about it, I have 
noticed my brother does not hit the children so much 
especially when I am around. I think that other Kurdish 
people returning will do the same, all these little changes 
make for bigger changes” (Warvan 19:M). 
 
Warvan believes that small changes will eventually lead to bigger ones; many 
diasporans are met with suspicion because they return with different mind-sets. 
Family, friends and work colleagues can often challenge these new ideals. 
Neyaz tells of his experience setting up his new business: 
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“Since returning I have started my own business as a 
business and office management consultant. The west are 
very advanced in office administration and in how to make 
things easier and more efficient in running a successful 
business. At first people were suspicious of me, but when 
they saw what sense it made they were supportive. I am 
glad I went to the UK, I feel I have brought some really 
useful knowledge back to help my country” (Neyaz 29:M). 
 
Despite the challenges Neyaz met with at first, introducing new ideas perceived 
as westernised by his work colleagues, there was an engagement by the 
diaspora and the host on both supporting expansive change. 
 
Returnees brought back knowledge and resources that could socially and 
economically make a difference. Befreen, who trained as a nurse in the UK 
hopes to set up breast awareness clinics in the regions’ hospitals; she wants to 
break through the cultural barrier and taboo of discussing intimate health 
matters which exist and makes such work difficult: 
 
“I have tried to explain to my Mum the importance of 
checking her breasts for lumps. At first she would not talk 
about it, she got cross and embarrassed with me. I said 
that in England there were many well women which 
encourage you to check so to catch any cancer early. I 
think it is sad that our culture should not talk about these 
things, they can really save your life, I am trying to start up 
a clinic at the hospital” (Befreen 32:F). 
 
Befreen is making an impact on social values and recognises that a change of 
mind-set is required, enabling a proactive stance on preventative checks. Many 
diaspora families are proud of their children and want them to succeed in higher 
education and bring those skills, abilities, and knowledge back home to 
Kurdistan. Rashid recognises the importance of the education he received in 
the host country and the impact and contribution this could bring to his country 
of heritage:  
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“My family are proud of me for having gained a good education in the UK 
and now teaching at the university, I know the things I have learnt in the 
UK will be really important in developing students who want to make a 
real difference in the country’s development. I have a wider outlook on 
world politics now and how positive infrastructures really help to boost 
economies” (Rashid 22:M).  
 
7.6 Temporary return 
Disappointment and disillusionment for returnees to the country of origin led 
some respondents to stay in Kurdistan on a temporary basis, visiting and/or 
commuting to Kurdistan, but having a permanent base in the UK. For some 
respondents this was the only way of successfully combining both worlds. Many 
women were reluctant to return on a permanent basis, enjoying greater 
independence in the West and less family interference, while families with 
children at school in the UK often did not want to interrupt education. Many 
returnee diaspora have temporary contracts with the shift in the economy in 
Kurdistan, and better healthcare and services in the west. Barzan tells why he 
returns to Kurdistan on a temporary basis: 
 
“I have temporary work in Soran University, when I have 
completed the contract I will return home to Plymouth. My 
wife doesn’t want to live in Kurdistan, she says life is 
better in Plymouth and the children are in school as well. I 
have the best of both worlds, temporarily working and 
living in Kurdistan, and living most of the time in the UK, 
keeping the whole family happy” (Barzan 28:M). 
 
For many diasporans, the importance of visiting family and friends and keeping 
family connections was of immense importance, and a clear reoccurring theme 
in the respondents’ answers of temporary return. Many diasporans were 
concerned at losing connectivity with family groups and Kurdish culture, and 
wanted their children to have a sense of belonging to their motherland. Taher 
explained why it is important for his children to stay connected with the family: 
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“…we go back to Kurdistan to visit twice a year always for 
Newroz. I want the children to know what our culture is 
about, only if you breathe the air and see and taste what is 
around you will you learn. It is also important to stay with 
our family and see our relatives, the children might not 
know them if we don’t go back” (Taher 53:M). 
 
Shilan, another temporary return diasporan, tells how his home is in the UK and 
how he has adopted a new cultural identity: 
 
“It’s great visiting my family and friends in Kurdistan, but I 
could never live there again, England is my home now. I 
am Kurdish-British, I don’t think in the Kurdish way, I 
prefer to be Westernised. I know this hurts my parents, but 
it is how I feel” (Shilan 29:F). 
 
The region’s security and protection from ISIS for some were also reasons of 
temporary return, with special allegiance to family members who had been 
involved in many wars and conflicts that have shaped Kurdistan. Harem 
explained that:  
 
“As soon as the war with ISIS is won I will return home to 
England, I don’t see me living forever here, I just want to 
protect my homeland and my people. My grandparents 
have put up with so much, with brutal regimes in the past, 
it is not going to happen again.” (Harem 26:M). 
 
Harem identifies that as soon as the war with ISIS is won he will return to the 
UK. The reality is that it might take some time, but the intention is still to do so, 
his motivation of temporary return was loyalty to his family and motherland. 
 
 
7.7  Return diaspora to diaspora 
The term of ‘diaspora to diaspora return’ is used to understand how the 
experiences of living at the place of return, and to discover why return diaspora 
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make the decision to return back to the diaspora life. The term ‘diaspora to 
diaspora’ refers to people that have gone through double diaspora life 
experiences. Tölölyan (1996) emphasises that diasporic people, “turn and re-
turn” toward the homeland while recognizing that they maintain dynamic 
attachments to both homeland and host land. The major reason behind the 
returnees in Kurdistan to return back to diaspora life was sustainability and 
security of the region, although the recent consequences of the Kurdish political 
crisis among the Kurdish parties and the relationship with the central Iraqi 
government has damaged the economic situation in Kurdistan. Azet gives the 
reasons why he wants to return to the UK: 
       
“I returned to the UK because Kurdistan is not safe 
anymore. I brought my family with me, I would worry about 
them too much there, it is not just the threat of ISIS, but 
also the increasing living costs there. I also worry about 
the political parties, everyone has an agenda in Kurdistan, 
it does not seem a stable environment to raise a family” 
(Azet 33:M). 
 
For some respondents the decision to return to their host country was initially 
driven by outside factors beyond their control, but precipitated the desire to 
return. The lack of quality education, inadequate health care, and poor 
infrastructures were some of many reasons given by respondents for returning 
back to their host countries. Karwan explained:  
 
“I thought life in England was expensive, that’s the reason 
we returned back to Kurdistan, but the wages are low in 
Kurdistan, they do not pay professionals what they are 
worth, buying and renting houses is expensive too. It has 
become difficult to maintain a good standard of living in 
Kurdistan that’s why I returned back to the UK’” (Karwan 
38:M). 
 
While Karwan cites the cost of living as a reason for return, he has concerns 
over his children’s education and welfare in Kurdistan, as well as the teachers’ 
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influence. In a culture that places great emphasis on education, Karwan feels 
his children will benefit from education in the UK: 
 
“I am not happy with the education my children were 
receiving, I know things have changed greatly but the way 
some of the teachers treat the children is wrong and the 
resources are so limited. I think a good education is really 
important for everyone, and it is my responsibility to make 
sure my children have the best, that’s why we returned 
back to Plymouth. When my children are older they can 
make the decision for themselves to return or not” 
(Karwan 38:M). 
 
Avin was forced to return to Europe when the international company she 
worked for relocated. With the changing security implication and lack of well-
paid employment Avin felt she had no choice in the decision to re-return to 
diaspora life: 
 
“The European company I work with was leaving 
Kurdistan, they felt it is no longer safe or sustainable 
there, that brought me problems, if I wanted to work with 
them I would have to return back to the UK. I needed a 
good job, things are changing in Kurdistan and not for the 
better” (Avin 27:F). 
 
Avin also returned to her diaspora country, she wanted to contribute to the new 
Kurdistan but when she arrived she met limitations in employment prospects. 
Samira also faced considerable pressure from her family to get married in the 
traditional way, and thus felt that the only way open to her was to return to the 
UK: 
 
“As a woman I don’t have a chance to live the life I want in 
Kurdistan, it is all about the man and what he wants. I 
couldn’t get the job I wanted even though I have a degree, 
and I know the family really wanted me to get married to 
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someone of their choice. I am now back in Plymouth and 
live my own life, I have the job I love and one day I will 
choose my husband, I know this is going to cause 
problems in the family, but that is just way it is” (Samira 
23:F). 
 
Mevan, on return to Kurdistan experienced a different family and social demand 
placed on him, that of joining the army. The threat of ISIS has meant that many 
Kurdish men in diaspora have expectations placed on them to join the army; 
this is not just from their families, but also from the wider society. For many 
respondents this meant returning to the diaspora host country: 
 
“Things were getting very difficult in Kurdistan, I no longer 
felt safe. My family were putting a lot of pressure on me to 
join the army, I didn’t want to. I returned to the UK 
because it is safe and I have freedom of choice, I feel so 
guilty but I have to be true to myself” (Mevan 26:M). 
 
Many respondents had an internal conflict regarding change. Their traditional 
norms and values had changed in the diaspora host country, and when 
returning to the country of origin they felt alienated from what they once 
believed in. This was a motivator for diaspora to diaspora return. Goran tells 
how he tried to settle down in Kurdistan, but he could not conform and live the 
life expected of him: 
 
“I have tried living again in Kurdistan, but the security and 
sustainability of the region changed after the threat of 
ISIS, we made a decision to return back to Plymouth. I 
know some people return to fight against ISIS to protect 
Kurdistan, but I have no choice but to save my family and 
return to Plymouth. There were so many challenges that 
we can’t cope with rather than re-return back to the UK” 
(Goran 30:M). 
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Goran put the safety of his family as being of central importance in making the 
decision to return to diaspora life.  
 
7.8 Safety and security 
This feeling of duty and responsibility for the family is not the only returnee 
motivator. With the recent increasing threat of ISIS, some respondents wanted 
to return home to protect their family and homeland. However, the last waves of 
Kurdish diasporas to return to south Kurdistan have been individuals wanting to 
protect the Kurdish homeland and fight side-by-side with the Peshmerga (armed 
forces of Kurdistan) against Islamic State (al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah – frequently 
called ISIS or ISIL). This was particularly apparent with second-generation 
diaspora who had strong nationalist feelings, like Kawani who recently returned 
to South Kurdistan (figure 7.2): 
 
Figure 7.2  The Kurdish Project 
 
“I have been in the UK since 1988, I was a member of the 
Peshmerga before I arrived in the UK, I was fighting against 
the Saddam Hussein Baathist regime. I am so happy now I 
am back with the Peshmerga. I returned to support my 
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brother and sister, and also it is our duty to protect the 
Kurdish land from terrorists or any enemies” (Kawani 55:M). 
 
Chiya, who has lived in the UK for more than two decades, believes that the 
Kurdish returnee diaspora have increased due to those who want to support 
their homeland’s safety and security. After a proclaimed ‘caliphate’ over part of 
Iraq and Syria in June 2014, several thousand people went from western 
countries to join terrorist activists. On the other side of the battle line, many 
Kurdish people, particularly second and third generation Kurdish diaspora, 
returned from western countries, in solidarity with the Kurdish Peshmerga in 
South Kurdistan, and took up arms to protect their homeland: 
 
“I cannot stay at the home in the UK to watch the Kurdish 
homeland be destroyed by Da’ash and kill my family and 
friends in Kurdistan. I decided to return back to Kurdistan 
to support the Peshmerga. At least with my knowledge I 
can be an interpreter or publish the story of the Kurdish 
battles online to outsiders to let them know what is 
happening in the homeland of the Kurds. I believe many 
people like myself return back from western countries and 
can do much with the pen and language to support 
Kurdistan. We were given three days training in how to 
use small weapons. I am so proud of the Kurdish 
Peshmerga as they have got most of our territory and land 
back” (Rawand 25:M). 
 
Even some of those participants who lived the majority of their adult life in 
western countries have returned to protect south Kurdistan. As Rawand 
indicated above, the Kurds’ return from diaspora will provide support through 
their knowledge of languages and skills to the territories of Kurdistan, regarded 
as an important marker of belonging. Like many of the Kurdish returnees from 
western countries, Rawand wants to be part of the closest thing to be proud of, 
what the Peshmerga achieves in the recent war against Daash or ISIL. The war 
against Daash articulated a greater sense of Kurdishness or Kurdayati in Kurds; 
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it has particularly united all the Kurdish political parties to have one army to 
protect Kurdish territory.    
 
Kurdish diaspora believed that without a British or European passport their 
ability to eventually return to their country of resettlement became more difficult. 
With the security situation in south Kurdistan fragile, and the real possibility of 
deteriorating, the ability to return to Europe was an important consideration. 
 
7.9 Conclusion 
The theme of return is a recurring subject when interacting with Kurdish 
diaspora particularly with the first generations who are forcibly separated from 
their native Kurdistan, and who often maintain a strong desire to be 
reconnected with families and friends back in Kurdistan. As pointed out by King 
and Christou (2011), the revival of studies focusing on returnee Kurds should be 
explained with ‘re-conceptualisation’ of the study of migratory phenomena 
through the adoption of diverse frameworks, ranging from the ‘mobility prototype 
and the transnational approach to diaspora studies’ (452). 
 
The duration of the stay in South Kurdistan for return diaspora members was 
influenced by a number of factors. First, a lack of security; second, temporary 
employment positions; and third – perhaps the most influential – the health and 
education system, and a variety of urban infrastructures which are still being 
rebuilt in the south of Kurdistan. Without these amenities, some Kurds from 
diaspora expressed an unwillingness to permanently relocate themselves or 
their families to south of Kurdistan.  
 
Little has been written on Kurdish returnees; most studies have focused on the 
Kurds while they were in diaspora. In addition, most research has been 
conducted in host countries, particularly in western countries, where many 
Kurdish diaspora settled. Ben Porat highlighted that:  
 
“return diasporas can be a product of homeland’s needs and policies, 
this determines fluid relations between diaspora and homeland. 
Therefore homeland also becomes fluid by claims, reclaims or renounces 
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the status of certain groups as its diasporas according to its changing 
needs and goals, thereby indicating its own fluidity” (2011:91). 
 
Information from the participants suggests that after many years of diasporic 
return, some of the interviewees consider the UK as their homeland. 
Furthermore, results have discovered that a high percentage of Kurdish 
returnees consider Kurdistan as the homeland. In addition, some of the 
returnees considered that they had ‘two homelands’, which makes difficulties 
essentialising concepts of diaspora and supports the intention of discourse of 
the Kurds as a return diaspora structured by two different homelands. Firstly  
the Kurdish territories where originally Kurds came from, and secondly the UK 
or other western countries where the proportion of the Kurds are living today. 
Analysing the interviewee’s accounts has revealed and acknowledged a 
narrative of successful integration in the UK, which has contributed to 
substantial feelings of belonging. The Kurds who consider Kurdistan as their 
homeland have expressively attached to their childhood memories, family roots 
and place of birth in Kurdistan. It was also discovered during the empirical 
research that interviewees often differentiated among the ‘new home’ and the 
‘old home’, or between both territories, thus representing the complex 
identification processes of a return diaspora. Carter (2005) expresses a 
territorial analysis of a connection among the diaspora and its territories. He 
expresses transcending the hybrid and diaspora identities that capture the 
multiplicity, and indicates the geopolitics of diaspora, which helps to understand 
the complex and ambiguous ways in which the territory is reconfigured through 
transnational practices.   
  
There are various reasons Kurdish returnees migrate back home, and these 
may be different from the reasons that caused them to leave home in the first 
place. The elements of returning are diverse, both in types and features, and 
can vary from simple individual concerns to those connected to the broader 
socio-economic and political parts of the departure and receiving territories of 
returnees. The causes for the majority of participants to return to Kurdistan who 
lived in different parts of the western countries included socioeconomic 
problems or matters such as unemployment and home connections, as well as 
reuniting with family members. Many Kurdish participant returnees discovered it 
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to be very difficult to settle and adjust to life in Kurdistan, particularly those who 
returned to the rural areas.  Sardar explained: 
 
“My family here (Kurdistan) always wanted me to be with 
them, so after 16 years I reunited with my family, but to be 
honest life here is very difficult, especially with the lack of 
the public services such as water, electricity, and 
healthcare, and the government doesn’t provide any 
support […] some time I want to go back to the UK but I 
can’t leave my mother behind. I hope I can find a job in a 
big city and settle” (Sardar 39:M).  
  
The most prominent factor that drove the majority of returnees to return to 
Kurdistan was the termination of the Saddam regime in 2003, and when the 
Prime Minister of the KRG, Nechirwan Barzani, restated his vision of being 
supportive of diaspora engagement in the Kurdish territory’s development, and 
to engage in the reconstruction process of the homeland. Since then, the Kurds 
in the diaspora have become dramatically associated in connecting to their 
states of settlement and Kurdish territory by shifting skills, capital, contacts and 
knowledge and “passing on concepts and values to the formerly isolated and 
undersupplied Kurdistan Region” (Emanuelsson 2008:24). Kurds who were 
living in diaspora had always hoped for an independent Kurdistan.   
 
In analysing the returnee’s interview data transcripts, the study discovered 
diverse decisions to return to Kurdistan. The majority of participants expressed 
two or more return ideas, and so I argue that their justifications for return are 
diverse and at the same time complex. The complexity that was raised by most 
participants, was that Kurdistan has not been recognised or has independent 
status, and they feel that this is a threat.  
 
The question of return for some respondents caused immense pressure living 
between two different cultures and belief systems, creating an environment 
where anxiety and depression grew. This often led to, or exacerbated, existing 
mental health issues, as Sarkewt explains: 
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“I find life here difficult, I think I have many problems with 
my head, I have seen too much and can’t go home, but I 
just don’t fit in here. I feel lonely, I don’t have a good job, I 
am not using my skills, I feel trapped especially in my 
head, it makes me feel so bad” (Sarkewt 36:M). 
  
Mental health issue’s especially depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress, 
are common in diaspora groups. Sarkewt’s statement above explains how he 
feels trapped not being able to return home, yet finding integration difficult and 
so leading to social exclusion. The percentages of respondents who either had 
or have mental health problems are high. 
 
Kurdish diasporans are a vulnerable group. For many first generation Kurds, the 
reasons they arrived at the host country was to flee the Baath party’s brutal 
regime, or to escape social and economic difficulties. The experiences that they 
have encountered and witnessed, often the journey to the host country, 
separation from family, friends, and a familiar cultural environment, arriving in 
an alien country with a different culture, and language barriers, have all 
reinforced, and in some cases exacerbated, mental health problems. 
Respondents who were second and third generation diaspora have differing 
social and cultural challenges, torn identities with a dual sense of belonging, 
family pressures to marry or go back to look after elderly parents, help with 
family businesses, or join the army, and these pressures with emotions of guilt 
attached to return or not to return, and failed return attempts, have put 
increased pressure on some respondents contributing to psychological health 
problems.  
 
Female diaspora returnees expressed concerns of gender stereotyping and 
pressures put upon them by their families to marry and conform to their 
homeland norms and values. For many who had experienced greater freedom 
of expression and opportunity in the west to lead a more independent lifestyle, 
the return to homeland was a traumatic and alienating experience, with feelings 
of suppression. This was more evident in second and third generation of 
diasporans who had been brought up in a western society and now had to 
conform to a country which did not have equal opportunities, especially in terms 
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of career aspirations. For some first generation female diasporans, returning to 
homeland was a positive experience, ending alienation from communities that 
they felt, whether imagined or real, excluded them. The freedom that return 
brought them was being part of a community where they contributed and felt 
valued, and had the support of the extended family network. The dichotomy of 
this is, for other first generation female diaspora living in the host country, that 
the separation from the extended family brought a new found freedom which 
liberated them, spending time with their husbands and bringing their children up 
without the influence and interference of family members. 
 
The different experiences between first- and second-generation diaspora was 
evident and influenced the intention and decision to return. The second 
generation-diasporans who grew up in the West had different aspirations to 
those of the first generation. For some, allegiance to the homeland was 
influenced by social media, with increased patriotism and a desire to contribute 
to the social and economic redevelopment of Kurdistan, and some respondents 
wanting to return to fight against ISIS, and the hope that one day Kurdistan 
would be an independent state. For other second-generation diasporans, the 
situation of the economy, education system, health provision and the 
infrastructure with political instability and increased vulnerability of safety and 
security of the region, gave cause for concern and reasons not to return on a 
permanent basis. Some second-generation respondents concurred that visiting 
on a regular basis was important to them and their children, but living in 
Kurdistan on a permanent basis was not an option. 
 
Second-generation diaspora who returned to homeland were sometimes 
confronted with hostility towards their newfound beliefs. Respondents 
interviewed said that often they were ridiculed by friends or family in their 
homeland, or treated with suspicion as having ‘westernised ideas and beliefs’. 
This was especially true in the work place, where some respondents 
complained of the frustration they felt in having skills and knowledge that they 
could not use, due to different norms and values in the homeland. There was a 
higher return to the host country by the second-generation of diaspora, who 
found living in a different culture too alienating and too far removed from the 
western culture that they grew up in. Limited choice in leisure facilities, gender 
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stereotyping, economic difficulties, freedom of speech and political activities 
were seen as challenges that could not be overcome. 
 
Although, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) does not have a specific 
department to identify talented Kurds in diaspora, the majority of participants 
return to Kurdistan through family and friend connections. People living in 
diaspora usually have a strong connection to their homeland and many children 
of the first generation return to Kurdistan, even though they were not born or 
raised there. One thing is certain, while there are diasporas in the western 
countries there will always be diasporas returning to homelands, whether that is 
on a permanent or temporary basis. Obtaining Western nationality is a major 
driver for Kurdish diasporans who are unable to have recognised status and 
nationality within their own territory in Kurdistan. For many this recognised 
status in a different country brings them freedom and security which they can 
only dream about in their homeland. Rizgar said with pride, “I am Kurdish-
British, I am proud to be so, I am free I can go anywhere, it’s like being born 
again” (Rizgar 46:M).  
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion  
 
The aim of this research has been to study the Kurdish diaspora in Devon, as a 
case study to contribute to the diaspora and migration fields. This thesis 
provides an understanding of the experiences and perceptions of returnees to 
the homeland, and contributes to the development of contemporary diaspora 
literature. This includes a critique of diaspora experiences such as identity, 
belonging, transnational home and homeland. This study provides detailed 
information on development among the diaspora through community 
engagement and the idea of wishing to return, placed in connection to 
contemporary discourses on integration and transnationalism. Moreover, the 
study discussed the significance of these social procedures for the ways social 
specialists can work with marginalized and disadvantaged people and endorse 
their struggle for equal citizenship beyond discriminatory and racist 
experiences. The participants react to ethnic discrimination in a range of ways 
including interpersonal discourses, strengthening differences among the self, 
and by deliberately ignoring racism. This research has contributed to the 
development of up to date current theoretical approaches to diaspora. It has 
been revealed that diaspora is partly inimitable and has its feature 
characteristics as well as similarities with other diaspora. This is why each 
ethnographic examination may lead to new theoretical developments in the field 
of diaspora.  
 
8.1 Experience in diaspora 
The experience of social exclusion and ethnic discrimination among the 
diasporic community in Devon is widespread. This study shows the day-to-day 
racism that is faced by the diasporic population, and the consequences of such 
a perception has been that the political and social relationship among resident 
people and diasporans have become largely ethnicised. The War on Terror, the 
invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the rise of ISIS, as well as Brexit has 
further aggravated circumstances for diasporans and consequently reinforced 
day-to-day ethnic and racial boundaries in the society.  This experience was 
furthermore compounded with several research participants who highlighted 
that these processes of ‘otherisation’ are not limited to the Middle-East, but also 
haunt them in the UK in their everyday encounter with some people with 
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Iranian, Turkish and Arab backgrounds who reject the idea of the Kurdish 
identity. Rejections to accept the legitimacy of a Kurdish national identity only 
serve to strengthen ethnic Kurdish nationalism, fostering a reactive and 
defensive identity among those people who encounter these discriminatory 
practices. 
 
This study examines diasporans’ experience in a rural host city that has seen a 
large increase in a BME community, driven by the NASS dispersion policy of 
the UK government, which has further compounded racism. Many of the 
respondents interviewed recounted their first experience of a host community as 
being an unknown destination, with shared experiences of an often violent exit 
from their homeland and an uncertain future. Diasporans were driven by a lack 
of localised support, and the commonality of maintaining a cultural awareness 
to develop their own support networks and community frameworks in host 
communities. Keeping Kurdishness alive was seen as of primary importance to 
participants, and related to the experience in diaspora. Many participants 
vocalised that living in diaspora gave them space and opportunity to be 
‘Kurdish’, to practise and follow ideologies and political freedoms denied to 
them in their ancestral homeland.  
 
This study has shown that cultural differences in local communities have 
presented positive and negative experiences in diaspora, that present 
challenges to diaspora, especially gender related, with females experiencing a 
high level of racism especially when wearing Islamic/traditional dress. This 
study explored ‘everyday racism’; the current literature does not focus on lived 
day-to-day experiences in a host country. Respondents often underreported 
incidents of verbal and physical abuse which they believed was due to a lack of 
knowledge from the local community, fuelled by the media which compounded 
negativity towards asylum seekers and refugee. This study illustrates that the 
demographics of Devon, a rural county, has had a significant impact of diaspora 
experiences with hidden racism. The contribution of data supports the incidents 
of day-to-day racism. Further research could be carried out to establish 
changes in racism in the light of Brexit, and which diaspora groups, or indeed 
how different religions experience this greater day-to-day racism. This said, the 
high number of racist incidents towards both male and female diasporas have 
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not deterred respondents who believed their challenges in their ancestral 
homeland have made them strong enough to accept them.  
 
This study illustrates that intercultural integration in the host community has 
benefited many respondents, allowing them space to build and improve 
relationships in the diaspora community and their homeland. Many experiences 
have been in dual societies with the cultural integration in the context of 
acculturation allowing contact and integration in both the host country and 
ancestral homeland. 
 
8.2 Identity and belonging  
There are multiple forms of identity in diaspora, and multiple places that can be 
called home. I have studied Kurdistan during a period of increasing autonomy. 
This has enabled me to examine some familiar questions in the diaspora 
studies field – like home, identity, belonging, and engagement, and have 
through an innovative and rigorous case study collated research material from 
participants who openly discuss their individual experiences.  This study has 
shown that the Kurdish diaspora are proud of their allegiance to their ancestral 
homeland. Several participants indicated that identities are hybridized, with a 
mixture of two or more cultures. This is primarily due to the impact of the 
cultural encounters and the influence of British or western society. This cultural 
hybridity indicates dualised circumstances, such as dual languages and the 
mutuality of cultures. As the data demonstrates, many participants like Said 
claim to “have two identities” or find themselves “in-between”. This bridge 
makes it easier to settle in to UK society.   
 
The results from this study indicate that holding British citizenship does not 
guarantee acceptance as being British, due to Britishiness being constructed in 
every-day life in essentialist terms. In these terms appearance, name, culture 
and history were evoked as essential markers of the British identity. This study 
has also shown that the participants’ experiences of an exclusive Britishness 
can have a significant impact on their understanding of their everyday lives and 
identity formation in the UK. The study results also indicate that identity and 
belonging in diaspora is more than having an affiliation/attachment to the host 
country, it is about attaining an identity, which was denied in their ancestral 
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homeland. In particular, this research provides an understanding of the Kurdish 
diaspora in Devon, with reference to their experiences of identity, integration 
and return. Inter-cuturalisation and multiculturalism provides diaspora people 
with the opportunity to strengthen their ethnic identity:  
 
“Cross-border connections may be making the identities of those in 
diaspora more fluid, hybrid and `in-between' as they actively strive to 
maintain symbolic and material links to their territorial homeland” 
(Mavroudi 2005:3).  
 
The study highlights the fact that identity is changeable, fluid and not fixed in the 
relationship between the people and the surrounding environment. Many of the 
participants demonstrated that holding British citizenship did not guarantee 
acceptance as being British, as Britishness was constructed in day-to-day life in 
essential characteristics:  
 
“Maintaining racism and discrimination against certain ethnic groups is a 
way for the dominant ethnic groups in the host societies to sustain and 
reinforce their self-perception and identity” (Khayati 2008:249).  
 
The participants confronted ethnic discrimination in a range of ways, including 
interpersonal discourses, strengthening differences among the self and other, 
and deliberately ignoring racism.  
  
The data from participants interviewed demonstrates that belonging to place 
and identity are in relation to home and where the participant’s family are 
residing. It has demonstrated the beneficial use of combining geographical and 
diasporic perspectives in a study that is committed to partially unravelling 
historicized and dynamic power tensions, relations, resistances and 
subjectivities through space and time. Some participants said that it was of 
greater significance to have the family living together, this then became home 
with a sense of belonging and identity to society. A large proportion of 
interviewees felt they had dual identities, wanting to retain the identity of their 
parents or their own place of birth as well as their diaspora society. Participants 
had an allegiance to both host and homeland and wanted their own children to 
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retain dual identity though for some returning to homeland was not considered 
an option. 
 
The term Kurdishness has been used consistently among Kurdish communities, 
political party speeches in diaspora, as well as in Kurdistan. This identity of 
Kurdishness or Kurdayati has been highly developed in the diaspora. The 
Kurdish diasporan outside of Kurdistan attempted to achieve a more coherent 
identity and rediscovered a deep Kurdish identity (Griffiths 2002). The 
transnational exchanges between Kurdistan and the UK give an increase to a 
diasporic space that bridges the two societies. Geography is central to creating 
a national identity, due to national identities being usually anchored in territories 
(Eliassi 2015). Many participants identified territorial identity as being an 
important part of the struggle for recognition and independence.  
 
The consequences of this research could be developed further by expanding 
the concept of cultural identity change in the social and cultural experience 
context through continued research on the ethnographic background, including 
distinctive thoughts regarding Kurdishness and Britishness, and how they vary, 
and what social and cultural components they consider Kurdish and British 
respectively. Moreover, further research could be conducted regarding the 
informants in this study, in the wake of returning to the ancestral homeland, or 
different informants who have already retuned to the ancestral homeland, and 
what will happen to their identity. In addition, the difficulties that they will 
confront in a changing society, with particular regard to gender identity from 
westernised ideals, cultures and traditions acquired in the host society and in 
conforming to ancestral traditional values in the homeland. These could result in 
significant impacts on their notions of identity.  
 
The study results indicate that holding British citizenship did not guarantee 
acceptance as British due to Britishness being constructed in every-day life in 
essentialist terms. In these terms, appearance, name, culture and history were 
evoked as essential markers of the British identity. This study has also shown 
that the participants’ experiences of an exclusive Britishness can have a 
significant impact on their understanding of their everyday lives and identity 
formation in the UK. The study results also indicate that identity and belonging 
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in diaspora is more than having an affiliation/attachment to host country, it is 
about attaining an identity, which was denied in the ancestral homeland.  
 
8.3 Community engagement  
Community engagement and community cohesion have become focal points for 
government policy. The findings of my data, clearly illustrate that within local 
government, particularly in Plymouth, there is a lack of policy that is in line with 
national policy and has no clear strategic plan. This lack of resource has 
created mistrust among diasporans, believing that the lack of community 
strategy is a deterrent to community engagement. The diaspora literature does 
not examine the consequences of not having a community engagement policy, 
and in particular it does not examine this when there is a national policy that is 
not implemented locally. This study has examined the consequences of a lack 
of community engagement policy, what is the primary consequence a lack of 
trust. The concept of integration as a common procedure challenges the notion 
that it is the prevailing subjects who have admittance to power in discourses 
with regards to the diasporans. It is also the prevailing subjects who choose the 
extent to which diasporans can be incorporated or prohibited in British society. 
Diaspora groups are often described by public and private sector agencies as 
‘hard to reach’. However, participants’ data shows that the integration may be 
motivated by a desire to contribute to the community cohesion policies and 
establish a cultural connection within the place of residence. Many participants 
are involved within their local community to actively engage and participate with 
the new host society. The data shows that engagement with black and ethnic 
minorities is a slow process and takes time to build connections and trust 
amongst diaspora groups, this is compounded with the lack of a localised 
diversity policy and with training. 
 
The way we characterise the boundaries of ethnicities makes ground for the 
ways we comprehend multiculturalism. Distinguishing how the boundaries of the 
country or the predominant group are built, empowers us to demolish those 
group boundaries and demonstrate the conceivable outcomes of new drawings 
of group boundaries that are not exclusive and unbending, but rather more 
adaptable and receptive to the progressions and the elements of the population 
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and the political balance in our social societies. This procedure acknowledges 
that citizenship should be renegotiated. 
 
Acculturation and integration from the informant’s point of view have different 
dimensions. Many British citizens view immigration as a positive influence that 
enriches our culture and communities. It brings diversity and a wealth of cultural 
experiences to the UK. Integration is also a dynamic process, with vicious as 
well as virtuous circles. A tolerant and diverse society can more readily 
accommodate not only people who want to fit in, but also those who are keen to 
be different. The contribution of the Kurdish diaspora, especially the first 
generation to the local host community and new arrivals, is seen by some 
respondents as a significant factor in successful integration. This is played out 
in numerous ways, impacting on the local economy and culture within the host 
society. Respondents acknowledged that without the foundations established by 
the first generation of diaspora it would have presented more challenges for 
cohesion and inclusion. 
 
In addition to integration, some of the results of this research demonstrate that 
integration symbolises the Kurdish first generation diasporans’ willingness to 
firstly survive, and afterward to succeed, with integration into a new society. 
Integration is accordingly characterised as a consistent procedure of a 
diasporans engagement within the place of residence, but additionally is 
impacted by past dynamics as experienced in the society of origin. The 
procedure of inclusion in a new country is transversely accounted by referring to 
past experiences of exclusion or inclusion. In such a manner, the question of 
disintegration inside the ancestral homeland, particularly the period of the Iraqi 
regime under Saddam Hussein, the absence and the lack of trustful 
organizations, and the random violence, obliged individuals to rediscover new 
perspectives, for example, their group and ethnic gatherings while searching for 
support, help and assets.  
 
Kurdish stories of settlement in western countries reflect the contradictory 
experiences between the present and the past. As indicated by research 
participants, once settled in the UK, the need to get to know the host society 
has been portrayed as a gradual process of insertion described by a recovering 
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of trust in authorities while adapting and coping with traumatic occasions of the 
past. In such a manner, integration is a complex procedure, which happens in a 
specific neighbourhood setting, however nourished by past memories. This 
research has been supported by the need to develop an empirical study that 
understands both the diversity of diasporans’ experiences within the 
communities, and the complexity of the processes of integration and 
transnationalism, in order to contribute to the goals of advancing diaspora 
engagement and social inclusion at the local level. In this regard, the findings 
add to a growing body of literature on integration and transnationalism. 
 
In Plymouth, the Kurdish diaspora has made significant efforts not only to 
integrate, but also to find employment or to start their own businesses. Most of 
the Kurdish people have expressed a desire to return to their own country and 
hope that one day there will be an independent Kurdistan. Some of those that 
have returned are able to use the skills they have learned in the UK to be able 
to secure worthwhile employment, other second generation Kurds can feel 
alienated from their original culture. Women in particular can experience a 
sense of loss of freedoms that they have enjoyed in the West. Many Kurdish 
people however accept the notion of a dual nationality and have made lives for 
themselves in the UK but still maintain links with their homeland through 
holidays and trips to maintain contact with their families and culture. This is 
especially important for young children who were born here but can often 
experience the greatest feelings of alienation. It has to be accepted however 
that the Kurdish diaspora is here to stay, and like the other people that have 
arrived on these shores, will eventually become part of a multicultural Britain. 
 
As study participants indicate, the movement of people crossing borders in 
search of safety, security and increased opportunities has increased, policy 
makers are faced with the challenge of migration policies from a narrow vision 
of control within the wider vision of management. There are quite distinctive 
characteristic differences between new arrivals and the ethnic groups 
established in settled communities. The new community feels excluded to the 
new environment as a result of cultural differences including representations, 
their voices not being heard because of language barriers. Limitations in 
understanding the laws and culture in a place of residence was seen by some 
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first generations of diaspora as barriers to community engagement. Many of the 
participants were proud of their roots but identified that changes were needed 
due to the different social and cultural environments if they wished to assimilate 
into a new host society. 
 
The results of this study could be developed further by expanding the concept 
of community engagement policy, the building of bridges of trust in the social 
and cultural experience context by continued research on the ethnographic 
background, including distinctive thoughts regarding integration, cohesion and 
the acceptance of being British, and how they vary and to what social and 
cultural components they consider in living together. Moreover, further studies 
could be conducted regarding the informants in this study in the wake of 
awareness of different diaspora groups who arriving to a new society and what 
has happened to them after arriving. In addition, the difficulties that they will 
confront in a changing society, with particular regard to cultural difference and 
norms and values. 
 
8.4 Return 
This research indicates that there is not enough literature on women and 
children’s experiences of return in the diaspora. In particular the experiences of 
women and children returning from western to non-western contexts and the 
freedoms they leave behind, is neglected in current scholarship. In addition, this 
study outlines women’s and children’s experiences, characterised by feeling 
forced, disappointment, and frustrated. 
 
When diasporans return they take with them their experience of living outside 
the homeland, including values, skills and relationships. Returning diasporans 
were keen to use their new knowledge and experiences gained in host nations 
in supporting the building of a new Kurdistan. This extended knowledge and 
skills base was seen by those interviewed to bring new opportunities to their 
returnee communities and the wider regions, but it was felt that it can also bring 
alienation and mistrust. Some diaspora have feelings of guilt for leaving 
Kurdistan in the first place, and then guilt for returning either because the reality 
of life in the host country  did not match preconceived ideas and returning has a 
stigma of failure or has encountered mistrust from friends and family as being 
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‘Westernized’. Gender played a significant part in attitudes towards return. 
Christou and King’s (2011) research has highlighted “diasporic imaginaries and 
mobilities, including rootedness and rootlessness, are experienced differently by 
men and women” (287). The decision to return was predominately a male 
decision while female returnees did so with little alternative, women who felt 
liberated from the social norms and gender roles expected of them from their 
extended families, experienced freedom in the host countries away from the 
matriarchal influence. The decision to return was not self-determining, this also 
applied to young people who had little choice on the decision to return, for many 
experiencing the freedom and autonomy in the westernised host land created 
challenges in the homeland where women and children faced alienation within 
their own communities, with some being regarded with suspicion and mistrust 
as being perceived to be westernised.  
 
The idea of the intention to return might be more readily adapted than the idea 
of diaspora, while analysing a more extensive transnational practice of Kurds 
and exploring their integration and transnational processes. Along these lines, 
this study contends that the dreams to return might be viewed as a productive 
idea both in diaspora and refugees studies, when managing inquiries of 
homeland and the examination of the notion of return. A few participants had 
returned back to their ancestral homeland for the first time and some of them 
had returned after quite a while living in the UK. An idealised picture of the 
imaginary country, Kurdistan was broadly held however after visiting south 
Kurdistan some participants indicated that their returning acted to demystify this 
admired and lost paradise of south Kurdistan. These journeys can be 
comprehended concerning their encounters of not being acknowledged and 
accepted as British and the vulnerability of the UK as their country or homeland. 
Verification of home and homeland is a social procedure that is arranged in 
political connections and structures yet it is likewise a social procedure where 
the overwhelming society constitutes a critical gathering of people. It is essential 
that belonging and citizenship are detached from ethnic ideas of Britishness in 
light of the fact that this is the fundamental motivation behind why diasporians 
with Kurdish backgrounds experience feelings of rejection.  
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In the case of the Kurdish diaspora, the return was frozen for a considerable 
amount of time, and turned into a plausibility to return after the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003. Initially participants reflected on a return to visit their homeland before 
making a full decision to return as permanent. The temporary return is not 
based on the unknown, instead it is constructed and deconstructed through 
well-organised links or contacts, visits and data, connecting the Kurdish 
diaspora to the crosswise societies of settlement and the society of ancestry. 
Indeed, even those Kurds who did not express any longing to do a reversal to 
Kurdistan, because of their traumatic encounters and absence of close social 
contacts, concluded that temporary visits could be an attractive idea for the 
future. 
 
The thoughts of return go beyond the mere nation-state discourse, however for 
all intents and purposes they intertwine with local opportunities. The return is 
always spatially set in contexts of personal identification that refer to localities 
such as towns or cities characterised by strong familial responsibilities and 
capabilities. In the meantime, the arrival can likewise be an issue of financial 
intentions particularly when managing recovered properties or new companies. 
In both cases, assessments of return may likewise be driven by sentiments of 
blame, which have persecuted people during their exile.  
 
The new millennium has seen a significant increase in global 
diaspora/migration. Global diasporans have made a significant contribution to 
the political, economic, and cultural life in many sending and receiving 
countries, and almost every society has been influenced by diaspora/migration. 
Diaspora more than at any other time has become a greatly contentious issue 
within the political arena, with fierce supporters on both sides. Several countries 
have started to launch new up to date diaspora/immigration policies and 
regulatory barriers for diaspora and migration, and as a result are making 
international diaspora/migration more difficult with a rigid selection process.  
 
The world’s economic crisis has raised a platform for the increase in 
nationalism, with migrants being the targeted scapegoat. This study has also 
shown that the Kurds in diaspora are playing an important role in promoting 
relationship, skills and trade between their host and origin countries. It is also 
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important that the UK government and KRG take the lead, but work in 
connection with other non-government stakeholders in designing policies of 
engaging the diaspora. This is due to the process of managing diaspora people 
involving cross-bordering to access opportunities that enhance their livelihoods. 
The diaspora population consists of some highly educated and skilled people 
that could have a significant impact if they could transfer some of that 
knowledge and expertise back home in order to develop Kurdistan. Diasporans 
return with hopes and aspirations to build a new better Kurdistan, creating their 
idealised society with long distance imagination created in the host land. The 
new period of stability in South Kurdistan has enabled some participants to feel 
optimistic over the possibility of being part of a change mechanism.   
 
It is important to remember that whatever one’s stance on diaspora is, real 
individuals’ lives are affected. Diaspora will continue to be a subject that is 
debated, for society to continue to grow, so must the ebb and flow of migration. 
This study is a way to claim that contemporary diasporas are not uniquely about 
the experience of oppression and trauma in the ancestral homeland, but also 
about concrete and tangible network formations and activities that take place in 
both time and space. The results of this research could be developed further by 
expanding the concept of return with special consideration of the changing 
dynamics running parallel, both in political and economic terms, with the 
increase and decrease of economies, and the evolving and changing political 
scene, such as with the current war with ISIS and recent decision of the UK to 
leave the EU.  
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Appendix 
 
Research Participants 
Name Gander Age 
Ali Male 44 
Kani Female 28 
Hersh Male 30 
Omar Male 44 
Qader Male 39 
Hewa Male 32 
Safeen Male 23 
Hoshyar Male 38 
Yassien Male 23 
Shilan Female 29 
Rizgar Male 46 
Nasreen Female 23 
Renas Male 37 
Aree Male 29 
Bewar Male 25 
Rezan Male 36 
Paree Female 29 
Mustafa Male 35 
Kamyar Male 20 
Roken Female 19 
Bashir Male 24 
Kader Male 47 
Amir Male 39 
Karwan Male 38 
Ala Female 28 
Alan Male 29 
Amin Male 31 
Adel Male 39 
Sami Male 27 
Baroj Male 33 
Zakria Male 38 
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Harem Male 26 
Saman Male 23 
Sheelan Female 24 
Delshad Male 29 
Aveen Female 18 
Hiresh Male 19 
Said Male 37 
Bayan Female 26 
Hemen Male 33 
Ahmed Male 33 
Kardo Male 19 
Ava Female 18 
Deldar Male 21 
Hajeen Female 20 
Barzan Male 28 
Saywan Male 36 
Khani Male 20 
Nareen Female 21 
Kovan Male 23 
Awaz Female 29 
Ashti Male 38 
Banaz Female 33 
Hazem Male 27 
Karokh Male 22 
Befreen Female 32 
Ibrahim Male 30 
Layla Female 23 
Rekan Male 20 
Awat Male 31 
Mala Male 23 
Warina Female 32 
Saleh Male 37 
Evan Female 29 
Hardi Male 29 
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Nazdar Female 25 
Sania Female 29 
Paree Female 29 
Rebin Male 26 
Rashid Male 22 
Tara Female 32 
Neyaz Male 29 
Kazem Male 35 
Sarvin Female 27 
Kadir Male 30 
Araz Male 28 
Khalil Male 35 
Adnan Male 29 
Barwan Male 33 
Ronia Female 18 
Barin Female 30 
Asmer Female 33 
Donya Female 27 
Delawer Male 25 
Suzan Female 39 
Warvan Male 19 
Kamal Male 29 
Ronia Female 18 
Aziz Male 29 
Ronak Female 29 
Karima Female 31 
Ayub Male 22 
Taher Male 53 
Khazal Female 35 
Hawker Male 46 
Azet Male 33 
Avin Female 27 
Samira Female 23 
Mevan Male 26 
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Goran Male 30 
Kawani Male 55 
Rawand Male 25 
Sardar Male 39 
Sarkewt Male 36 
Karen Community worker 
Peter Community leader 
Janathon Community worker 
Jacky Community worker 
Graeme Police officer 
Martin shopkeeper 
Keith Police officer 
Roya Community leader 
Dave Fire officer 
Ann Community worker 
Chris Police officer 
Susan Community worker 
 
 
 
 
